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Ashley is an associate in the Casualty Department, handling matters involving Special Investigations (SIU), New York Labor Law, and General Liability matters.

As part of the Special Investigation practice group, Ashley’s experience is in defending cases where we assert allegations of fraud and exaggerated injuries against Plaintiffs. These fact-intensive cases involve fraud rings, staged accidents and exaggerated injuries, in addition to improper and fraudulent medical provider billing and reporting.

As part of the New York Labor Law practice group, Ashley handles complex construction site accident cases throughout the state. These include claims involving the use of scaffold systems, demolition and heavy machinery in industrial, commercial and residential projects

Ashley handles a variety of General Liability matters involving claims of personal injury and property damage. Specifically, defending clients in matter of premises liability (residential, commercial, restaurant, and retail) and motor vehicle torts, including for claims of wrongful death and punitive damages.

Ashley is admitted to practice in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York. Outside of her work at Marshall Dennehey, she stays active through hiking, running, working out, and traveling.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2023)
    • Kutztown University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 2018)
    • Kutztown University of Pennsylvania (Paralegal Certificate, 2018)
    • New Jersey, 2024
    • Pennsylvania, 2024
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2024
    • Maryland, 2025
    • New York, 2025
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2025
  • Obtained summary judgment in a construction site accident matter in which the plaintiff alleged he was injured after lifting a cover and falling into a hole at an active worksite. Our client was the owner of the building under construction at the time of the accident. Based on the contractual agreements and testimony of the parties involved, we successfully argued that the subcontractors and the plaintiff’s employer were solely responsible for worker safety, supervision, and site conditions. We further argued that our client could not be held liable for the alleged negligence of independent contractors. The court agreed, finding that our client owed no duty to the plaintiff, and dismissed all claims against our client.

    Obtained summary judgment in a breach of contract matter involving 41 separate small claims actions filed against our client arising from travel protection policies. The court consolidated the actions into a single matter. The plaintiff, acting by assignment from insureds, sought recovery under the policies’ rental car damage provisions for alleged vehicle damages incurred by his rental car company. We successfully argued that the majority of the assignments were invalid, depriving the plaintiff of standing to sue. We further argued that, even if the assignments were deemed valid, the plaintiff failed to comply with the policies’ terms, conditions, and claim submission requirements, including conditions precedent to coverage. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against our client.

    Successfully obtained summary judgment in a slip-and-fall matter in which the plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell on snow and ice in a parking lot while entering her vehicle. Our client owned property adjacent to that of a co-defendant, and based on the accident report, plaintiff’s testimony, and expert findings, we successfully argued that the incident did not occur on our client’s property and that our client therefore owed no duty to the plaintiff. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against our client.

    Successfully obtained summary judgment in a breach of contract claim against our client in the Eastern District of New York. The case involved a rental car company attempting to recover from a credit card company based on credit cardholders’ assignment of Collision Damage Waiver benefits to the plaintiff. We argued that there were no contracts between the credit cardholders and our client, but that the contracts were between the cardholders and the non-party banks. The Court dismissed the case in its entirety.

    Successfully won a dismissal of a New York Labor Law case before the Supreme Court, New York County. ​Plaintiff's counsel withdrew from this case after potential fraud issues were raised by the defense. The plaintiff proceeded pro se and then did not appear at further court conferences. The judge later dismissed the case entirely. 

    • “Enforceability of Choice-of-Law Provisions in Maritime Contracts,” Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

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Defense Digest

Enforceability of Choice-of-Law Provisions in Maritime Contracts

December 1, 2024

Key Points:  Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are enforceable. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC helps with the uniformity of federal maritime law. This decision helps save on costs and time if there is a future dispute to the contract. General Overview A choice-of-law provision is a contractual provision that would be used to specify what law will govern the contract should a future dispute arise. Choice-of-law provisions have been known to be an issue when it comes to insurance contracts. A dispute arises when there are two different states’ laws that may be applicable to a contract and the parties do not agree on which one should be applied. If the parties do not agree and cannot decide which state’s law to apply, the court must then decide. These issues ultimately arise when the parties to the contract are in different jurisdictions. In many maritime contracts, the parties are from different jurisdictions, so this issue is one that comes up frequently. Enforceability of a choice-of-law provision is governed by federal maritime law.  The Supreme Court of the United States recently applied federal maritime law in Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, 144 S. Ct. 637, 642 (2024). Their decision has streamlined this issue by holding, when there is a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract, the court must enforce it, except if one of the two exceptions applies. Further, the Supreme Court stated that a “[l]ongstanding precedent establishes a federal maritime rule: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable.” Before this case, the Court had not addressed this issue, but other lower courts had.  Rule on Choice-of-Law Provisions  In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court determined that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, subject to two narrow exceptions: (1) when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute or an established federal maritime policy; or (2) when the contracting parties cannot show any reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. With regard to the second exception, the court must apply “substantial deference to the contracting parties.”  Advantages of Rule on Choice-of-Law Provision  The Supreme Court stated: “By identifying the governing law in advance, choice-of-law provisions allow parties to avoid later disputes—as well as ensuing litigation and its attendant costs.” Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, 144 S. Ct. 637, 644 (2024). Further, by allowing a choice-of-law provision to be enforceable in a contract, it will save time and money that would be expended on motions and hearings to determine which state’s law should apply to the dispute. If a maritime contract has a provision with the choice-of-law already agreed upon, there would be no dispute as to what law the court would apply to the case. Moreover, determining the choice-of-law in advance helps maritime shippers to decide on the front end “what precautions to take” on their ships (American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 454 (1994)) and enable[s] marine insurers to better assess risk (see Brief for American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici Curiae, at pp. 12–13). Choice-of-law provisions, therefore, can lower the price and expand the availability of marine insurance. Should a dispute between parties arise, the court would then turn to the choice-of-law provision in the contract as the law to be applied, unless the contract falls within one of the two exceptions listed above.  The Future The Supreme Court did not discuss the “issue of federalism in admiralty and the scope of application of state law in maritime cases...” Great Lakes Ins. SE, 144 S. Ct. at 642 (quoting 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 4:4, p. 268 (6th ed. 2018). As stated above, this rule on choice-of-law provisions applies to federal maritime law. However, if a state court is hearing a maritime case, it can apply its state laws, as long as they do not conflict with the federal maritime law. Conclusion This decision is favorable for insurers as these provisions will generally be upheld in future contracts. Also, by having these provisions in maritime contracts going forward, insurers will be saving time and costs on disputing these issues pre-trial. Lastly, knowing what law will apply to the contract gives the contracting parties the advance opportunity to determine what protections/precautions they should take. *Ashley is an associate in our Casualty Department and works in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.