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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW JERSEY WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2021

What’s Hot in Workers’ Compensation, Vol. 24, No. 12, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

1.    The Appellate Division affirmed a Judge of Compensation’s decision to include the petitioner’s portion of attorneys’ fees and costs in the employer’s Section 40 lien.
Panckeri v. Allentown Police Dep’t, Docket No. A-2015-19 (Appellate Division, Decided Mar. 2, 2021)

In this per curiam decision, the Appellate Division enforced a statutory lien, agreeing with the Judge of Compensation that the petitioner’s share of costs and fees should be included as a part of the subrogation calculation. In affirming the judge’s decision, the Appellate Division heavily relied on the judge’s reasons and only added that the petitioner’s reliance on Kuhnel v. CNA Insurance Cos., 322 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div. 1999) was misplaced, as the petitioner’s share of fees and costs was not addressed Kuhnel was decided eight years prior to the 2007 amendment of Section 40, in which there was no mention of a petitioner’s portion of fees and costs.

2.    The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed medical marijuana in workers’ compensation cases.
Hager v. M&K Constr., 246 N.J., 1247 A.3d 864 (2021)

The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed both the workers’ compensation court’s order and the Appellate Division’s to order a respondent to reimburse a petitioner’s medical marijuana costs. First, the Supreme Court found the employer did not qualify as “a government medical assistance program or private health insurer” under the Compassionate Use Act and N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14 and that medical marijuana was a reasonable and necessary treatment. Finally, the Supreme Court noted the employer was not aiding and abetting the petitioner’s possession of marijuana by reimbursing medical marijuana costs.

3.    The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of a workers’ compensation case based on the premises rule.
Pilone v. Cnty. of Middlesex, Docket No. A-1676-19, (Appellate Division, Decided Mar. 15, 2021)

The Appellate Division agreed with the judge’s decision that the petitioner’s injury was not compensable as it did not arise out of and in the course of employment. In reiterating that the premises rule limits an employer’s liability to locations that the employer controls, such as by ownership, maintenance or exclusive use, the Appellate Division noted the respondent had no control over the sidewalk where the petitioner fell. In addition, the Appellate Division pointed out the petitioner failed to prove the respondent directed her to have her meeting in the donut shop. 

4.    The Appellate Division affirmed a judge’s finding of causal relationship between the work accident and need for treatment after weighing expert opinions.
Soto v. Exclusive Coachworks, Inc., Docket No. A-2331-19, (Appellate Division, Decided Apr. 12, 2021)

In affirming a judge’s order to provide benefits, the Appellate Division noted the judge, as the trier of fact, was in the best position to weigh the credibility of experts and the decision was well-supported by the record. In this case, both experts agreed the petitioner needed a total knee replacement; that as a result of the 2017 incident, he required arthroscopic surgery, at a minimum; and his underlying arthritis was exacerbated by the 2017 incident. 

5.    The Appellate Division affirmed a workers’ compensation judge’s decision to dismiss as the injury was not in the course of employment.
Regalado v. F&B Garage Door, Docket No. A-0083-20 (Appellate Division, Decided Jun. 8, 2021)

The Appellate Division affirmed a Workers’ Compensation Judge’s decision to dismiss a petitioner’s claim as a result of a car accident after an employer’s annual holiday party. The Appellate Division reviewed Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513 (2004), noting that an employee’s subjective impression of compulsion alone was insufficient. Rather, other factors needed to be taken into account, such as the employer’s solicitation of employee participation, when/where/whom the event takes place, and whether refusal could negatively impact the employee’s employment. 

6.    The Appellate Division affirmed a workers’ compensation court order to deny additional medical and temporary benefits to a petitioner.
Constanzo v. Meridian Rehab, Docket No. A-5547-18 (Appellate Division, Decided Jun. 17, 2021)

The Appellate Division agreed with the judge, who heard testimony and found the petitioner failed to establish a causal relationship between the original injury and current left knee condition. There was ample evidence to support that the current left knee condition was not related to the April 2016 incident and the judge did not err in giving greater weight to Dr. Sieler’s testimony, as judges are in the best position to assess credibility, and giving more weight to one expert’s opinion is not a basis to reverse a judgment.

7.    The Appellate Division affirmed the workers’ compensation court decisions, noting petitioners were not entitled to redetermination of benefits.
Published Consolidated Appeals (Appellate Division, Decided Jun. 21, 2021): Wilhelm v. Ryder Logistics & Transp. Sols. & Second Injury Fund, Docket No. A-3770-18; Bozarth, Sr. v Burlington Cnty. & Second Injury Fund, Docket No. A-3792-18; Schiazza v. Western Oilfield Supply & Second Injury Fund, No. A-3797-18; and Pierce, Jr. v. CBF Trucking & Second Injury Fund, Docket No. A-3798-18

The Appellate Division agreed with the Judge of Compensation that N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 did not compel a triennial redetermination of Average Current Earnings (ACE) nor was it mentioned. As an issue of first impression, the Appellate Division noted that New Jersey was a reverse offset state, in which the workers’ compensation award was reduced rather than Social Security Disability. In addition, the Appellate Division noted the plain language does not include same and there was no mention in the legislative history. It was also indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) created an exception for reverse offset states. As such, the Appellate Division found the triennial redetermination of Average Current Earnings (ACE) was not applicable in New Jersey as a reverse offset state.

8.    The Appellate Division affirmed grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs’ failure to establish intentional wrong.
Estate of Portillo v. Bednar Landscaping Serv., Inc., et al. and Estate of Zelaya v. Bednar Landscaping Serv., Inc., et al., Docket No. A-3110-19 (Appellate Division, Decided Jul. 8, 2021)

In affirming the Law Division’s grant of summary judgment, the Appellate Division found the plaintiffs were collecting workers’ compensation benefits and the defendants did not commit an “intentional wrong.” After reviewing relevant case law, the Appellate Division found that, unlike some of the prior cases, the defendants here had no prior OSHA citations and were not aware of OSHA’s safety regulations for trenches. In addition, the plaintiffs could not show the defendants had knowledge regarding the unsafe trench practice and substantial certainty of the collapse. Judge Sabatino joined in the majority’s decision to affirm summary judgment, but added in his concurring opinion his thoughts on the troubling inconsistency between the defendants’ lack of knowledge assertions in the civil case and Bednar Landscape’s plea of guilty to a criminal accusation of violating a known legal duty to take precautionary safety measures. 

9.    The Appellate Court affirmed dismissal of claim for petitioner’s failure to demonstrate injury was in course and scope of employment.
Mackoff v. New Brunswick Saw Serv., Docket No. A-3625-19 (Appellate Division, Decided Jul. 14, 2021)

The Appellate Division agreed with the judge in denying the petitioner’s motion and dismissing the claim. In doing so, the Appellate Division reviewed Jumpp v. City of Ventnor, 177 N.J. 470 (2003), in which the Supreme Court found that compensability for employees who work away from the office should be based on whether the employee was performing job duties at time of the injury. Because the petitioner admitted that the Inn was two hours out of his way, rather than going directly to his office from the meeting location; the Inn was never a customer; and he had no other appointments with customers, the Appellate Division declined to disturb the judge’s findings. 

10.    The Appellate Court reversed dismissal of workers’ compensation claim under premises rule.
Walker v. Saker ShopRite, Docket No. A-2770-19 (Appellate Division, Decided Sep. 7, 2021)

The Appellate Division reversed the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s dismissal of a claim based on the conclusion that the accident did not take place in the course of the petitioner’s employment. In revising the premises rule, the Appellate Division found the petitioner’s incident occurred in an area controlled by Saker. The Appellate Division further explained that “it is well-established in workers’ compensation jurisprudence that when compensability of an accident depends on control of the employer, that test is satisfied if the employer has the right of control; it is not necessary to establish that the employer actually exercised that right.” 

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.