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Defense Digest

Splitting the Road: Navigating Uninsured Motorist Coverage of Divorced Spouses

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024

June 1, 2024

by Kathleen A. Carlson

Key Points:

  • In Florida, a divorced or separated spouse of an auto insurance policyholder may be entitled to uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM) benefits under their former spouse’s auto policy. 
  • The issue arises when the spouses divorce (or separate) and establish separate residences but do not remove the divorced or separated person from the policy. 
  • Result will be heavily dependent on the facts and terms of the policy.

Is the divorced or separated spouse of an auto insurance policyholder entitled to uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM) benefits under their former spouse’s auto policy? Surprisingly, maybe.

Often an insurance policy issued to married spouses will list a single individual as the named insured and the other spouse as another insured or operator. An issue arises when the spouses divorce (or separate) and establish separate residences but that person is not removed from the policy. Certainly, the carrier did not intend for one personal auto policy to apply to multiple households. The policyholder is likely not even aware of the potential consequence.

When separation or divorce is not reported to the carrier, the carrier has no way of independently knowing. As a result, insurers may continue affording UM coverage to the divorced spouse, believing they are still a member of the policyholder’s household. The carrier’s first notice of the divorce/separation may not even occur until the case is in suit and discovery is underway.

Availability of UM coverage for the divorced or separated spouse is heavily dependent on facts and the terms of the policy. So, it is important to determine if the individuals and autos are covered.

Outside of the named insured policyholder, for example, UM coverage may be afforded to a permissive user, resident relative, or household member. This policy language is important, as it is possible for a divorced or separated spouse to be considered a household member of the policyholder. This is because exclusory policy terms, such as “resident relative” or “household member,” must be construed as liberally as could reasonably be permitted under common use to give effect to the intentions of the parties and the purposes of insurance. Row v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 474 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). 

The test to determine if an individual is a member of the household is physical absence with no intent to return to the household. Sanders v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Most of the Florida case law applying this residency/intent test is in the context of adult children and children of divorced parents, but is it easy to see the parallels if applied to a separated spouse? In American Security Insurance Co. v. Van Hoose, 416 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the court held that a father and daughter were not members of the same household, even though the father provided a substantial amount of financial support to the daughter, but she lived in a different home. Importantly, the court recognized that a joint-household is not established just because one household is dependent on the other for support. 

Outside of Florida, the same residency/intent standard has been applied to separated and divorced spouses. Although other state law is not binding on Florida, the out-of-state courts’ analyses demonstrate that the common theme throughout the case law concerning divorced spouses turns on residency and the parties' intent to return to the relationship/household.

In some states, it is well-established law that a divorced spouse who does not reside with the policyholder is not a member of the policyholding spouse’s household. See, e.g., Crews v. Allstate Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. App. 1998); Johnson v. Payne, 549 N.E. 2d 48 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1990). Similarly, in cases where the spouses are separated and not yet legally divorced, courts in many states consider the physical residency and the status of the relationship. See, e.g., Ledet v. Leighton, 736 So.2d 854 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999); United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Akers, 729 P.2d 495 (Nev. 1986); Wall v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 446 N.W.2d 75 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); GEICO Casualty Company v. Collins, 371 P.3d 729 (Colo. App. 2016). 

However, even if the former spouse is not a household member, there is still the potential for coverage under the policy depending on the vehicle occupied when the loss occurred. If the vehicle is listed on the policy, coverage may extend to the divorced spouse as a permissive user of the vehicle. In this instance, it is important for the carrier to determine if the vehicle garaging and residential information is accurate. 

If a divorced spouse who resides outside of the policyholder’s home owns the vehicle and that vehicle is not listed on the policy, there may not be coverage to the divorced spouse. Similarly, if a divorced/separated spouse is traveling in a ride-share vehicle, like Uber or Lyft, it may be excluded by a covered or owned auto provision. 

These situations are heavily dependent on specific facts and policy language. This issue can be easily overlooked. Once the carrier learns the former spouse is divorced from the policyholder, the carrier should gather the facts to evaluate the situation and potentially seek judicial clarification on the matter through a declaratory action or other appropriate filing.

*Kathleen works in our Jacksonville, Florida, office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

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Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

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Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.