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Defense Digest

After Further Review: Manufacturers & Sellers Incidental Contacts and their Impact on Venue

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by John P. Kelly

Key Points:

  • A manufacturer and seller of retail goods should seek a transfer of venue if their online sales in the plaintiff’s selected forum generate limited revenue for the company.
  • The mere act of online sales in a Commonwealth forum does not give rise to laying venue where these sales occur – the actions of the manufacturer or seller must also be deemed continuous, habitual, and systemic in that venue.
  • Where a manufacturer or seller has no physical presence in the forum – such as brick‑and‑mortar locations, in‑state sales representatives, or the licenses and authorizations required to conduct business in Pennsylvania – it may possess a strong basis for arguing that venue is improper.

In today’s world of online advertisement and sales, manufacturers and sellers are seemingly serving forums at an increasing level. This trend is here to stay, as consumers across the nation and Commonwealth are adapting to, and addicted to, the ease of online shopping. As discussed below, the capacity to sell goods online has resulted in an ever-evolving, liability concern: forum shopping and unfavorable venues.

While online shopping may be a boon for the consumer, it raises concerns for manufacturers and sellers of goods. Mainly, how does the nature of a manufacturer’s and seller’s online presence impact its prospective liability in forums across the Commonwealth? After all, the reality of serving consumers in Philadelphia County or Lackawanna County creates a range of exposure more dire than, say, Clinton County or Columbia County. The nature of online sales was recently addressed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Watson v. Baby Trend, Inc., 308 A.3d 860 (Pa. Super. 2024). While the purchase involved in Watson occurred in a retail store – Babies “R” Us – in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, the nature of the manufacturer’s online sales formed the basis of the plaintiff’s decision to select the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas as the forum to file suit.

The Watson case was brought as a result of the plaintiffs’ infant daughter dying of asphyxiation while sleeping in a car seat manufactured by the the defendant, Baby Trend. An amended complaint was filed in October of 2021, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, bringing products liability/strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty claims against Baby Trend. Later that month, Baby Trend filed preliminary objections, asserting that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas was not the proper venue for suit.

Baby Trend argued Philadelphia was an improper venue as it did not own real estate in Philadelphia County, the car seat was not purchased in Philadelphia County, the tragic incident itself did not occur in Philadelphia County, and, most importantly, Baby Trend did not conduct substantial, continuous, and systemic business activities in Philadelphia County.

In this regard, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas analyzed Baby Trend’s sales data under the well-established “quality-quantity” venue test. As noted in previous Superior Court precedent, “[a] business entity must perform acts in a county of sufficient quality and quantity before venue in that county will be established.” Zampana-Barry v. Donaghue, 921 A.2d 500, 503 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasis added).

Baby Trend’s business model is largely to sell its goods through big-box retailers, such as Walmart and Target. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas determined that roughly 99% of its sales occurred through big-box retailers. While it did have an online presence, this only comprised 1% of its sales revenues. The plaintiffs attempted to use Baby Trend’s online sales in Philadelphia County as proof that their acts were of a sufficient “quality and quantity” to justify their selected venue. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas ultimately rejected this argument, sustaining the defendant’s preliminary objections, and transferred suit to Bucks County in August of 2022. As a result of that decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court narrowed its review of the trial court’s decision by further analyzing Baby Trend’s sales data and its applicability to the “quality-quantity” test. The Superior Court described the 1% of online sales directed to Philadelphia County consumers as incidental and de minimis. Thus, the quality prong was not satisfied. This is a big takeaway as it provides manufacturers with a clear-cut data point as to what kind of impact their online sales will have in relation to the forum they may expect to be haled into.

Further, the Superior Court reasoned that the quality-quantity test was not satisfied because Baby Trend did not own real estate in Philadelphia; did not have a place of business there; did not employ sales representatives there; did not own licenses, authorizations, or registrations from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and was not registered as a foreign corporation for the purpose of doing business in Philadelphia. Thus, the court determined that Baby Trend’s contacts in Philadelphia did not support suit in the forum because the evidence suggested that its contacts with Philadelphia were incidental by nature and would not be seen as continuous, habitual, or regular.

The Honorable Terrence R. Nealon of the Lackawanna Court of Common Pleas relied on Watson in a case currently being handled by our Scranton, PA office. While our preliminary objections to venue were overruled in that matter, Judge Nealon based his decision on the fact that an individual defendant had been properly named – making venue proper under Pa. R.C.P. 1006(a)(1). However, in his decision, Judge Nealon cited Watson as authority on proper venue, ultimately reasoning that the parties would have been directed to engage in venue discovery – as they did in Watson – to properly determine if the defendant’s actions in Lackawanna County were continuous, general, or habitual. See Celli v. Endless Mountains Extended Care, LLC, 2024 WL 4182838 (C.P. Lacka. Sept. 12, 2024).

Thus, Watson serves as a significant Pennsylvania decision for determining proper forum/venue for cases brought against manufacturers and sellers. Plaintiffs often seek to establish venue in plaintiff-friendly forums, aided by tenuous connections to the forum. However, Watson provides the defense bar with a myriad of arguments to combat these efforts, particularly in the context of retail liability.

John works in our Scranton, PA office. He can be reached at (570) 496-4640 or JPKelly@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.