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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The New Jersey Supreme Court addresses medical marijuana in workers’ compensation cases.

Hager v. M&K Constr., 246 N.J., 1247 A.3d 864 (2021) and Calmon v. Pepsi Bottling Group, No. A-2160-19, (App. Div. May 11, 2021)

July 1, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In Hager v. M&K Constr., the respondent, M&K Construction, appealed a workers’ compensation order to reimburse the petitioner for medical marijuana, which was prescribed after a work-related injury. The petitioner was injured in August 2001 while employed as a laborer for M&K. He underwent two back surgeries, but due to persistent pain, he took opioid medication. He began treating with Dr. Joseph Liotta in 2016, when he was enrolled in the medical marijuana program as an alternative pain treatment and a means to wean him off opioids. Although he started with an ounce per month, his dose increased to the maximum allowed—two ounces—which cost more than $600.00 per month.

At trial, Dr. Liotta testified for the petitioner, noting that he suffered adverse side effects from opioids and was “motivated” to stop, which happened a month after starting medical marijuana. Dr. Liotta indicated there is a smaller risk of addiction to marijuana and fewer serious side effects. The petitioner also testified that it helped him wean off opioids, lessened his pain and helped with muscle spasms. In addition, Dr. Cary Skolnick testified for the petitioner that he needed long-term pain management as a result of the August 2001 injury and that he was 100% permanently and totally disabled, apportioning 65% for the back injury and 35% due to medication effects.

On the other hand, Dr. Gregory Gallick testified for the respondent, finding the petitioner to be 12.5% permanently disabled and still capable of certain jobs. Dr. Robert Brady also testified in describing side effects and risks of medical marijuana. He noted both medical marijuana and opioids were equally psychologically addictive, though opioids were more physically addictive. He opined that medical marijuana was not proven effective for conditions such as the petitioner’s and, rather, the best form of relief would be physical therapy and home exercise.

The Workers’ Compensation Judge found 65% permanent partial disability, apportioning 50% for the orthopedic condition and 15% due to medical marijuana effects. In choosing between medical marijuana and opioids, the court noted medical marijuana was the “clearly indicated option” and ordered M&K to reimburse the petitioner for its costs. The judge found Dr. Liotta and the petitioner’s testimony to be more credible than that of Dr. Brady, specifically emphasizing the petitioner’s ability to wean off opioids. The court indicated that “the Legislature intended to make available the benefits of medical marijuana to persons displaying a medical need, despite the federal attitude toward the substance.” Finally, the judge rejected the notion that M&K was like a private health insurer or government medical benefit program, which would not be required to reimburse medical marijuana costs.

The Appellate Division affirmed the workers’ compensation court’s findings and further went on to analyze whether the New Jersey Jake Honig Compassionate Use Medical Cannabis Act (Compassionate Use Act) was preempted by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). In doing so, the Appellate Division found the Compassionate Use Act did not require employers to “possess, manufacture, or distribute” marijuana per the CSA. In addition, the Appellate Division concluded there was no aider-and-abettor liability for assisting in the petitioner’s possession as M&K did not have the requisite intent and, thus, did not face a credible threat of federal prosecution.

The Supreme Court then granted M&K’s petition for certification. First, the Supreme Court considered M&K’s argument that it should not have to reimburse the petitioner for costs of medical marijuana under the Compassionate Use Act and N.J.S.A. 24:6I-14 as it exempts “a government medical assistance program or private health insurer” from reimbursement. The court rejected this argument, citing to the plain language of the statute and indicating a workers’ compensation carrier does not fall into either category. Furthermore, the court looked to the legislative intent in not specifically including workers’ compensation insurance in the Compassionate Use Act, as other states have done. Because the Legislature did not exclude workers’ compensation carriers and included “chronic pain” as a qualifying medical condition, M&K was not exempt from reimbursing the petitioner.

Next, the Supreme Court rejected M&K’s argument that medical marijuana was not a “reasonable and necessary treatment.” The court looked to a prior decision in Squeo v. Comfort Control Corp., 99 N.J. 588 (1985), where construction of an injured worker’s apartment was found to be reasonable and necessary. The Squeo court not only considered the petitioner’s loss of use of his arms and legs, but also the possible psychological harm due to the petitioner’s multiple suicide attempts after an offer for placement in a nursing home. Similarly, in this case, the court recognized a potential harm to the petitioner in continuing to use opioids. In addition, reimbursement of medical marijuana was noted to be much less unique than the construction of an apartment found in Squeo.

In returning to the first point, as the Supreme Court found M&K was obligated to reimburse the petitioner under the Compassionate Use Act and the workers’ compensation statute, the court then analyzed whether the federal CSA quashed M&K’s state law obligations. After finding guidance from the United States Supreme Court and several circuit courts, the court determined M&K could follow both the Compassionate Use Act and CSA, as the first does not create any obstacles in accomplishing congressional objectives. The court also acknowledged that its decision differed from other state supreme courts, but it noted they were not binding and that its decision was in line with legislative intent, an analysis of federal authorities and the principles of preemption.

Finally, the Supreme Court discussed M&K’s contention that reimbursing medical marijuana costs would be aiding and abetting the petitioner’s possession of marijuana. The court initially noted that M&K was not “electing” to aid the petitioner’s possession of marijuana but, rather, that it was being compelled by court order. Further, the court indicated M&K failed to demonstrate specific intent to aid-and-abet. Again, it was reiterated that M&K was being compelled by the court and, thus, could not be considered as intentionally committing an offense.

Approximately a month after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hager, the Appellate Division in Calmon v. Pepsi Bottling Group affirmed the workers’ compensation order to reimburse the petitioner for medical marijuana prescribed for a work-related back injury. As Hager addressed the same issues raised by Pepsi Bottling Group, the Appellate Division issued this decision after relying on Hager.

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.