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Results

  • Summary Judgment for Spa in Wrongful Death Case Involving Whirlpool.

    We obtained summary judgment in a wrongful death case arising from an alleged drowning in a whirlpool at a spa. The decedent, a 73-year-old woman, was found unresponsive by a lifeguard in the client’s whirlpool. There was no evidence as to how long the decedent had been submerged in the hot tub before she was found. The Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy and listed the decedent’s primary cause of death as hypertensive and arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, with cardiomegaly. Drowning was listed as a significant contributing factor. The plaintiff argued that our client was negligent by positioning the lifeguard in such a manner that the lifeguard would not have a direct line of sight to the bottom of the whirlpool from the lifeguard station, and that, had the plaintiff been discovered earlier, she could have been resuscitated. The defense produced an expert liability report stating that the client was in compliance with all applicable codes and standards. The defense also presented an expert medical report from a cardiologist who opined that the plaintiff suffered sudden cardiac death and could not have been resuscitated. Plaintiff’s counsel relied upon the Medical Examiner’s conclusions to prove medical causation and did not serve a liability report. Without reaching the issue of liability, the court found that the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof on medical causation. The plaintiff could not simply rely upon the Medical Examiner’s conclusions as to the cause of death as he is not an expert in cardiology.

  • Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Successfully Argue Before the Delaware Supreme Court.

    Following oral argument heard en banc, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion upholding the application of the Continuing Storm Doctrine, resulting in the affirmation of the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment to our client. 

  • Plaintiff’s Case Goes to the Dogs.

    We obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial in Pennsylvania. The defendant was walking her Labrador Retriever, along with her five-year-old cousin. She entrusted the leash to her cousin, who promptly lost grip on the leash, allowing the dog to escape. The dog ran in the direction of the plaintiff and his Shih Tzu, with the defendant in pursuit. The plaintiff claimed that the Labrador Retriever jumped on his chest, knocking him to the ground and causing compression fractures in his lumbar spine. The injuries were confirmed by the defense IME. The defendant, on the other hand, claimed that she was able to regain control of the retriever before any contact with the plaintiff, and she testified that the plaintiff lost his balance and fell after becoming entangled in his own dog’s leash. The defense argued that the plaintiff’s injuries were the result of his failure to maintain control over his own dog, not because of negligence on the part of the defendant. The jury accepted the defendant’s version of the event and found in her favor.  

  • Product Liability Case Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Over a National Corporation

    In this complex lawsuit, the plaintiff suffered traumatic injury when the steering column of his tractor trailer became unyoked, rendering it uncontrollable and causing it to crash. The manufacturer is a Delaware LLC headquartered in North Carolina, but it manufactured the truck at its plant in Virginia. The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, crashed while driving it in Texas. The suit was filed in Philadelphia, as the LLC’s sole corporate parent is a Pennsylvania corporation. Based upon that, the plaintiff argued that the LLC should be deemed a citizen of Pennsylvania. The trial court sustained our preliminary objections due to lack of jurisdiction. We briefed and argued the appeal the plaintiff filed with the Superior Court, which affirmed on the basis that, despite its Pennsylvania parent, the LLC itself is not “at home” in Pennsylvania because it is formed and headquartered elsewhere. Therefore, there is no general personal jurisdiction over it.

  • Summary Judgment for Marshall Dennehey Client Only, in Multi-defendant Action.

    We obtained summary judgment in a general liability case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was an employee of a recently-renovated resort when a solid wooden panel fell down and struck her in the head, causing serious injuries. The plaintiff alleged improper design, manufacture, and installation of the panel against a number of the defendant contractors and subcontractors. It was unclear as to which defendant actually installed the panel. However, there was testimony that the panel had fallen down after the renovations were completed and that the resort’s maintenance employees had possibly re-installed the panel before it fell the second time, striking the plaintiff. There was no evidence of record that our client had any role in the design of the panel. The judge granted summary judgment as to our client only on a case where the plaintiff will be putting over $2 million on the board at trial. 

  • Summary Judgment for Wellhead Manufacturer

    We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a wellhead manufacturer in a product liability matter pending in Western Pennsylvania. The plaintiff drill operator alleged a wellhead was defectively designed, causing oil and gas to escape during operation, which led to a fire at the well site. The plaintiff asserted economic losses in excess of $1.4 million. We successfully argued that the plaintiff failed to elicit sufficient expert opinion to support the defect claim and also spoliated evidence in discarding the subject wellhead.

  • Superior Court Reaffirms “Hills and Ridges” Doctrine, Per Defense Argument.

    We argued successfully before the Pennsylvania Superior Court on behalf of a commercial real estate developer. The case involved a probation officer who fell and badly injured himself during a blizzard. The demand was in excess of $4 million. In its decision that reaffirms the “Hills and Ridges Doctrine,” the court reiterated our argument that, in essence, our client had no duty to remove snow and ice while it was still snowing. The court went further and held that no landowner has a duty to “pre-treat” their premises, and there is no duty to salt or place sand on parking lots during a storm or IMMEDATELY thereafter. It also reaffirmed that oral contracts for snow and ice removal are valid. 

  • NY Labor Law Case Won by Motion for Summary Judgement

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an owner and tenant where plaintiff alleged violation of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) and 200 when he fell off a ladder at the premises. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated these Labor Law sections in failing to provide him with a secure ladder and adequate safety devices while he was working on the alarm system at the premises. Defendants contended that the activity that the plaintiff was performing constituted maintenance and not repair of the alarm system and therefore was not an activity covered under the Labor Law. Defendants further contended that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident by taking and using a ladder from the premises without the permission of the owner or tenant instead of using a ladder from the service truck that he brought to the premises Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under Labor Law §240(1) was denied and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing all Labor Law and common law claims was granted.  

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.