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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2026

January 1, 2026

RESULTS*

Tony Natale (King of Prussia, PA) successfully prosecuted a termination petition. The claimant, a police officer for the borough, sustained a work injury to the neck, back and lower extremities in the form of aggravations of pre-existing conditions. The claimant testified that he only treated sporadically for the pre-existing condition before the work injury and that his treatment intensified greatly after the work injury. To the contrary, the treatment records showed the claimant regularly treated for his medical conditions three times a week prior to the work injury, all the way up to two days before the work injury. The claimant’s expert was unaware of the prior treatment, and on cross examination Tony was able to force the expert to agree that the claimant’s base-line condition was equivalent to the current symptomatology. As such, the court granted the full recovery as the claimant reached base line and fully recovered from the work aggravation.

Rachel Ramsay-Lowe and Bill Murphy (both of Roseland, NJ) received dismissal without prejudice. The petitioner alleged a motor vehicle accident on May 5, 2024, resulting in injuries to her neck, back, left side of her body and her left arm. A motion was filed to dismiss for lack of employment, arguing that the petitioner was never in the employment of our insured. The motion was unopposed, and on November 25, 2025, the judge ordered dismissal of the claim for lack of employment. 

Anna Robertelli and Bill Murphy (both of Roseland, NJ) received dismissal without prejudice. The petitioner alleged occupational exposure from October 2013 to October 2023, resulting in orthopedic and neurologic injuries to his right arm, hand and wrist, including but not limited to carpal tunnel syndrome. Following the petitioner’s failure to timely respond to our discovery requests, a motion to dismiss was filed for lack of prosecution. On December 8, 2025, the judge entered an order for dismissal for lack of prosecution.

Michael Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) and Alana Staniszewski (Pittsburgh, PA) were successful in having a Claim Petition denied where the claimant avered he sustained work-related chemical burns. The claimant testified that while working for the employer, he sat on an overturned trash can to take a brief break before clocking out. After getting up, he noticed his pants and underwear were wet. He punched out and walked to his apartment about a block away. He undressed, took a shower, and noticed his buttocks burning. He put a cream on it, but it became worse. The next morning he sought medical treatment. He was hospitalized from August 3, 2024, until September 3, 2024, as he had second degree chemical burns on his buttocks and the back of his thighs. He received an incision, debridement, and soft tissue necrosis procedure to his perineum, buttock and left thigh. The claimant eventually was released to return to work without restrictions and found fully recovered by his doctor. No medical testimony was submitted. The claimant submitted medical records and relied upon a one-page report opining that his burns were related to sitting on a wet trash can. No details were provided regarding any specific exposure to chemicals. We presented fact witness testimony detailing the claimant’s job duties and exposure to chemicals which revealed the claimant was not exposed to any hazardous chemicals, only normal cleaning supplies. Video footage submitted revealed the claimant sitting on the trash can, getting up, moving to another trash can, and then leaving without issue; he never looked at his pants or felt his pants to see if they were wet. The workers’ compensation judge found the claimant’s testimony not credible because he would expect the claimant to try to touch his pants, look at it, or dry it off. He did not find the claimant credible regarding showering and then sleeping with the burning sensation before seeking treatment 16 or more hours later. The judge also found the employer’s fact witness credible. He did not find the claimant’s one-page medical report credible as this claimant’s expert opinion was cursory and provided no explanation other than merely relying on the claimant’s history. Thus, the claim petition was denied and dismissed.

Michael Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) successfully settled a case with no admission of liability and a settlement of $24,500 with no payment of medical bills. The claimant, a mason, alleged he sustained a stroke while at work. The claimant reported to work in the morning, although he told his supervisors he was not feeling well. He was provided an apprentice and told to take it easy. He went to the bathroom multiple times and then asked to leave early. He left after about two to three hours of working. He then went to the hospital, was discharged, and then went back. When he returned, he was told he had a stroke. He was hospitalized for a period of time and then discharged with out-of-work restrictions. His expert testified that the claimant’s job duties as a mason caused his stroke. Specifically, this expert alleged the claimant’s job was physically demanding, he was regularly exposed to concrete dust and had stressors from supervising an apprentice, all of which caused his stroke. Our expert testified that the claimant’s stroke was a result of his unregulated hypertension and failure to consistently take his blood pressure medication. The employer’s fact witness testimony revealed the claimant did not supervise any apprentice and wore respirators whenever he was exposed to concrete dust. After completing all evidence, claimant’s counsel presented a demand of $310,000 plus payment of medical bills and reimbursement of litigation costs. 

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 


NEWS

Michael R. Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) we recently elected a shareholder of the firm effective January 1, 2026. Mike focuses his practice on defending employers and insurance carriers in matters related to workers’ compensation. He represents employers across numerous industries including trucking, construction, landscaping, manufacturing, hospitality and long-term care. He is a member of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Coalition, Brehon Law Society, Philadelphia Bar Association and Judge Alexander F. Barbieri Workers’ Compensation Inn of Court. He earned his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University and his juris doctor from Widener University Delaware Law School. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.