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Case Law Alerts

Plaintiffs Deemed ‘Strangers to Insurance Policy’ Have No Right to Recover

Sam M. Twal, et al., Plaintiffs v. Alberto Y. Vasquez Gomez, et al., Defendants; 2025 WL 3707524

January 1, 2026

by Emily S. Knepper

Sam Twal was stopped in traffic in East Brunswick, NJ when a vehicle driven by Alberto Gomez struck the rear of Twal’s vehicle and pushed it into the vehicle in front of him. The vehicle driven by Gomez was owned by Freddy Pascal Estevez, Axel Logistics LLC, and was insured by United and ABC Corps 1-25.

The plaintiffs filed a complaint for various causes of action, one being a claim against United for violation of Pennsylvania Code 32.11(d), which sets liability insurance minimums for large passenger carriers, and Pennsylvania Code 75. United filed a motion to dismiss, which the plaintiffs opposed.

United made three primary arguments in support of dismissing the complaint as it relates to the counts asserted against it: (1) the plaintiffs did not have a direct cause of action against an alleged tortfeasor’s insurer; (2) there was no direct cause of action against the insurers based upon an insurer’s purported failure to comply with motor carrier safety regulations; and (3) the issues the plaintiffs raised were not ripe because United did not owe a duty to indemnify unless and until there is a settlement or judgment against its insured.

The plaintiffs’ claims against United failed under both New Jersey and Pennsylvania law. Under New Jersey law, “an individual or entity that is ‘a stranger to an insurance policy has no right to recover the policy proceeds.’” Ross v. Lowitz, 120 A.3d 178, 189 (N.J. 2015). The court held that the plaintiffs, as tort claimants, are strangers to the insurance policy and had no right to recover against United absent an assignment of rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to cite any authority that demonstrates they had standing, as third parties to the policy, to bring an action against an insurance company for failing to provide the statutorily required minimum coverage to an insured.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.