.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 9, September 2023

September 1, 2023

NEWS

Elias Hassinger (Philadelphia, PA) will co-present at the 2023 Philadelphia Bar Association’s Bench-Bar & Annual Conference on September 22, 2023. In “Proper Identification of Pain Generators in Work Injuries/Personal Injuries and Novel Treatment Options,” Eli and the other panelists will explore proper identification of pain generators and novel treatment options and how they may affect the workers' compensation claim.

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) will co-present “Getting Caught with Your Hand in the Proverbial Cookie Jar” at this year’s ClaimsXchange in Philadelphia. In this presentation, the panel will discuss best strategies for investigating, uncovering, and deterring fraudulent acts while exploring methods to recover monies paid out to fraudulent actors. They will also examine how fraud impacts the claim value and how to counteract its debilitating effects. For more information, visit: https://www.theclaimsx.org/getting-caught-with-your-hand-in-the-proverbial-cookie-jar.  
 


 

RESULTS*

Greg Bartley (Roseland, NJ) successfully defended a case involving the cancellation of a workers’ compensation policy. The case involved a company that had failed to pay their insurance premium on its workers’ compensation policy. The carrier notified the insured company that the premium had not been received and that the carrier was taking the necessary steps to cancel the policy. The carrier complied with rules for policy cancellation pursuant to the New jersey Department of Labor. The case involved a worker who was injured on the day after the policy was cancelled. The company, on the day after the worker’s injury, electronically paid the premium. The day following receipt of the policy premium, the carrier issued a new policy covering the company. When given notice of the claim, the carrier denied it based upon the cancellation of the policy. The petitioner filed a claim petition, alleging that the failure to pay the premium should not deny him coverage, as the payment of the premium and subsequent issuance of the new policy amounted to a mere lapse in coverage and the carrier’s acceptance of the premium should result in the coverage being reinstated as of the date of cancellation, not the date of the new policy. After numerous hearings over more than two years and two judges, who supported the position of the petitioner, Greg argued the case with all parties present. The court agreed that the cancellation was legally effective and, therefore, entered an order of dismissal as to the carrier.

Ben Durstein (Wilmington, DE) was successful in having the Delaware Superior Court affirm the Industrial Accident Board’s decision that the employer correctly paid for ketamine infusion treatments. The Board had found that these treatments were properly paid pursuant to the Delaware Workers’ Compensation Fee Schedule. The court rejected the claimant’s argument that Section 2322(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act required a higher payment for the “reasonable cost” of the treatment.

Adam Huber (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully obtained orders for dismissal with prejudice on two Medical Provider Applications. Two separate New Jersey medical providers alleged they were entitled to additional money for medical treatment provided in New Jersey to a New Jersey resident. Each provider claimed that, because the injured worker who received the treatment was a current resident of New Jersey and treatment was rendered in New Jersey, that provided sufficient contact for the court to exercise jurisdiction for a Medical Provider Application and bills should be paid at a usual and customary rate, as opposed to New York’s fee schedule. The worker’s compensation claim that resulted in the Medical Provider Applications was a New York claim, with no New Jersey contacts for the parties at the time of the injury. The injured worker only later moved to New Jersey and received medical treatment with New Jersey providers, who were then paid per the New York fee schedule. The providers’ billed amounts were $221,591.55, $6,157.50, and $6.157.50 for three dates of service. The employer made payments in the amount of $55,488, $1,401.83, and $740.42, respectively, per the New York fee schedule. Adam successfully argued to the court that, because it would not have been able to exercise jurisdiction over the underlying worker’s compensation claim, it would not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the two resulting Medical Provider Applications. Therefore, the providers could not seek additional money in New Jersey based on its usual and customary standard, as opposed to New York’s fee schedule. This saved the employer up to $176,276.30 in potential medical payments. Both Medical Provider Applications were dismissed with prejudice.

William Murphy (Roseland, NJ) successfully obtained orders for dismissal with prejudice where two New Jersey medical providers alleged they were entitled to additional monies for medical treatment provided in New Jersey to a New Jersey resident. The underlying accident involved a truck driver who resided in New Jersey, regularly worked in New Jersey, but sustained injuries in Massachusetts. While the injured worker initially filed a New Jersey workers’ compensation claim, he subsequently opted to pursue his claim in Massachusetts, in part, because Massachusetts allowed him to select his own treatment providers (unlike New Jersey, where the employer designates the treatment providers). Each provider claimed that, because the injured worker was a resident of New Jersey, worked in New Jersey and treatment was rendered in New Jersey, there was sufficient contact for the court to exercise jurisdiction for a Medical Provider Application. As such, they claimed their bills should be paid at New Jersey’s standard of a usual and customary rate, as opposed to Massachusetts’s fee schedule. The providers’ billed amounts were $173,927.52 and $128,088.00. The employer made payments in the amount of $13,872.87 and $7,149.01, respectively, per Massachusetts’ fee schedule. William successfully argued to the court that, because the injured worker had opted to pursue a Massachusetts workers’ compensation claim and had selected these medical providers pursuant to said claim (as a New Jersey claim would have required employer-approval), the payment of these medical providers should be governed by Massachusetts’ workers’ compensation system. Therefore, the providers could not seek additional money in New Jersey based on its usual and customary standard, as opposed to Massachusetts’ fee schedule. This saved the employer up to $280,993.64 in potential medical payments. Both Medical Provider Applications were dismissed with prejudice.

Tony Natale (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended a claimant’s reinstatement and review petitions and prosecuted the employer’s termination petition. The claimant sustained traumatic injuries when the vehicle he was operating was targeted for collision by a mentally disturbed individual trying to commit suicide. The claim was accepted as compensable, and eventually, the claimant was able to return to work full duty. Nine years later, the claimant alleged his right to reinstatement to total disability and payment of medical bills that quizzically were not submitted to the carrier but were paid, in part, by a personal health carrier. The claimant was also pursuing Heart & Lung benefits, and the township’s bargaining agreement allowed the H&L claim to be governed by the ruling in the workers’ compensation claim. Both sides submitted expert evidence on the issues of full recovery and recurrence of disability and factual evidence on the payment of medical bills. The court found in the favor of the employer on all issues. 

Tony Natale (Philadelphia, PA) successfully prosecuted a termination petition involving a knee injury where claimant’s job duties required him to fill a basket with mushrooms, pivot or sidestep and dump the basket into a slicer machine. During his course and scope of employment, it was judicially determined that he sustained injuries in the form of meniscal tears of the knee and the rather vague “injury” of patellar subluxation. On cross examination of claimant’s medical expert, Tony forced him to admit that the meniscal tears had fully recovered. As for the subluxation, Tony exposed the fact that the expert did not diagnose such a condition in the medical treatment notes but, instead, referred to a “chondromalacia” condition that was NOT judicially part of the work injury. The claimant’s medical expert went as far as to indicate on cross examination that the claimant remained totally disabled from his pre-injury job, even though Tony forced him to admit that he had no idea of the claimant’s pre-injury job. 

Robin Romano (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the claimant’s petition to review to add a right hip injury. The claimant had already succeeded in having a claim petition granted that acknowledged the left hip and left hip surgery. The Workers’ Compensation Judge carefully considered the testimony of both medical experts. Importantly, the judge rejected the claimant’s surgeon’s testimony, which found a causal relationship between the right hip and the work injury. Robin presented the defense medical expert, who credibly testified that the mechanism of the original injury would not have caused a right hip injury and, also, that an altered gait, suffered by claimant as a result of the accepted left hip surgery, did not lead to a right hip injury or aggravation of what was clearly pre-existing osteoarthritis. 

Michael Sebastian (Scranton, PA) successfully defended a claim petition alleging a specific loss of the right eye from being hit in the eye with the top of a box. The Workers’ Compensation Judge rejected the claimant’s expert’s testimony that the macular scar, which is in the back of the eye, was caused by the work injury and believed the defense expert, who opined there was insufficient force from the top of the box to cause the injury to the back of the eye. The defense expert testified that the claimant’s loss of vision was unrelated to the work event because the claimant did not have any visible damage to the front of the eye at the time of the accident and that there are dystrophies that can cause macular degeneration in one eye. 

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 9, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.