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Case Law Alerts

County Court Denies Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, Alleging Bad Faith Handling, Based on Insurer’s Confession of Judgment and Failure to Cure Civil Remedy Notice Within 60 Days.

Gulf Coast Injury Centers, LLC a/a/o Craig Jorden v. Allstate Ins. Co., County Court, 13th Judicial Circuit Hillsborough County, Case No: 2021-CC-115756

January 1, 2024

The instant suit involved a dispute for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, extended medical payment benefits, penalty, postage, interest, costs and attorney’s fees. After suit was filed, the court issued a General Differentiated Case Management Order, establishing the deadlines in the suit and setting a projected trial date of May 2023. 

Once suit was filed, defense counsel attempted to confer with plaintiff’s counsel. These attempts were ignored, and approximately eight days after defense counsel’s attempts to confer, the plaintiff filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) with the Florida Department of Financial Services. A response to the CRN was timely filed by Allstate. 

Throughout the life of the case, Allstate made more attempts to confer with the plaintiff, all of which were ignored. Finally, Allstate filed a confession of judgment for $1,549.64, stipulating to the plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees and costs. Following the confession of judgment, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to supplement and/or amend the complaint for statutory bad faith pursuant to Section 625.155, Florida Statutes. The proposed amended complaint alleged bad faith claims handling, alleging that Allstate did not attempt to cure the CRN within 60 days, after which it filed a confession. 

In deciding whether to grant the amendment, the court analyzed Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190 as well as the standards established by case law in which an amendment may be granted if the court finds that: (1) granting the amendment does not prejudice the opposing party; (2) the privilege to amend has not been abused; and (3) the amendment is not futile. 

With regard to prejudice, the court found that the amendment would prejudice the defendant as the suit had been pending for 19 months and every deadline in the Case Management Order had elapsed. The court also noted that the plaintiff was not precluded from filing a separate cause of action for bad faith should it choose to do so. 

In analyzing whether the privilege to amend had been abused, the court found that the plaintiff’s actions demonstrated “the precise abuse that is intended to be prevented.” The court also took issue with the fact that the plaintiff filed its CRN after litigation had commenced, as opposed to before. The court also took issue with the plaintiff’s actions in ignoring all of Allstate’s attempts to amicably settle the suit, thus, forcing the confession of judgment. 

In analyzing futility, the court noted that the proposed amended complaint would be subject to dismissal as it was legally insufficient, thus, making the amendment futile. This was because the plaintiff did not comply with Fla. Stat. 624.155, which requires a CRN to state with specificity the facts giving rise to the violation, along with the specific policy language relevant to the violation and the specific statutory language that has allegedly been violated. In analyzing the CRN, the court found that it did not satisfy the requirements of Section 624.155, thus, barring the plaintiff from being able to bring a bad faith claim against Allstate. Accordingly, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion. 

This order should prove to be a boon for carriers defending against PIP suits in which plaintiffs attempt to use boilerplate Civil Remedy Notices as further leverage to force settlement. As this is a common strategy utilized by certain plaintiff firms in Florida, this order should give carriers a useful tool to defend themselves against these sort of scorched-earth litigation tactics. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 1st Quarter, January 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.