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Results

  • Claims Barred Under New Jersey's Charitable Immunity Doctrine.

    We obtained summary judgment in the Passaic County Superior Court of New Jersey on behalf of a non-profit shelter for battered women. The plaintiff, who was staying at the shelter at the time of her alleged incident, accused the shelter of negligence with regard to removing snow and ice from their parking lot. The plaintiff attempted to argue that she was not a “beneficiary” of the shelter but was a volunteer, who was not required to help but who chose to work at the shelter in exchange for room and board. Defense counsel successfully argued that the defendant was a qualified non-profit organization and that the plaintiff was clearly benefiting from the non-profit at the time of her incident. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims were barred under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity doctrine.

  • Defense Verdict in Deli Case Premises Liability Lawsuit.

    Obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a supermarket in a premises liability case in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff claimed that she was injured when her hand was trapped in a deli case door that was closed by an inattentive employee. She claimed that in an attempt to free her hand from the deli case, she suffered an injury to her shoulder and her neck. MRI scans after the incident did show degenerative disc disease in her neck, as well as multiple herniated discs. Her treating orthopedic surgeon attributed the injuries to the incident in question and recommended a cervical fusion. Through investigation, we learned that the plaintiff had filed a lawsuit in New York as a result of a fall in 2007. We obtained a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition from the prior lawsuit, which indicated that her treating physician in the New York case had recommended the same health care procedures that had been recommended after this incident. The jury did find the employee who closed the deli case door on the plaintiff’s hand to be negligent. The jury also found that the plaintiff was negligent in sticking her hand in the area of an open deli case and that the plaintiff’s negligence outweighed the defendant’s negligence, barring her recovery. 

  • Summary Judgment for Spa in Wrongful Death Case Involving Whirlpool.

    We obtained summary judgment in a wrongful death case arising from an alleged drowning in a whirlpool at a spa. The decedent, a 73-year-old woman, was found unresponsive by a lifeguard in the client’s whirlpool. There was no evidence as to how long the decedent had been submerged in the hot tub before she was found. The Medical Examiner conducted an autopsy and listed the decedent’s primary cause of death as hypertensive and arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, with cardiomegaly. Drowning was listed as a significant contributing factor. The plaintiff argued that our client was negligent by positioning the lifeguard in such a manner that the lifeguard would not have a direct line of sight to the bottom of the whirlpool from the lifeguard station, and that, had the plaintiff been discovered earlier, she could have been resuscitated. The defense produced an expert liability report stating that the client was in compliance with all applicable codes and standards. The defense also presented an expert medical report from a cardiologist who opined that the plaintiff suffered sudden cardiac death and could not have been resuscitated. Plaintiff’s counsel relied upon the Medical Examiner’s conclusions to prove medical causation and did not serve a liability report. Without reaching the issue of liability, the court found that the plaintiff did not meet the burden of proof on medical causation. The plaintiff could not simply rely upon the Medical Examiner’s conclusions as to the cause of death as he is not an expert in cardiology.

  • Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Successfully Argue Before the Delaware Supreme Court.

    Following oral argument heard en banc, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion upholding the application of the Continuing Storm Doctrine, resulting in the affirmation of the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment to our client. 

  • Plaintiff’s Case Goes to the Dogs.

    We obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial in Pennsylvania. The defendant was walking her Labrador Retriever, along with her five-year-old cousin. She entrusted the leash to her cousin, who promptly lost grip on the leash, allowing the dog to escape. The dog ran in the direction of the plaintiff and his Shih Tzu, with the defendant in pursuit. The plaintiff claimed that the Labrador Retriever jumped on his chest, knocking him to the ground and causing compression fractures in his lumbar spine. The injuries were confirmed by the defense IME. The defendant, on the other hand, claimed that she was able to regain control of the retriever before any contact with the plaintiff, and she testified that the plaintiff lost his balance and fell after becoming entangled in his own dog’s leash. The defense argued that the plaintiff’s injuries were the result of his failure to maintain control over his own dog, not because of negligence on the part of the defendant. The jury accepted the defendant’s version of the event and found in her favor.  

  • Product Liability Case Dismissed for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Over a National Corporation

    In this complex lawsuit, the plaintiff suffered traumatic injury when the steering column of his tractor trailer became unyoked, rendering it uncontrollable and causing it to crash. The manufacturer is a Delaware LLC headquartered in North Carolina, but it manufactured the truck at its plant in Virginia. The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, crashed while driving it in Texas. The suit was filed in Philadelphia, as the LLC’s sole corporate parent is a Pennsylvania corporation. Based upon that, the plaintiff argued that the LLC should be deemed a citizen of Pennsylvania. The trial court sustained our preliminary objections due to lack of jurisdiction. We briefed and argued the appeal the plaintiff filed with the Superior Court, which affirmed on the basis that, despite its Pennsylvania parent, the LLC itself is not “at home” in Pennsylvania because it is formed and headquartered elsewhere. Therefore, there is no general personal jurisdiction over it.

  • Summary Judgment for Marshall Dennehey Client Only, in Multi-defendant Action.

    We obtained summary judgment in a general liability case in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was an employee of a recently-renovated resort when a solid wooden panel fell down and struck her in the head, causing serious injuries. The plaintiff alleged improper design, manufacture, and installation of the panel against a number of the defendant contractors and subcontractors. It was unclear as to which defendant actually installed the panel. However, there was testimony that the panel had fallen down after the renovations were completed and that the resort’s maintenance employees had possibly re-installed the panel before it fell the second time, striking the plaintiff. There was no evidence of record that our client had any role in the design of the panel. The judge granted summary judgment as to our client only on a case where the plaintiff will be putting over $2 million on the board at trial. 

  • Summary Judgment for Wellhead Manufacturer

    We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a wellhead manufacturer in a product liability matter pending in Western Pennsylvania. The plaintiff drill operator alleged a wellhead was defectively designed, causing oil and gas to escape during operation, which led to a fire at the well site. The plaintiff asserted economic losses in excess of $1.4 million. We successfully argued that the plaintiff failed to elicit sufficient expert opinion to support the defect claim and also spoliated evidence in discarding the subject wellhead.

  • Superior Court Reaffirms “Hills and Ridges” Doctrine, Per Defense Argument.

    We argued successfully before the Pennsylvania Superior Court on behalf of a commercial real estate developer. The case involved a probation officer who fell and badly injured himself during a blizzard. The demand was in excess of $4 million. In its decision that reaffirms the “Hills and Ridges Doctrine,” the court reiterated our argument that, in essence, our client had no duty to remove snow and ice while it was still snowing. The court went further and held that no landowner has a duty to “pre-treat” their premises, and there is no duty to salt or place sand on parking lots during a storm or IMMEDATELY thereafter. It also reaffirmed that oral contracts for snow and ice removal are valid. 

  • NY Labor Law Case Won by Motion for Summary Judgement

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an owner and tenant where plaintiff alleged violation of Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6) and 200 when he fell off a ladder at the premises. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated these Labor Law sections in failing to provide him with a secure ladder and adequate safety devices while he was working on the alarm system at the premises. Defendants contended that the activity that the plaintiff was performing constituted maintenance and not repair of the alarm system and therefore was not an activity covered under the Labor Law. Defendants further contended that the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident by taking and using a ladder from the premises without the permission of the owner or tenant instead of using a ladder from the service truck that he brought to the premises Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under Labor Law §240(1) was denied and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing all Labor Law and common law claims was granted.  

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.