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Defense Digest

Can Felons Pursue Damages Against Their Providers for Their Criminal Conduct? The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Says No

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024

June 1, 2024

by Nicole E. Tanana

Key Points:

  • Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently evaluated the no felony conviction recovery rule. 
  • No felony conviction recovery rule bars medical malpractice and indemnification claims brought against murderer’s medical providers.

Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court evaluated the no felony conviction recovery rule in the context of a quadruple murderer. In DiNardo v. Kohler, et al., 304 A.3d 1187 (Pa. 2023), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the no felony conviction recovery rule barred medical malpractice and indemnification claims brought against murderer’s medical providers. 

Cosmo DiNardo, who suffers from various mental health illnesses and conditions, including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder, confessed to killing four individuals and pleaded guilty to four counts of first-degree murder. Subsequently, DiNardo, through an agent, filed a complaint against his treating psychiatrist and mental health care providers, alleging that his criminal conduct was the result of his psychiatrist’s grossly negligent treatment. DiNardo sought compensatory damages, indemnification for judgments levied against him by his victims’ families, and counsel fees. As to compensatory damages, DiNardo sought recovery for “severe emotional distress and physical pain” for: (1) living with the knowledge that he murdered four individuals; (2) knowing his family’s businesses suffered irreparable harm due to his actions; (3) knowing his family will bear the costs of litigation and judgement due to the murders; and (4) knowing he will spend the rest of his life in state prison. 

Mr. DiNardo’s providers filed preliminary objections to his complaint, seeking to have the complaint dismissed as a whole. The trial court sustained the preliminary objections as to DiNardo’s request for indemnification and counsel fees, but overruled the preliminary objections as to DiNardo’s medical malpractice claims. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling as to DiNardo’s request for indemnification and counsel fees, reversed the trial court’s ruling on his medical malpractice claims, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal with respect to the following issue: “Does the ‘no felony conviction recovery’ rule preclude the award of any civil damages or relief where [DiNardo] alleges that [he] would not benefit or profit from his own criminal acts, but rather would be compensated for alleged malpractice relating to the crimes for which he pleaded guilty to?” 

The no felony conviction recovery rule is a common law principle, that a person should not be permitted to benefit from their own wrongdoing. The Pennsylvania Supreme started with the well-established premise that psychiatrists and psychologist are subject to liability for malpractice or professional negligence, including negligence related to treatment or lack thereof. However, the court then acknowledged that case law “firmly establishes” that persons convicted of serious crimes must bear the losses stemming from their criminal actions and public policy will not permit the responsibility for these losses to be shifted to others. Highlighting decisions from outside the Commonwealth, the court noted that other state courts routinely bar plaintiffs from seeking damages sustained as a result of their own criminal conduct, and courts are “virtually unanimous” in rejecting a patient’s attempt to shift responsibility for their criminal actions onto their psychiatrist or other healthcare providers.

There are several public policies which are the basis for the no felony conviction recovery rule. The bedrock public policy is that injuries that arise from volitional criminal conduct should not provide a basis for a recovery in a civil action based in tort. The Supreme Court stated that allowing such a civil action would impact the criminal justice system and the public’s perception thereof, as the goal of finality and allocation of responsibility would be undercut by allowing such a civil action. The court also recognized the potential detrimental effects on the practice of psychiatric medicine, stating: 

Allowing the recovery of damages from a mental healthcare provider for a patient’s criminal conduct could undermine trust between the patient and psychiatrist; encourage psychiatrists to refuse to treat, or avoid treating, certain patients; spur institutionalization and excessive medication out of concern for financial liability should patients be released from care and commit crimes; and would not respect the difficulty mental healthcare professionals face in predicting whether an individual poses a risk of violence.

Finally, the court acknowledged that such civil actions would have a financial impact by potentially increasing health care costs if medical providers “became “guarantors” of the financial costs of the crimes committed by their patients.

With all of these public policies considerations in mind, the court held that the no felony conviction recovery rule bars an individual from maintaining a tort action for damages that are sustained as the direct result of his volitional serious criminal acts and prohibits the person from recovering for losses which flowed from such acts. Regardless of whether the damages sought are considered profit, compensation, or a benefit, a criminal is barred from recovering damages that flowed from his criminal conduct. 

This ruling creates another avenue for seeking dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims against a medical provider, particularly mental health professionals, at the preliminary objection stage of a proceeding. Further, the court’s consideration of the various public policy considerations may lead to the creation of additional novel arguments based on the same or similar public policy considerations, which may provide another avenue to seek the dismissal of a health care provider. 

*Nicole works in our Scranton, Pennsylvania, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Result

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.