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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Court Clarifies What Constitutes a Clear Waiver of Section 40 Right

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 4, April 2026

April 1, 2026

by Kiara K. Hartwell

Tomaselli v. Petco, No. A-2252-24 (April 3, 2026)

In Tomaselli v. Petco, Petco appealed from a workers’ compensation order regarding the waiver of its N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 (“Section 40”) lien rights. On December 23, 2017, the petitioner was struck by a car while collecting shopping carts in Petco’s parking lot. He filed a workers’ compensation claim in February 2018, and Petco filed an answer with Sedgwick administering the claim on its behalf. The petitioner also filed a third party case and obtained a settlement of $85,000 in underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits and $15,000 in third party settlement.

Sedgwick sent a letter to the petitioner on June 28, 2021, advising of the Section 40 lien rights and noting the benefits paid to date, though medical treatment was ongoing. It noted Sedgwick agreed to accept $33,333.33 of the $85,000 from the UIM settlement and $15,000 from the third party settlement. On August 19, 2021, the petitioner’s counsel sent a check for $33,333.33 with a letter noting the check represented a final payment of the lien, which Sedgwick cashed.

After a workers’ compensation trial, the judge issued a written decision finding the petitioner suffered a compensable injury, exacerbating his pre-existing condition and found the $33,333.33 payment was in full satisfaction of the Section 40 lien and that Petco waived its future lien rights. Petco appealed the portion of the judgment regarding waiver.

The Appellate Division noted that neither party disputed Petco had the right to recover reimbursement under Section 40, absent the alleged settlement and waiver. The only issue on appeal was whether Petco waived its Section 40 lien rights. While Petco argued the letter describing the check as “full and final” was not a clear and unambiguous waiver of its rights, the Appellate Division disagreed, indicating the waiver did not have to be expressly stated as long as the party knew of its rights and clearly intended to waive them. The Appellate Division found that Sedgwick’s cashing of the check with the letter resulted in the waiver. Petco also argued the letter did not explicitly reference Section 40 and that accepting the $33,333.33 was only for the accrued amount to date. However, the Appellate Division noted Petco was not entitled to the third party proceeds except by virtue of the Section 40 lien and Petco could have waited until the workers’ compensation case resolved before perfecting its lien. The Appellate Division also pointed out that Petco could have insisted on the full third party recovery amount at the time it accepted the $33,333.33 as it already paid more than the third party amount.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.