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The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania

The Quarterly Dose – August 2025

August 1, 2025

Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Mental Health Facilities May Be Liable for Gross Negligence in Denying Voluntary Admission
Matos v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 334 A.3d 288 (Pa. 2025)

An individual with an extensive mental health history sought admission to two different mental health facilities for inpatient psychiatric care. However, both facilities denied his request. Shortly after, he killed his girlfriend. The estate of the victim brought suit against the facilities, alleging their denials met the threshold for gross negligence or willful misconduct pursuant to the voluntary-care provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that written consent to voluntary admission into a mental health care facility for inpatient treatment was not a prerequisite to impose liability against health care providers under the MHPA. For involuntary commitment, prior cases, such as Leight, have held that no liability arises unless a formal written application is completed. However, for voluntary admission, the court reasoned that the act of seeking treatment itself is sufficient to trigger the facility’s duty to evaluate and respond reasonably. However, liability attaches only when the denial of voluntary admission constitutes gross negligence. 

 

Hospital Owed Duty of Care Through Pre-Transfer Involvement, Pennsylvania Court Affirms
Munoz v. Children’s Hosp. of Philadelphia, No. 1388 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 1504354 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 27, 2025)

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which found that CHOP had undertaken and provided health care services to a minor decedent and, therefore, owed him a duty of care.

The plaintiffs, the parents of the minor decedent, brought suit against Einstein Medical Center and CHOP. The decedent was treated at Einstein Medical Center, who contacted CHOP for assistance. CHOP opened a chart for the decedent and dispatched a transport team to Einstein. Upon arrival, the decedent deteriorated rapidly, and CHOP nurses provided treatment to the decedent, guided by a CHOP physician who was providing instructions over the phone. However, the decedent suffered cardiac arrest and passed away before transfer to CHOP.

The Superior Court affirmed that CHOP assumed a patient relationship by advising on treatment, opening a chart, dispatching a transfer team and providing emergency care. As such, they created a duty to exercise reasonable care. Hospitals may assume liability when they become involved in the care and treatment of a patient, even if it is indirectly through telephone guidance and dispatch of staff. CHOP entered a physician-patient relationship with the decedent for treatment purposes because of CHOP’s active participation in the care of decedent prior to the transport team arrived at Einstein, and the continued services provided by the CHOP team upon arrival.

 

Superior Court Reverses Nonsuit, Holds Trial Court Bound by Prior Ruling on Expert Qualification
Joyner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosps., Inc., No. 534 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 933175, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2025), reargument denied (May 29, 2025)

In her suit, the pro se plaintiff alleged negligent placement of leg restraints during gall bladder surgery. As she alleged a deviation from the professional standard of care, she was required to file a certificate of merit pursuant to Rule 1042.3.

The appellate court previously ruled that the plaintiff’s expert was an “appropriate licensed professional” under Rule 1042.3(e). Prior to trial, the defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff’s expert testimony regarding the standard of care, and the trial court limited his testimony solely to causation. The trial court granted a compulsory nonsuit, finding that the plaintiff lacked a duty breach.

The Superior Court reversed the nonsuit, finding that once the court accepted the plaintiff’s expert as a qualified expert, the trial court was bound to that determination.

This decision highlights issue preclusion; once an appellate court determines an expert is qualified, lower courts cannot re-litigate this issue. 


 

The Quarterly Dose – August 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority.  *Thomas F. Glassman, a shareholder in Marshall Dennehey’s Cincinnati office, filed a brief in the Ohio Supreme Court on behalf of the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, in support of the insurer’s position.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.