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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

“All Suits” Means All Suits: Second DCA Requires Pre-Suit Notice for Non-Monetary Property Insurance Claims

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. Hamid Nekouee No. 2D2025-2866, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1659a. (Fla. 2nd DCA August 14, 2026)

October 5, 2026

by Carolin A. Pacheco

The Second District Court of Appeals rendered an opinion finding that a cause of action must be dismissed without prejudice for failure to provide the statutorily required pre-suit notice (Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation), including actions concerning declaratory relief where no monetary damages are being claimed.

Citizens petitioned for certiorari review of a trial court order denying its motion to dismiss the homeowner’s declaratory judgment action. Citizens argued dismissal was required because the homeowner failed to provide pre-suit notice through the Florida Department of Financial Services as mandated by section 627.70152, Florida Statutes. The pre-suit notice is a condition precedent which applies to residential or commercial property insurance policies per Section 627.70152. The trial court denied Citizen’s motion, concluding that pre-suit notice was not required because the homeowner was not seeking monetary damages and there was uncertainty concerning whether a coverage dispute existed.

Citizens provided coverage for the homeowner’s property including hurricane loss. After alleged hurricane damage to the insured property, Citizens determined coverage for the loss fell below the policy deductible and denied the claim. The homeowner disagreed, their adjuster finding the loss exceeded the applicable deductible. The homeowner demanded appraisal under the policy. The respective party’s appraisers agreed on a loss amount, but the homeowner refused to sign the Appraisal Award form, objecting to its language as imposing extracontractual conditions. Rejecting the appraisal award, the homeowner filed a declaratory judgment action seeking judicial determination of the form's enforceability and their rights under the policy, without seeking monetary damages.

On appeal, the homeowner raised issues concerning whether section 627.70152, Florida Statutes, requires pre-suit notice for declaratory judgment actions arising under residential property insurance policies when the plaintiff seeks no monetary damages. The Second District granted the petition and quashed the trial court's order.

The Second District Court held that section 627.70152 requires pre-suit notice for all suits arising under residential property insurance policies, including declaratory judgment actions that do not seek monetary relief. The court was particularly stressed that the phrase 'all suits' means all suits without exception. Applying principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that general terms like 'all' must be given their general meaning (Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020), quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). "Consequently, we `strive to determine the text's objective meaning through "the application of [the] text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued" (Levy v. Levy, 326 So. 3d 678, 681 (Fla. 2021), quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 33).

In making its decision, the Second District Court rejected the homeowners’ reliance on Bristol West Insurance v. MD Readers ,Inc., 52 So. 3d 48, 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), noting that case involved a different statute requiring pre-suit notice before filing 'any action for benefits,' not the broader language of section 627.70152. The court also rejected the homeowner’s argument that their suit did not 'arise under' the policy, finding that resolution required interpretation of policy terms, making it clearly arise under the insurance contract.

The Second District Court granted Citizen’s Petition and the trial court order was quashed. The homeowners failed to provide the necessary notice and thus the case must be dismissed without prejudice.

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

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