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As an associate in the Casualty Department, Angie represents a diverse range of clients in civil litigation, focusing on premises liability, auto liability, and other general liability matters.

Angie graduated early from Florida Atlantic University with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. During her undergraduate career, Angie wrote her honors thesis titled: Exploring the Effects of Prosecutorial Discretion on Sentencing. She graduated with her juris doctor from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law. During her law school career, she served as a bilingual article editor for the International Law Students’ Association Journal of International and Comparative Law. She wrote and published an article in ILSA’s Volume 28 Issue titled:  A Comparative & International Study of Laws & Regulations Protecting Against Sexual Crimes in the United States, Colombia, and Norway: Sexual Violence in the Military and Armed Forces.  As an intern with Florida Legal Aid, Angie provided guidance and legal assistance to victims of domestic violence. Further, she gained valuable experience as an intern with the Broward County Public Defender’s Office. She also participated in the Children and Families Law clinic as a certified legal intern where she offered representation in various family law matters with the supervision of the clinic director. 

Prior to joining the firm, Angie represented both plaintiffs and defendants in landlord-tenant, construction defect, commercial, and municipal matters. 

Outside of the practice of law, Angie enjoys spending time with her family.  

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2023)
    • Florida Atlantic University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2020)
    • Florida, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2025
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2025
    • Spanish (Fluent)
    • Florida State Bar Association, Young Lawyers Division
    • Obtained summary judgment in a foodborne-illness wrongful death case. The plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against multiple parties, including the seafood supplier, asserting that the Decedent died after consuming raw oysters containing vibrio vulnificus. Our attorneys represented the supplier and argued that there was no evidence the oysters were defective when they left the supplier’s control. Their expert provided an affidavit outlining the applicable harvesting, processing, and transportation standards and confirmed that the supplier met all relevant duties. Faced with this record, plaintiff’s counsel ultimately conceded that the evidence did not support a claim against the supplier. The Court granted summary judgment in the supplier’s favor. The case continues against the remaining defendants, who face multimillion-dollar demands.

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Defense Digest

Limitations to Expert Testimony

December 1, 2025

Key Points:  An expert may not testify to matters that fall outside his or her area of expertise. Biomechanical engineers are generally qualified to opine about an accident’s forces and the general types of injuries those forces may generate.  Biomechanical engineers may not offer opinions regarding patient-specific causation without appropriate medical expertise.  Experts play a critical role in litigation. In cases where there is a dispute over whether the forces involved in an accident were sufficient to cause an alleged injury, biomechanical experts are especially valuable. These experts analyze human movement and applied forces to assist in accident reconstruction and injury mechanism analysis.  Under Section 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2025):  [A] witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if:  (1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The Fifth District Court of Appeal recently addressed the limits of biomechanical expert testimony in Clark v. Hahn, 401 So.3d 550, 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024), in which the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Kermit and Evelyn Hahn for negligence.  The plaintiff alleged she suffered permanent injury as a result of a car accident. During the trial, the plaintiff requested that the court prohibit the defense expert from giving medical causation opinions. The defendants’ counsel assured the court that the biomechanical expert would not offer medical opinions.  However, during the trial, the biomechanical expert was asked whether the forces applied to the plaintiff’s spine could have produced the injury mechanisms at issue. The expert opined that the particular accident would not have generated the mechanisms necessary to cause an intervertebral disc herniation in the cervical spine in a person of the plaintiff’s height and weight, given the specific vehicle involved. The trial court overruled the plaintiff’s objection and permitted the testimony.  The jury ultimately found that the plaintiff did not suffer a permanent injury. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial, and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the expert’s testimony exceeded the scope of his expertise. The District Court reasoned the expert testified to matters outside of his area of expertise by offering a patient-specific causation opinion. The biomechanical expert was not a medical doctor and, thus, not qualified to render such an opinion. The court explained, “While biomechanical experts may discuss the forces generated by an accident and how a hypothetical person’s body will respond to those forces they are not qualified to render medical opinions regarding the precise cause of a specific injury.” Biomechanical experts are not generally allowed to render opinions that require medical expertise, such as the permanency or severity of an injury. Such opinions require a medical evaluation of the patient, which is beyond the typical expertise of a biomechanical engineer. This limitation does not necessarily apply if the biomechanical engineer is also a medical doctor. Doctors retained as experts may testify as to specific causation.  The expert’s training, education, and certifications must be analyzed alongside their expected testimony to determine whether their opinions are beyond their expertise. In such cases, a Daubert motion must be timely filed to exclude the opinions that are outside of the expert’s scope. The Daubert standard stems from a United States Supreme Court case that outlines the trial courts’ role as the “gatekeepers” of expert testimony. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Daubert standard is codified in § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2025), and requires the expert’s testimony to be both relevant and reliable. Understanding the limitations of an expert’s testimony plays a vital role in structuring litigation strategy. Clark reinforces a key evidentiary boundary for expert testimony. Biomechanical engineers may testify regarding the magnitude of accident forces and the general injury mechanisms such forces can produce. However, biomechanical engineers may not cross into medical causation opinions without the appropriate medical qualifications. The case also highlights the importance of timely objecting to improper expert testimony.   Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.