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Gregory P. Graham

Shareholder

GPGraham@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Gregory P. Graham

Greg is a member of the Professional Liability Department whose practice focuses on the defense of corporations and professionals in commercial, construction and class action litigation. He also defends attorneys in legal liability actions covering a wide range of malpractice claims including those arising from civil and family disputes, business transactions in the real estate and oil and gas industries, and commercial litigation. 

Greg has substantial experience defending high-value class action cases at both the state and federal level.  In doing so, he prioritizes the development of an early case strategy to defeat class certification in order to minimize his clients’ potential liability and damage exposure. He has successfully defeated class certification in multiple jurisdictions for clients facings claims of invasion of privacy, violations of state and federal electronic communication protection acts, and allegations of improper assessment and conversion of state sales taxes. When certification cannot be avoided, Greg develops an aggressive discovery strategy to minimize class size and damage exposure. He has obtained summary judgment dismissals and favorable settlements in class actions in both state and federal court.  

Greg's construction practice includes the representation of owners, contractors, and design professionals from defect and commercial loss claims related to the construction industry. He has litigated on behalf of clients in matters arising from publicly and privately-funded projects in state and federal court across the country. He also defends construction entities in the natural gas and energy industry facing high-exposure commercial loss and environmental claims. 

Greg has experience litigating on behalf of securities professionals in court and FINRA arbitration. He has successfully assisted financial management companies in responding to administrative investigations brought by state and industry regulatory agencies.  

He is also proficient in matters involving significant E-Discovery and document discovery.  His experience with managing large-scale E-discovery efforts minimizes unnecessary cost while also allowing Marshall Dennehey to provide the best defense possible for its clients in discovery-intensive cases.    

Greg was a 2013 graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. While in law school, Greg was invited to be a visiting research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany. He was also an Articles Editor for the Journal of Technology Law & Policy and a member of two award-winning moot court teams.  

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 2013)
    • Michigan State University (B.A., 2007)
    • Pennsylvania, 2013
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Commercial Litigation; Construction Law; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants (2021-2025)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Litigation – Construction; Professional Malpractice Law (2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2020-2022, 2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute (PDI), Co-Chair Professional Liability Committee
    • AI in the Legal Profession, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, September 2024
    • Co-Taught "Business Law," Westminster College, Spring 2015
    • "Don't Reinvent the Wheel: Approaching Gen AI Usage in Litigation,"The Legal Intelligencer, October 10, 2024
    • "Retooling the Client Engagement Letter to Minimize Liability Claim Exposure,"PLUS Blog, March 23, 2023
    • "Demand for Remote Desktop Access and Cloud Computing Services Necessitates a Refined Approach for Civil Litigation Electronic Discovery," Lawyers Journal, November 18, 2022
    • "Supreme Court's Halliburton Ruling May Be Curse in Disguise for Securities Defendants" Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • "Storm Fronts and Filmmaking: Cloud Computing Regulation and the Impact on Independent Filmmakers," University of Pittsburgh School of Law Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Vol. 13, 2012
    • "Lost in a Cloud: Overview of Legal Obstacles to the Growth of Cloud Computing in European Markets," Croatian Journal of Media & Technology, Vol. 18, 2012

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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Pennsylvania Superior Court Effectively Expands Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice Claims in Pennsylvania

March 1, 2026

After much anticipation, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued its en banc decision in Poteat v. Asteak on December 11, 2025.  In Poteat, the Superior Court sitting en banc confirmed an earlier opinion addressing the question of whether the “gist of the action” doctrine applies to legal malpractice claims. In a disappointing ruling for the defense bar, the court ruled that it does not.  In doing so, it has created uncertainty moving forward as to the defense of legal malpractice actions sounding in breach of contract. Poteat arose from a legal malpractice lawsuit following appellee-attorneys’ provision of legal services to an appellant in a criminal matter. In the legal malpractice action, the trial court granted the appellees’ preliminary objections seeking dismissal of the action via application of the gist of the action doctrine. The appellant set forth a breach of contract claim, arguing that since the breach of contract claim sounded in tort, namely negligence, it should be treated as such by application of the gist of the action doctrine. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence barred the claim. Appellees further argued that the complaint was legally insufficient because it failed to allege a breach of a specific executory promise in the retainer agreement. The plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court’s en banc decision held that hiring an attorney automatically creates an implied contract term that the attorney will provide competent legal services, regardless of whether the contract includes any explicit contractual term promising such. In doing so, the Superior Court has provided authority for plaintiffs in legal malpractice claims to assert the existence and breach of an implied duty that arises from a specific legal contract, without regard to the expressed language of that agreement. In essence, the court eviscerated any gist of the action application to legal malpractice claims and ignored prior precedent which also held that breach of contract claims must be based upon the contract itself, rather than implied terms. Even more problematic for the defense of legal malpractice lawsuits is the fact that this ruling effectively means that all Pennsylvania lawyers’ professional liability claims will be subject to a four-year contract statute of limitations. A negligence claim that an attorney deviated from a professional standard of care that may have been dismissed for falling outside the two-year statute of limitations time period may now be pursued under an alternate breach of contract theory which is subject to a four-year statute. There was a vigorous dissent which was joined by three Superior Court judges. This decision has been appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court given the severity of its potential implications.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Invoking the Mandatory Mediation Clause Against Buyers – A Beneficial Strategic Tactic

November 1, 2025

When facing claims, Pennsylvania real estate agents too often view the mandatory mediation paragraph found within the Standard Agreement for the Sale of Real Estate as little more than boilerplate. In practice, however, this clause can be a valuable and strategic tool for the successful defense of claims. Rather than overlooking such a useful tool, real estate agents should consider invoking the mandatory mediation provision to obtain significant advantages in cost management, liability clarity, and settlement posture. The mandatory mediation provision typically contains the following language: Buyer and Seller will submit all disputes or claims that arise from this Agreement, including disputes and claims over deposit monies, to mediation. Mediation will be conducted in accordance with the Rules and Procedures of the Home Sellers/Home Buyers Dispute Resolution System, unless it is not available, in which case Buyer and Seller will mediate according to the terms of the mediation system offered or endorsed by the local Association of Realtors®. Mediation fees, contained in the mediator’s fee schedule, will be divided equally among the parties and will be paid before the mediation conference. This mediation process must be concluded before any party to the dispute may initiate legal proceedings in any courtroom, with the exception of filing a summons if it is necessary to stop any statute of limitations from expiring. Any agreement reached through mediation and signed by the parties will be binding. Any agreement to mediate disputes or claims arising from this Agreement will survive settlement. This section precludes either the buyer or seller from initiating a legal action without first attempting to mediate the dispute. The only exception identified within the provision allows for the filing of a summons to halt the application of any potential statute of limitations.  At first glance, the provision would not appear to be available to agents involved in the transaction; however, the language is clear that all disputes that arise from the agreement are subject to the mandatory mediation requirement. Upon receipt of a pre-suit claim, real estate professionals should consider invoking this provision to bring all claims and involved parties to mediation. Alternatively, if a lawsuit has already been filed, real estate agents should consider the merits of filing a Motion to Stay and to Compel Mediation pursuant to the provision.  There are numerous benefits to do so.  Cost Savings Through Early Resolution Pre-suit mediation offers a controlled, confidential, and relatively inexpensive forum for resolving the dispute while the parties are still evaluating their willingness to engage in the costs of discovery, depositions and motion practice. By invoking the mediation provision promptly after a buyer identifies a pre-suit claim or upon the receipt of a complaint, an agent and their counsel can participate in a structured discussion aimed at resolution without the procedural overhead of court involvement. Even if mediation does not result in a full settlement, narrowing the issues can dramatically reduce later litigation expenses. Insurers can separately consider the benefits of early mediation for their insureds, as it signals proactive risk management and can help avoid unnecessary defense costs. Clarifying Responsibility Through Information Exchange Claims made by the buyer against real estate agents are often defended on the grounds that the seller’s or buyer’s own actions are the cause of the buyer’s damages. Forcing those parties to mediation encourages the early and informal exchange of key documents—inspection reports, disclosure forms, repair records—that can help inform the parties’ assessment of who bears actual responsibility. When the facts are developed cooperatively, rather than through adversarial discovery, the mediation process often highlights that the real estate agent’s role was limited to communication rather than concealment. This can refocus the dispute toward the truly responsible party and may even resolve the matter without further involvement of the agent.  Managing Plaintiff Expectations for Future Negotiations Even if resolution cannot be achieved during the mediation process, a mandatory attempt early in the life of a claim also serves as an effective opportunity to set realistic expectations for a buyer-plaintiff’s potential recovery. Through the mediator’s neutral perspective, plaintiffs often gain a clearer understanding of the legal limits on agent liability, the availability of defenses—such as the reliance on seller representations—and the challenges of proving causation and damages, especially if the buyer waiver or failure to inspect questions are involved. Even if mediation does not fully settle the case, it can temper inflated expectations and create a more productive environment for subsequent negotiations. In short, mediation under the Pennsylvania Standard Agreement is not merely a procedural requirement—it is a strategic defense opportunity. By embracing early mediation, real estate agents can reduce costs, clarify liability and shape the tone of any future dispute toward resolution rather than escalation.  Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – November 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

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Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia

Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.