.

Candace N. Edgar

Portrait of Candace N. Edgar

Candace is a member of the Professional Liability Department with over 15 years of litigation experience devoted almost exclusively to insurance defense litigation, representing both insurers and insureds in state, federal and appellate courts in Pennsylvania. Candace has successfully defended a myriad of cases, including insurance coverage, bad faith, first-and third-party auto, transportation, premises liability, employment, construction, medical malpractice and subrogation cases. She is experienced in all facets of a case from pre-suit investigation through verdict and appeal. She has presented at several insurance conferences and seminars, as well as provided training to claims professionals on best claims handling practices.

Candace graduated from Penn State University Dickinson School of Law in 2008 where she was recognized for her accomplishments in oral and written advocacy, including receipt of the ALI-ABA Scholastic and Leadership Award, The George F. Douglas, Jr. Memorial Award and the CALI Award for Excellence in Advocacy to name a few. Prior to law school, she graduated cum laude from Millersville University where she studied Broadcast Journalism and Political Affairs.
 

    • Penn State Dickinson Law (J.D., 2008)
    • Millersville University of Pennsylvania (B.S., cum laude, 2004)
    • Pennsylvania, 2008
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Life Care Plans: Cutting Them Down To Size, 2023 PAMIC Claims Summit, Gettysburg, PA, April 19, 2023
    • Retail & Hospitality Webinar, The Harmonie Group, February 23, 2021 
    • Successfully defended insurers in cases involving coverage disputes and claims of insurance bad faith, including a successful appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversing and vacating a sizeable award for attorney fees against the insurer.
    • Successfully handled through resolution claims made against auto insurers for uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits and first party benefits.
    • Successfully defended commercial motor vehicle carriers in wrongful death and catastrophic bodily injury cases.
    • Successfully obtained multiple defense verdicts in favor of commercial property owners, including a national retailer and amusement park.
    • Dauphin County Pro Bono Program
    • Love the Hill - Wildheart Ministries, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Third Circuit Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion for Uninsured Dirt Bike, Overturning District Court Ruling

September 9, 2024

The Gallagher decision initially led to widespread uncertainty and confusion. However, Pennsylvania Courts have since given its holding substantial clarity and limitation, as this recent precedential decision from the Third Circuit demonstrates.  Fifteen-year-old Levi Werley was seriously injured while riding an uninsured dirt bike on private property in Kempton, Pennsylvania. The tortfeasor, who was also 15 years old, struck the dirt bike while driving a Jeep CJ-7. The Jeep was insured under a policy providing $100,000 in bodily injury coverage, which was paid, in full.  Levi then sought payment of UIM benefits under the two Mid-Century policies in the Werley household. The one policy belonged to Levi’s parents and insured four vehicles, providing $250,000/$500,000 in UIM benefits. The second policy belonged to Levi’s father and sister and insured one vehicle, similarly providing $250,000/$500,000 in UIM benefits. Stacking had been waived under both policies. However, pursuant to Donovan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 526 A.3d 1145, 1157 (Pa. 2021), the stacking waiver executed for the multiple-vehicle policy was invalid as to inter-policy stacking or stacking amongst separate policies. As stated, the dirt bike Levi was riding at the time of the accident was completely uninsured, so it had no coverage of any kind, including UIM benefits.  Although both household policies contained household vehicle exclusions, their language materially differed. Specifically, the household vehicle exclusion of the single-vehicle policy applied only to an accident involving a “car.” Because Mid-Century determined that the dirt bike did not meet the definition of a “car” under the policy, it paid Levi the $250,000 UIM limit. In contrast, the household vehicle exclusion under the multiple-vehicle policy applied to any accident involving a “vehicle,” which included a dirt bike. Accordingly, Mid-Century denied coverage based upon the household vehicle exclusion and subsequently filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania.  In a 55-page opinion, the District Court decided in favor of Levi and invalidated Mid-Century’s household vehicle exclusion under the multiple-vehicle policy, concluding that it acted as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking in violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1738 and Gallagher v. GEICO Indemnification Co., 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2019). Central to the District Court’s decision was Mid-Century’s payment of UIM benefits under the single-vehicle, household policy because such payment meant that Levi was no longer seeking UIM benefits in the first instance. Instead, Levi had recovered UIM benefits he was now seeking to stack upon, differentiating this case from the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Erie Ins. Exch. v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023), where the host vehicle had no UIM coverage and both the household polices excluded UIM coverage under their household vehicle exclusion.  On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit issued a precedential decision vacating the District Court’s order, holding that the household vehicle exclusion was valid under these facts, pursuant to recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent. See Mione, supra; Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., 308 A.3d 780 (Pa. 2024). The Third Circuit rejected the District Court’s holding that the uninsured status of the dirt bike was irrelevant, finding that the Werleys’ failure to insure the dirt bike meant that they had no reasonable expectation of coverage, thus, “application of the household vehicle exclusion here deprived the Werleys of nothing for which they had bargained.” According to the Third Circuit, a household vehicle exclusion is invalid only if: (1) a policy insures the vehicle involved in the accident, (2) that policy provides UIM coverage on that vehicle, and (3) the household vehicle exclusion of a second policy sought to stack on top of the first policy would exclude UIM coverage for that vehicle. Because no policy insured the dirt bike, the Third Circuit concluded that the household vehicle exclusion of the multiple-vehicle policy was applied validly.  This case and other recent decisions are evidence that the household vehicle exclusion remains a valid and enforceable exclusion for Pennsylvania insurers with its application prohibited in only very limited circumstances.     Legal Update for Insurance Services - September 9, 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.