Casualty

In an arbitration matter filed against our insurance company client, the applicant claimed our client owed him for the unpaid medical bills of the claimant totaling approximately $20,000. The claimant was purportedly involved in a motor vehicle accident and sought payment for medical treatments/surgery. It was argued that our client owed the applicant’s client for the medical services, despite New York State being the improper venue for hearing such a claim. The policy of insurance was written in Pennsylvania, the accident occurred in Pennsylvania and the claimant lived in Pennsylvania. The applicant, the provider of the medical services, and the medical facility where the services were rendered were all located in New Jersey. There was no apparent connection to the state of New York, other than the fact that the surgeon performing the surgery maintains an office there. The arbitrator agreed that this single contact was insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the New York State no-fault system to adjudicate these no-fault claims in the state of New York.

We obtained summary judgment for a national trucking company in a lawsuit filed in Middlesex County, New Jersey, arising from a multi-vehicle trucking accident on the New Jersey Turnpike in which a young girl was killed and her mother seriously injured. In addition to being granted summary judgment, we recovered for our client all of its property damage, towing, and related costs from the other vehicles involved in the accident. A consolidated case filed by the County of Middlesex in which they sought to recover cleanup and environmental costs associated with the accident, was also dismissed, with prejudice.

​The defendants were two family-owned companies that grow, process and sell mushrooms. One defendant, our client, owned the property, and the other operated the business there. The plaintiff worked for an independent company that was contracted to load compost into the defendants’ mushroom beds. The plaintiff encountered a problem with the equipment used to lift the compost (the source of the problem is in dispute). A connection between components broke, and a metal pan fell on the plaintiff’s arm, crushing it. The plaintiff alleged he had previously reported the problem to the defendants. Our attorneys successfully argued that the defendant who owned the property was a “landlord out of possession” and not responsible for injuries to third parties on the premises. The plaintiff argued that his complaint to one defendant about the equipment problem was notice to both, because both companies were owned by the same family. The court ruled that the shared ownership of the companies did not impose a legal duty on a defendant that was not otherwise responsible for the property.

Our client owned a parcel of land upon which a building was being erected. The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was at the premises cleaning up the worksite on a Saturday morning. He was standing on top of a company-owned work van in the parking lot, securing ladders to the roof of the van, when he slipped and fell off the van to the ground, sustaining serious leg and knee injuries. He underwent two knee surgeries and was also told he needed back surgery. The plaintiff sued our client, as the owner of the property, and the general contractor under Labor Law sections 200, 240 and 241(6). Labor Law section 240, also known as the “scaffold law,” imposes absolute liability to the landowner for height-related injuries that occur at construction sites when someone falls off a building or building under construction. Section 241(6) involves violations of the Industrial Code. At the close of depositions, we filed a summary judgment motion to dismiss all allegations of the Labor Law in that our client was not directing or controlling the plaintiff when he was injured. We further argued that the plaintiff fell off a motor vehicle, not from a building or anything construction-related, as the vehicle was in the parking lot adjacent to the construction and, therefore, the scaffold law did not apply. The court granted our motion in its entirety.

​Our client was the roofing contractor on a project in Philadelphia. The plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor of our client. The plaintiff was injured when he fell through a skylight cutout in the roof. He fell approximately 15 feet and sustained injuries, including a broken hip (requiring ORIF) and fractured vertebra. The plaintiff was hospitalized for one month. The last settlement demand was $2.5 million. We moved for summary judgment based upon arguments that our client, the roofing contractor who did not occupy the site nor control the work, breached no duty of care to the plaintiff. The court granted summary judgment.

The verdict came within 30 minutes of deliberation in a five-day Bradford County PA fire-loss subrogation trial. Social distancing protocols were in place: all participants had their temperatures taken before entering the courthouse; jury selection took place at a local school auditorium; everyone in the courtroom was required to wear masks or face shields; and the jurors were spread out to the gallery section of the courtroom instead of the jury box. Witnesses could appear via Zoom. Two witnesses were flawlessly broadcasted to the courtroom with help from the firm’s Allentown and Mount Laurel offices.

We obtained a no cause verdict following a one day non-jury trial (conducted virtually) in the Law Division of Hudson County for our client, a national trucking company. The plaintiff alleged the truck swerved into his lane causing property damage. The defense successfully argued that the plaintiff’s identification of the trailer as belonging to our client was not dispositive on the issue of the identification of the company responsible for operation of the truck which was pulling the trailer at the time of the accident. The judge further found the police report was not admissible on the identification of the operator of the vehicle and also that regardless of identification, the plaintiff failed to establish the operator was negligent.

Marshall Dennehey’s appellate attorneys filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute and Pennsylvania Association of Defense Counsel in a case pending in the Pennsylvania Superior Court that involved interpretation of a “regular use” exclusion that commonly appears in underinsured motorist coverage in automobile policies. The Superior Court enforced the exclusion, as PDI and PADC had requested. The plaintiff regularly used a company vehicle for his daily work. But one or two days before the accident, the specific vehicle he had been driving was taken out of service for repairs, and his employer rented a replacement vehicle for the plaintiff’s use. The insurer denied the UIM claim, based on the “regular use” exclusion, because the plaintiff was driving a company vehicle, which was his regular practice. The plaintiff countered that the vehicle he was operating at the time of the accident had not, in fact, been made “regularly” available to him because he only began using it a day or two prior. Relying on its prior decision in Brink v. Erie Ins. Group, 940 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 2008), which held that the “regular use” exclusion properly barred coverage for a plaintiff injured in a “fleet vehicle,” even though the plaintiff may have driven a different specific vehicle each day, the Rawl court held that the employer’s temporary rental of a replacement vehicle triggered application of the “regular use” exclusion and barred coverage. “Stated simply,” Rawl explains, “it does not matter whether Mr. Rawl had regular use of a particular vehicle furnished by his employer, but whether he regularly used a vehicle supplied by his employer.” The court, therefore, affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the carrier.

We obtained a per curiam affirmance in the Fourth District Court of Appeal in a suit against a campground/RV park. The suit alleged that the campground negligently maintained the campsite and failed to keep the electrical up to code, forcing an RV owner to abandon her RV at the site. The campground countersued for writ of distress to remove the unsightly vehicle from the campsite. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings and declined to amend the complaint, finding an amendment would be futile. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s entry of final judgment in favor of the campground on the main claim as well as the counterclaim. The court also conditionally granted the campground’s motion for appellate attorney's fees and remanded the case to the trial court to rule on the validity of the unaccepted proposal for settlement.

Marshall Dennehey was successful in the New Jersey Appellate Division, which affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint under New Jersey’s Charitable Immunity Act. The defendant operated a shelter for battered women, their dependent children and the homeless. The plaintiff and her child were residents at the shelter and beneficiaries of its charitable goals when the plaintiff slipped and fell on ice on the shelter’s property. She argued that she was not a beneficiary of the charity because she did administrative tasks and volunteered in the charity’s thrift store. However, the trial court and Appellate Division rejected those arguments, holding that the plaintiff’s presence on the defendant’s property was due to her being a resident beneficiary of the charity, not as a result of any volunteer work she may have performed for the defendant. Thus, because her volunteer activities were incidental to her residency at the shelter, the Charitable Immunity Act applied and the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.

Obtained a dismissal at trial in Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County. ​The plaintiff, an acupuncture facility, alleged wrongful denial of personal injury protection/no-fault benefits relating to acupuncture services rendered to its assignee, a claimant who sought benefits under the defendant-carrier’s policy. The trial judge granted dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the carrier’s defense, that payments were issued in accordance with the applicable fee schedule and, therefore, nothing further was owed to the plaintiff.

Marshall Dennehey successfully obtained summary judgment, dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction New York Labor Law case in the Supreme Court in Rockland County. ​The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case, all seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client in causing the injuries sustained to the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused, in whole or in part, the injuries the plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor filed motions to reargue, which were denied.

We obtained summary judgment in Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County. ​The plaintiff commenced an action seeking reimbursement of PIP benefits under the defendant-carrier's policy for anesthesia rendered to the claimant during a surgical procedure. After establishing that the claimant failed to appear at multiple, duly-scheduled independent medical examinations—a condition precedent to coverage—the complaint was dismissed.

We obtained a unanimous 12-0 defense verdict after a two-week trial in Santa Fe County, New Mexico, where the plaintiff was seeking approximately $40 million in damages. In this asbestos litigation case, it was alleged that the decedent contracted mesothelioma and died at the age of 76 as a result of being exposed to asbestos-containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. The decedent worked as an electrician for 40 years and contended he worked in the vicinity of drywall workers at various commercial worksites throughout Albuquerque and New Mexico. The plaintiff claimed that our client’s joint compound was defective because it was sold without a warning of the well-established dangers of asbestos. Further, the plaintiff argued that our client was negligent because it knew or should have known of the dangers of asbestos, which were readily known from as early as the 1930s. The defense argued that the asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound was safe because the fibers were short fibers and not known to increase the risk of disease. It was further argued that our client acted reasonably and in a timely manner when it placed a government-mandated warning on their product in the early 1970s. Lastly, it was argued that the only product identification witness called by the plaintiff was not credible because he gave three depositions in 2017 and did not identify our client’s product. He first identified our client’s product during his fourth deposition in late 2019, when our client was the only remaining defendant. The jury found our client’s product was not defective, but that they were negligent. However, the jury found the negligence was not a cause of the decedent’s mesothelioma.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a commercial tenant in a premises liability case. The plaintiff brought suit against our client, the commercial landlord and the City of Newark. The plaintiff alleged that the parties failed to maintain a condition of the sidewalk that caused a trip and fall. We moved for summary judgment for contractual indemnification, arguing that the co-defendant commercial landlord was obligated under the language of the lease to indemnify our client for the landlord’s own negligence. At oral arguments, we were able to establish that the language of the lease was clear and that it was undisputed that our client had no duty to the plaintiff. Furthermore, we were able to argue that the motion was not premature, as the co-defendant’s opposition conceded that, based on the language of the lease, we had no duty. The judge agreed with our arguments, and the court granted our motion for summary judgment and required the landlord to indemnify our client.

We obtained a defense verdict in a Bucks County case on behalf of a driver despite his conviction for driving at the time under the influence of alcohol and drugs. The accident occurred at an intersection controlled by a flashing traffic light. The defendant was traveling in the direction of the yellow flashing light. The plaintiff testified that he stopped at the painted stop block for the red flashing light. The plaintiff looked both ways, and believing that all was clear, proceeded into the intersection. The plaintiff saw the defendant coming from his left at a high rate of speed, only an instant before the accident. The defense argued that the plaintiff’s position at the painted stop block did not allow for adequate sight lines, and that under Section 3323(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code he was obligated to move forward to a point where he had a clear view of approaching traffic.

We were successful on a motion for summary judgment, thereby barring the application of the mode of operations in a slip and fall case where an alleged partially eaten sandwich was found in the aisle of the retailer. ​The facts indicated that the sandwich came from a fast-food sandwich shop within the premises and was dropped by an unidentified customer, who took the item to go and dropped it in the aisle before the plaintiff fell. The court ruled that the mode of operations did not apply because the aisle, which contained greeting cards and the like, and did not create an extension of the cafeteria within the retailer’s premises. Further, the court ruled there was no nexus to any self-serve component of the fast food restaurant’s business to the area in the retailer’s store proper where the accident occurred.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a boxing gym. ​The plaintiff, a seasoned boxing coach, claimed to have been injured when he fell out of a boxing ring during a sparring match at the defendant’s gym. The plaintiff asserted that while standing on the apron with his back to the ring, he was struck by one of the fighters and propelled out and onto the floor. He alleged the defendant was negligent because the boxing ring was “too high” and the flooring surface “too hard.” In granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court found first that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff because Pennsylvania law imposes no duty on sports facilities to protect spectators from risks that are common, frequent, and expected, and that the circumstances surrounding the incident eliminate any duty on the part of the defendant. The court also held that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s contentions that the boxing ring was too high or that the lack of padding on the surrounding floor was a deviation from an established custom. In fact, the evidence established that the boxing ring complied with national boxing regulations. Accordingly, summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff did not appeal the decision.

We successfully defended a significant dog mauling case against a landlord defendant. ​The plaintiff was fortunate to have survived the attack and suffered severe permanent physical and emotional trauma. The parties stipulated to damages of $1.75 million and submitted the case to binding arbitration on liability only. The case rested entirely on the credibility of the landlord who claimed that he had no knowledge that the tenant had a dog on the property. The law requires that the landlord know that the dog is present on the leased property and has actual knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. There was a lot of evidence that the dog had exhibited very aggressive behavior to anyone it came into contact with prior to the event. The plaintiff argued that the landlord had to know of the presence of the dog and its dangerous propensities given the number of times the landlord visited the property. The arbitrator found in favor of the plaintiff and against the tenant only.

We represented a plumbing subcontractor in a case venued in Supreme Court, Bronx County. ​The plaintiff alleged he sustained serious neck and back injuries as a result of falling pipes. The plaintiff had been hired by a subcontractor involved with boiler replacement work at a large residential building located in Manhattan. The plaintiff alleged violations of Labor Law Section 200, 240 and 241(6). These claims were alleged against the building owner, management company and various subcontractors at the site. The plaintiff alleged he sustained cervical and lumbar injuries resulting in a cervical fusion and lumbar discectomy. He also allegedly sustained a fracture of the thoracic spine. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff claimed he could not return to work. The settlement demand made before the motions were filed was in excess of $10 million. The court granted our summary judgment motion in its entirely and dismissed all claims against our client on the basis that our client had absolutely no involvement with the accident, having only performed work on the upper floors of the building. The court order also granted the cross motions by the other defendants, resulting in a complete dismissal of all claims against all defendants.

We were successful on a motion for summary judgment that was granted dismissing all claims against our client, an environmental compliance services and tank testing company, in a case where the plaintiff made an $8.75 million settlement demand. ​The plaintiffs, a minor mother and child, were at a gas station in Philadelphia when a vehicle inadvertently struck a fuel dispenser, knocking it over and causing a fire and explosion. The claims and cross-claims asserted against our client alleged it should have installed or advised the gas station owners to install a valve that would have prevented the fuel leakage that exacerbated the fire. We filed a summary judgment motion arguing that the claims and cross-claims asserted against our client went beyond the scope of the environmental compliance services it was hired to perform such that our client had no duty to either install or advise of installing different valves. The court granted our motion dismissing all claims and cross-claims against our client.

We obtained a defense verdict in a three-day jury trial  in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. ​The 81-year-old plaintiff, who was staying at her daughter's home, alleged that she slipped and fell on water in the basement of the rental property and injured her hip. The property was owned by our clients. The plaintiff's daughter and son-in-law claimed they repeatedly complained to our clients of leaks from the ceiling in the basement, without response. They were in the midst of eviction proceedings with our clients for failure to pay rent for several months when the fall occurred. Our clients denied any knowledge of the leaking problem alleged by the tenants, though they did admit that they were aware of leaks in other areas which they attempted to fix. The jury deliberated for 2 ½ hours, had two questions, and asked for the negligence charge to be read back to them. They then returned a finding of no negligence. There was a nuisance value settlement offer made prior to trial, which was rejected.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of our homeowner clients in a case involving an alleged “attack” by our client’s dog. ​As the plaintiff walked past the client's property on a public sidewalk, the dog ran out to the edge of the sidewalk barking loudly. The plaintiff became "startled" and stepped back, falling into the street and sustaining a seriously displaced left distal radius fracture that required open reduction and internal fixation. Upon review of the summary judgment motion, the court found no evidence that the dog was a "dangerous dog" or that the dog had ever left the confines of the insured's property. Interestingly, the court ruled that the dog's barking and charging the sidewalk did not represent a breach of duty by the homeowner to the public on the sidewalk under the applicable statutory and case law.

We obtained summary judgment in New York County in a case where the plaintiff, a construction laborer, was struck by a rolling dumpster and sustained severe crush injuries to his left foot and leg. The plaintiff, the dumpster company and the subcontractors alleged our general contractor client was responsible for overall site safety. After obtaining billing and work records for the project, the client confirmed that it did not have any involvement in the project, and we moved for summary judgment. After oral argument, the court granted our motion in its entirety and dismissed the case and all cross-claims.

We secured the dismissal of a New York no-fault/personal injury protection (PIP) lost wages suit that carried a potential judgment of more than $1.37 million. The suit commenced in 2014, and over several years, the plaintiff was not cooperative in providing requested information. In 2018, the defense served a 90-day notice on the plaintiff, which advised that we would move for dismissal if the plaintiff did not take action or file a notice of trial within 90 days. The Rockland County Supreme Court Judge recognized that there was no activity in the case for years, but was apprehensive about dismissing the case on the spot. He scheduled an additional hearing and required the plaintiff and new counsel, if retained, to appear to discuss the case status and activity. When they did not appear, Scott successfully moved for dismissal.

We successfully tried a premises liability action to a defense verdict in favor of a resident’s association in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, and also successfully defended against the plaintiff’s appeal. ​The plaintiff, who was a community resident (formerly married to a unit owner but not an owner herself), claimed that she tripped and fell on a tree branch on common area steps at night as a result of a burned out PECO-owned lamp, and that the Association failed to ensure that the light was fixed. The plaintiff had asked for either invitee status or a hybrid charge on duty, but the court agreed with the defense that she was able to use the common areas by permission, not by invitation, making her a licensee only. This resulted in the duty owed being only to make the property as safe as it appeared. The defense presented multiple instances of notice to PECO of the burned-out light, and the plaintiff conceded the defense contention that it could not change the bulb itself because PECO owned the lamp. The plaintiff also conceded that she had been aware of the light being out for some time. The jury unanimously found in favor of the Association and, on appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the judgment on the jury verdict, finding that the trial court did not err by charging the jury that the plaintiff was entitled only to the care due to a licensee on the property, and not an invitee.

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a rock climbing center. ​The plaintiff, a certified climber, was injured when she fell from a 25-foot rock-climbing wall at our client's facility. After reaching the summit of the wall, she pushed off to begin repelling down, only to realize that she forgot to connect to the auto-belay system. She fell to the ground and fractured both ankles and underwent open reduction internal fixation surgery. She had previously visited the client's facility approximately 35 times and had executed a liability waiver on each occasion, including the date of the accident. We moved for summary judgment to dismiss her complaint based upon the fact that the liability waiver was enforceable. The plaintiff argued that the liability waiver was only enforceable as to her claims of ordinary negligence, and that the issue of whether the defendant was grossly negligent was a triable issue of fact. However, we successfully argued that no reasonable jury could find that the client was grossly negligent based on the client's testimony of the safety procedures, protocols and equipment in place at the rock-climbing center. Accordingly, the court granted our motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, in its entirety, against our client.

We were granted partial summary judgment in a Labor Law case venued in the New York Supreme Court, Bronx County. The plaintiff was installing new floors in a large residential building in Manhattan that was owned by our client. The project involved a large-scale renovation of a penthouse and several lower levels. During the renovation, the plaintiff fell through an opening in the floor and sustained injuries to his knee and back. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment under New York Labor Law Section 240(1). We cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of all claims. Our expert concluded that the plaintiff could have avoided the accident and that proper safety equipment was provided. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion and granted our motion in part by dismissing the plaintiff’s Labor Law Section 200 claim and numerous 241(6) industrial code violations.

We obtained summary judgment in the Supreme Court of Rockland County, New York. The plaintiff slipped and fell while walking to her mailbox during a severe winter storm in January 2016. The plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against her homeowners association and its snow removal contractor. We moved for summary judgment on behalf of the defendants, asserting that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the storm-in-progress doctrine. In opposition to our motion, the plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to adequately salt the premises, that the defendants were aware of the icy conditions, and that the storm had ended prior to the plaintiff’s accident. In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court found the defendants established that there was a storm in progress at the time of the plaintiff’s accident and that their efforts to prevent ice accumulation and remove snow did not create a hazardous condition. According to the court, the plaintiff’s testimony was self-serving, contradictory and a feigned attempt to create a material issue of fact as to when the storm came to an end.

We prevailed on an appeal before the Appellate Division, Second Department, NYC, reversing a lower court order that denied summary judgment to our client, the owner of a movie theater. The plaintiff was a patron at the movie theater, where he got into a fight with another patron over a parking spot. The plaintiff sued the theater for negligent security. The defense was able to show that there was no notice to the theater because the incident was sudden and unexpected, based on the short duration of the altercation, and the lack of similar prior incidents at the theater. The appellate court granted summary judgment to the theater.