.

Case Law Alerts

Federal Court Remands Car Accident Case After Defendant Fails to Prove Plaintiff’s Domicile for Diversity Jurisdiction

Maximo Cruz-Guevara, Plaintiff v. Vijay L. Sukhram, Defendant; 2025 WL 3692677

January 1, 2026

by Emily S. Knepper

Maximo Cruz-Guevera filed this action in New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, in which he alleged that Vijay Sukhram caused a car accident that injured him and damaged his vehicle. Sukhram removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), invoking this court’s diversity jurisdiction. The court then ordered Sukhram to show cause as to why the case should not be remanded for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Sukhram’s initial notice of removal asserted that Cruz-Guevara was domiciled in New York. Sukhram based this assertion on Cruz-Guevara’s complaint, which alleged only that Cruz-Guevara was a resident of New York. Sukhram then submitted one page of Cruz-Guevera’s deposition testimony. In it, Cruz-Guevara stated that his current address is in Long Island and that he has lived there for “a year and something. Maybe two years; I don’t know.” The court found that this was inadequate as the excerpt from the deposition revealed nothing about the other factors relevant to domicile.

Although the state court complaint also alleged that Cruz-Guevara owns, and was driving at the time of the accident, a car registered in New York, Sukhram did not submit any evidence as to this allegation.

The court held that Sukhram failed to prove that Cruz-Guevara was domiciled in New York, which is necessary to support the existence of diversity jurisdiction. The case was remanded.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.