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Case Law Alerts

Delaware’s Long-Arm Statute Does Not Confer Specific Jurisdiction for First Party UIM Claim

James E. Berry, Plaintiff Below, Appellant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant Below, Appellee; Slip Copy, 2025 WL 3678629

January 1, 2026

by Emily S. Knepper

The plaintiff/appellant, a Maryland resident, was injured in an automobile collision in Delaware and sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under a Maryland automobile policy issued to him by State Farm. The Superior Court held that Delaware’s long-arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), does not confer specific jurisdiction over State Farm for Berry’s first-party UIM claim.

Berry was injured in an automobile accident in Delaware. At the time of the accident, Berry resided in Maryland, and his vehicle was insured under a Maryland State Farm policy that provided UIM coverage for accidents occurring anywhere in the United States. The tortfeasor’s insurer paid its $25,000 policy limit to settle Berry’s claims. State Farm consented to that settlement and acknowledged Berry’s right to pursue a UIM claim under his policy.

Berry then filed this action in the Superior Court, seeking UIM benefits, and State Farm moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court relied, primarily, on Eaton v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co., which held that a UIM claim against one’s own insurer is a first-party contract dispute, not a tort claim. As the tortfeasor’s liability had been resolved, and the remaining controversy concerned the insurance company’s alleged failure to perform its obligations under a policy issued and negotiated outside of Delaware, the long-arm statute does not apply.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.