.

Defense Digest

UIM Stacking Even When Not a Named Insured

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

December 1, 2024

Key Points:

  • Pennsylvania Superior Court addresses issue of first impression involving UIM stacking and coverage. 
  • The company president, insured under policy covering one vehicle, was entitled to inter-policy stacking of UIM benefits.    

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently addressed an issue of first impression involving UIM stacking and coverage in Baclit v. Sloan, 323 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2024).  The plaintiff, Timothy S. Baclit, died acting as a good samaritan to aid the defendant, Steven Sloan, who was involved in a single motor vehicle accident after crashing into a bridge retaining wall. Mr. Baclit was operating a motor vehicle owned by his mother and stopped at the accident scene to render aid to Mr. Sloan. In the process of providing assistance to Mr. Sloan, Mr. Baclit fell from the bridge retaining wall and later succumbed to his injuries.  

Mr. Sloan’s automobile liability coverage through Farmers Insurance tendered the limits to the administrator of the estate of Mr. Baclit. The vehicle Mr. Baclit operated was insured under a multivehicle policy through State Farm Mutual Insurance Company with stacked UIM limits of $300,000. State Farm paid the stacked UIM policy limits under that claim. At the time of his death, Mr. Baclit owned a motorcycle that had UIM coverage through Progressive, which also tendered its UIM policy limits. What remained at issue was a commercial automobile policy through United Financial Casualty Company (United).      

Mr. Baclit was the president and sole officer of a trucking business, TKC Trucking, which was covered by a commercial automobile insurance policy through United.  Under that commercial policy, TKC Trucking was a “named insured” and Mr. Baclit and another individual were designated as rated drivers. The subject policy covered a truck and load trail trailer and provided stacked UIM coverage. 

The administrator of the estate for Mr. Baclit filed a complaint against United, asserting claims of breach of contract, bad faith, wrongful death, and survival. Notably, there was no waiver of stacking signed by Mr. Baclit under that policy and the premiums reflected higher payments for stacking coverage. 

Upon inception of the policy, United charged a premium for stacking under the single car commercial policy. The trial court felt that, since the carrier chose to provide stacked insurance coverage on a one-vehicle commercial policy, where the injured party was both the sole officer of TKC Trucking and named as a rated driver in the policy, the attempt to deny stacked coverage served as a de facto waiver, in violation of the language of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). Thus, the trial court found that the estate was entitled to collect UIM benefits and granted its motion for summary judgment. 

United appealed to the Superior Court, which noted that the only question before it was purely one of law requiring of a determination whether Mr. Baclit was entitled to UIM benefits under the United policy. The court examined the interplay between the provisions of the MVFRL and the plain language of the policy. It reviewed the various provisions of the MVFRL pertaining to UIM coverages, focusing on section 1738(a), which provided, when multiple vehicles are insured on one or more policies providing UIM coverage, any UIM coverages “stacked” by default and the amount of coverage shall be the sum of the limits for each motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured. See also Gallagher v. Geico Indemnity Co., 201 A.3d 131, 137 (Pa. 2019). Section 1738 (a) unambiguously provides for inter-policy as well as intra-policy stacking. 

Although UM/UIM coverage is stacked by default, a named insured may waive stacking of UM or UIM coverages, in which case, the limits of coverage available under the policy for an insured shall be the stated limits for the motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738(b). Each named insured purchasing UM/UIM coverage must be “provided the opportunity to waive stacked limits of coverage and instead purchase coverage as described under Subsection (b). The premiums for an insured who exercises such waiver shall be reduced to reflect the different cost of such coverage.” Id. § 1738(c). Similarly, with regard to the waiver of UIM coverage, stacking may also be waived through the statutorily prescribed form contained in § 1738(b)(2). Failure to comply with the appropriate language in the rejection form will void any purported waiver.  

Citing Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 137, the Superior Court stated that “[w]e must apply general principles of contract interpretation, as, at base, an insurance policy is nothing more than a contract between an insurer and the insured.” It also referred to Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 137 (citation omitted), in noting that, “[i]mportantly, however, provisions of insurance contracts are invalid and unenforceable if they conflict with statutory mandates because contracts cannot alter existing laws.” Based on Erie Ins. Exch. v. Eachus, 306 A.3d 930, 933 (Pa. Super. 2023), it indicated that “[t]he provisions of the MVFRL are mandatory, and where the insurance policy provisions fail … to comply with the provisions of the MVFRL, the policy provisions will be found unenforceable.”

Utilizing these principles, the Superior Court interpreted the policy to determine whether Mr. Baclit, as a sole officer of the company, should be regarded as an insured under the subject policy and, therefore, entitled to stacked UIM benefits. The court first recognized that “[t]he owner and/or officers of a corporation are ‘Class I’ insureds under a policy issued in the name of a corporation.” Miller v. Royal Ins. Co., 510 A.2d 1257, 1258 (Pa. Super. 1986). The Superior Court in Miller had found that Mr. Miller was a de facto named insured under the business automobile policy and that the spouse of a corporate officer was also a “Class I insured.” Taking the analysis in Miller, the court here felt that because Mr. Baclit was the sole officer and president of TKC Trucking and was the sole corporate officer and person responsible for paying premiums for the subject policy, he would be the one who would have had the power to decline waiver of UIM and stacking of coverage for TKC Trucking. 

United contended the subject policy should have been considered a first priority UIM policy. Thus, the concept of “stacking” would not have come into play unless the insured had more than one vehicle insured under one or more policies providing UM or UIM coverage. United presented a hypothetical that Mr. Baclit would be seeking primary UIM coverage under the policy as a single policy of insurance that insures a single vehicle. Following the hypothetical through to its logical conclusion, Mr. Baclit would thereafter seek stacked UIM coverage from his mother’s policy and his own motorcycle policy. As the driver or operator of the vehicle insured under the policy involved in an accident, wherein Mr. Baclit was not at fault, he would recover first priority UIM coverage from the policy under §§ 1731 and 1733 and not stacked coverage under § 1738. Yet, there would be no mechanism for any individual to stack benefits paid for by TKC Trucking under the policy. As per the Supreme Court in Gallagher, this constituted de facto waiver of stacking benefits in violation of the MVFRL. Gallagher, 201 A.3d at 132. 

In the absence of finding Mr. Baclit was an insured under the policy pursuant to Miller, the language of the policy (defining an “insured” in a corporate policy for purposes of stacking UIM benefits) operated as a de facto waiver of stacking coverage because, as in Gallagher, there was no ability for anyone to recover stacked UIM benefits, despite the fact that the carrier did not obtain the requisite waiver in violation of § 1738 of the MVFRL. 

To the contrary, as in Gallagher, Mr. Baclit paid increased premiums to obtain stacked UIM benefits under the commercial policy and, as the sole officer of the company and one who made the payments, reasonably expected to receive such stacked UIM benefits. Unless Mr. Baclit was a named insured under the policy, United’s constricted view of who could constitute as “an insured” for purposes of collecting stacked UIM benefits under a single-vehicle, business automobile policy violated the MVFRL. As such, the Superior Court found no error or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision and affirmed the trial court’s order granting the estate’s motion for summary judgment seeking stacked UIM benefits under United’s commercial automobile policy.  


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.