.

Case Law Alerts

Appellate Court Affirms State Liability in Intersection Crash, Finds Other Driver’s Negligence Not a Superseding Cause

Hunt, et al. v. State of New York, 237 A.D.3d 1386 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025)

July 1, 2025

by Brittany E. Bakshi

In a case involving an automobile collision, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division affirmed a decision in favor of the claimants, holding that the other driver’s negligence was not a superseding cause, thus precluding the State of New York’s liability, and it declined to reapportion fault among the State of New York and the other driver. 

The claimant brought this negligence action against the defendant, the State of New York, after the plaintiff’s motorcycle was struck by another driver at an intersection. The claimant alleged that the defendant knew or should have known about certain visual obstructions at the intersection and failed to adequately respond to the dangerous condition thus created. The court of claims found the defendant 75% liable. 

In support of its appeal, the defendant asserted that other driver’s negligence was the sole cause or that its liability was limited by the same. Upon reviewing relevant substantive state case law, the appellate court noted that proximate cause is at issue when the defendant’s negligence is a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury. 

Here, the court held that the claimant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s uncontested negligence in failing to study and adequately remedy the known dangerous condition of the intersection may be deemed a proximate cause of the subject accident. It further held that when a proximate cause analysis involves an intervening act by a third party that liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence. Therefore, the appellate court held that other driver’s negligence in failing to yield the right-of-way was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the situation created by defendant’s negligence. The appellate court concluded by declining to reapportion fault to 50/50 because of the nature of the respective risk-creating conduct, as well as the comparative strength of the causal connection. 


 

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.