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Results

  • Defense Proves Surgery and Disc Herniation Not Work-Related.

    We successfully defended a national home décor manufacturer in the litigation of a review petition, which sought to add a cervical disc herniation and surgery to the nature of injury accepted in the case. The litigation had wide ramifications since the same claimant had attempted to reinstate workers’ compensation benefits based on an accepted shoulder/arm injury a year earlier and failed. As a result, the claimant traveled to Florida and underwent cervical disc surgery, claiming it was part of the same work-related injury. The defense proffered medical evidence to support the fact that the surgery and disc herniation were not caused by the work injury and that the medical bills and disability associated with the surgery were, likewise, not work-related.

  • Federal Black Lung Fatal Claim Petition Denied.

    We successfully defended a fatal claim petition filed by the widow of a coal miner who had been awarded benefits for totally disabling coal workers’ pneumoconiosis in 1984. Despite the fact the miner had been collecting temporary total disability benefits from 1984 until the time of his death in 2016, we were able to present credible and persuasive medical evidence to the Workers’ Compensation Judge that coal workers’ pneumoconiosis was not a substantial contributing factor to the miner’s death. The fatal claim petition was denied.  

  • Successful Defense of National Car Company in Workers’ Compensation Litigation.

    We successfully defended a national car company in a case involving the defense of a termination petition, the claimant’s petition for review of the utilization review determination, the claimant’s petition to review compensation benefit off-set, and a petition for penalties. The case involved a 2013 injury involving low back sprain/strain and an aggravation of degenerative disc disease with radiculopathy and facet arthropathy. The defense expert, a board certified orthopedic surgeon, reviewed all of the claimant’s pre- and post-injury medical records and diagnostic study films. The claimant admitted that he had increases of pain with activities not associated with work (long drives out of state, shoveling snow, housework) which he had failed to report to the IME physician or his own treating doctor. The Workers’ Compensation Judge ordered the termination of all the claimant’s benefits. The judge also dismissed the claimant’s petition to review the URO, finding the treating physician’s treatment no longer reasonable and necessary. Finally, the claimant’s penalty petition was dismissed.  

  • Workers’ Compensation Judge: No Work-Related Brain Injury.

    We successfully defended an eastern regional can corporation in the litigation of a brain injury case. The claimant was struck in the lower extremities by a form of sheet metal which caused him to become unconscious. Nearly three years later, the claimant filed a petition alleging that he sustained a brain injury with post-concussion syndrome and cervical disc herniations as a result of the incident. The defense presented fact witness testimony from the scene of the accident which directly contradicted the claimant’s version of the facts. Moreover, the defense emphasized the weaknesses in the claimant’s medical expert’s opinions on cross examination as to causation. The Workers’ Compensation Judge found the claimant did not sustain a brain injury, post-concussion syndrome or cervical disc herniations related to employment.  

  • Successful Prosecution of a Modification/Suspension Petition

    Successfully prosecuted a modification/suspension petition on behalf of a large financial institution nearly 12 years after the claimant’s injury. ​The claimant sustained injuries to her left shoulder and cervical spine in October of 2005. Since that time, she had two cervical spine surgeries and two shoulder surgeries. The defense established that the claimant was able to return to work in a sedentary-duty capacity, working from home in a telemarketing position, thus modifying her total disability benefits to partial disability. The Workers’ Compensation Judge was particularly persuaded by the factual testimony demonstrating that the actual job duties were no more than what she had to do in her normal activities of daily living.

  • Successfully Defended Local University in a Hostile Jurisdiction on a Course and Scope of Employment Defense

    The claimant was a very credible employee who was seriously injured while on a horseback riding excursion at a Continuing Medical Education seminar. While attendance at the seminar was part of the claimant's job, the case evidence focused on whether the horseback riding extracted the claimant from the course and scope of employment. The defense presented fact witnesses from the university who testified that activities undertaken by the claimant outside of the scheduled CME classes (despite fostering camaraderie among the participants) were not within the claimant's course and scope of employment. The Workers’ Compensation Judge accepted our arguments, and the claim petition was denied and dismissed.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.