.

Defense Digest

Penalties, Sanctions and Other Bad Employer Words

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Robert J. Fitzgerald

Key Points:

  • Permanency benefit awards must be paid in a timely manner.
  • The penalties awarded should be consistent the lateness of the payment, the amount of permanency benefits awarded and the possible bad faith of the parties.
  • The penalties awarded should be governed by permanency award factors, such as the amount of time it takes the litigation to resolve.

In Luis Ripp v. County of Hudson, 277 A.3d 1071 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2022), the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed factors to be considered in awarding financial penalties for the late payment of permanency benefit awards. The petitioner worked for Hudson County as an assistant chief engineer/boiler operator. He sustained a work injury on February 11, 2013, and filed a claim petition. On January 26, 2021, he received an award of permanent/total disability. When the award was not paid within 60 days, the petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce.

The award was paid on April 12, 2021, 16 days after what the parties considered to be the due date. The respondent offered several excuses for the late payment, including that its third-party administrator failed to submit the payment request in time for the county commissioners meeting, that its third-party administrator was delayed due to the transfer of an adjustor and, of course, that there was delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Judge of Compensation noted in the underlying litigation that the petitioner needed to successfully make enforcement motions to obtain temporary disability benefits. The judge also noted that there were settlement discussions for a permanent/total award in August 2019, but the county did not authorize settlement until January 2021. She stated the petitioner was “without significant funding for quite a long time” and had written to the court on many, many occasions, sharing his dismay over the amount of time it was taking to resolve his claim. She said the petitioner was “anxious about money and the court was very sensitive to all of that.”

In granting the motion, the judge ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner an additional $43,370 within 60 days. The county appealed. In the subsequent written decision, the judge reiterated that the respondent agreed in early 2019 that the petitioner was totally disabled. She noted that the petitioner was receiving Social Security Disability benefits and that, because “Social Security is notoriously slow,” it delayed computation of the petitioner’s average current earnings, necessary so the order could be effectuated.

The judge also recognized that, given the size of the award, the county needed to involve its excess insurance carrier. The excess carrier’s authority to settle was not provided until December 2020.

However, the judge stated this delay “was to the dismay of [Ripp].” She cited “several letters” from the petitioner that she shared with counsel, detailing his emotional and financial distress as a result of not working. The judge cited the petitioner’s “life-altering injury,” lack of “wages for over four years,” and his “disabled child,” which left the judge very sympathetic. The judge also said the court had “bent over backwards to give the [county] the time to ‘get it’s ducks in a row,’” and it was “inconceivable” that payment was overdue. The judge found the county’s delay was “unreasonable” and concluded it was appropriate to impose the maximum additional assessment of 25% to enforce the order.

On appeal, the respondent argued the judge erred in her expansive application of Section 28.2 (Penalties and Sanctions) and, additionally, that she abused her discretion in imposing a manifestly excessive assessment under the circumstances. The court agreed and reversed the order. It first referenced Section 28.1 which provides:

If an . . . employer’s insurance carrier, . . . unreasonably or negligently delays or refuses to pay temporary disability compensation, or unreasonably or negligently delays denial of a claim, it shall be liable to the petitioner for an additional amount of 25% of the amounts then due plus any reasonable legal fees incurred by the petitioner as a result of and in relation . . .

Next, the court referenced the amendments to Section 28.2, which now provide:

If any employer . . . fails to comply with any order of a judge of compensation . . . , a judge of compensation may, in addition to any other remedies provided by law:

a.         Impose costs, simple interest on any moneys due, an additional assessment not to exceed 25% of moneys due for unreasonable payment delay, and reasonable legal fees, to enforce the order, statute or regulation;

b.         Impose additional fines and other penalties on parties or counsel in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for unreasonable delay, with the proceeds of the penalties paid into the Second Injury Fund

Additionally, the Division then adopted Rule 12:235-3.16(h)(1)(i), which allows a judge to impose an additional assessment not to exceed 25% on any moneys due if the judge finds the payment delay to be “unreasonable.” Unlike Section 28.1, which deals with delays in paying temporary disability benefits and defines a 30-day delay as presumptively unreasonable, the Legislature here chose not to specify what is a presumptively unreasonable delay in payment of settlement proceeds under an order entered under the statute.

Based on these provisions, the court reasoned that the plain and unambiguous language of Section 28.2 limits imposition of a penalty to situations justifying the court’s enforcement of its order fixing the moneys due a petitioner pursuant to that order only if there is an “unreasonable payment delay.” In this case, the order was not entered until January 26, 2021. Therefore, it was not an “unreasonable payment delay” prior to March 26, 2021.

Accordingly, it was legal error for the judge to consider, for example, the length of time it took to resolve the petition after the parties agreed the petitioner was totally disabled. No payments were due the petitioner until the order was entered, and no payments were delayed for the first 60 days after that. Further, the judge recognized that there were ample, legitimate reasons why it took until January 2021 to enter the order finally settling the matter, and that those delays were not “unreasonable.”

Having said that, however, the county did not contest that it failed to pay the petitioner the moneys due under the order in a timely fashion. Rather, it offered various excuses for the delay, which the judge considered and, to some degree, accepted as reasonable. Nevertheless, the judge imposed the maximum statutory penalty for a 16-day payment delay.

In reversing the order, the court noted there was no reported case defining the appropriate standard of appellate review of a penalty awarded pursuant to a motion seeking enforcement of an order entered under the statue. In remanding the case, the court instructed that it would be appropriate to consider the length of the delay, the size of the late payment, and the effect a sizeable payment that is delayed beyond its due date would undoubtedly have upon a petitioner and his or her family.

Notably, a judge cannot consider delays in the litigation that predated entry of the order. Further, the court insinuated that an award of the maximum penalty under the statute, even though the delay in payment was only 16 days, and the certain extenuating circumstances that reasonably delayed payment in this case, would be struck down. Additionally, the court also suggested the lack of presence of bad faith, if any, would be factor to consider. Interestingly, the court indicated that the proceedings on remand could be conducted by a different judge.

This is the first case that addresses the factors to be considered in awarding penalties and sanctions for the late payment of a permanency benefit award. It is also very timely, given that many respondents are struggling to hire and retain claims professionals in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and The Great Resignation over the past couple of years. In its decision, the court confirms the long-standing requirement that workers’ compensation awards are required to be paid on a timely basis. When that fails to happen, Section 28.2 allows for various penalties, sanctions, etc., but maximum monetary punishments should not be awarded reflexively. Accordingly, respondents should continue to strive for full compliance in the timely payment of awards, or unnecessary and possibly substantial additional financial losses could result.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Deemed Worker an Employee Despite Independent Contractor Agreement; Insurer Estopped from Denying Coverage

In this case, the claimant filed a Claim Petition for injuries sustained on October 28, 2019, naming J&S as his Employer, and alleging that the injuries occurred when he fell from a ladder while installing a satellite dish for Dish Network. Dish Network contracted with J&S to install satellite dishes. Subsequently J&S filed a Petition to Join Brickstreet Insurance Company and the claimant filed a Claim Petition against the Uninsured Employer Guaranty Fund. The Fund then joined Dish Network as another employer.  Before the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), the claimant testified that he was hired in 2015 by J&S and at the time signed an Independent Contractor Agreement (IC Agreement). J&S defended the case on the basis that the claimant was not an employee, but was an independent contractor, even after the IC Agreement expired. Additional evidence showed that, at the time of the October 28, 2019, work injury, J&S’ workers’ compensation insurance with Brickstreet had lapsed, even though a Brickstreet agent had been working to renew J&S’ policy and had a Certificate for coverage from September 25, 2019 to September 25, 2020 issued, with Dish Network listed as the Certificate Holder. A renewal policy was not in effect at the time the Certificate was issued and the agent learned on October 25, 2019 that Brickstreet was not going to renew their policy with J&S, due to an unpaid premium.    Ultimately, the WCJ found that the claimant was an employee of J&S at the time of the work injury and that J&S did not have a workers’ compensation policy in place at the time, due to their failure to pay the renewal premium to Brickstreet. The WCJ also found Dish Network was a Statutory Employer under Section 302(a) of the Act. The Claim Petition and the Guaranty Fund Claim Petition were both granted, as was the Guaranty Fund’s Petition to Join Dish Network. The WCJ also denied J&S’ Petition to Join Brickstreet, finding that neither J&S or Dish Network showed that Brickstreet was estopped from denying coverage. J&S and Dish Network appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) and the Board affirmed. J&S and Dish Network appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court rejected J&S' argument that the claimant was an independent contractor. In doing so, the court noted that the claimant credibly testified that he worked for J&S full time, could not work for another company, and that J&S, scheduled his jobs, tracked him, and scheduled additional installations, if he finished early. Additionally, the court noted the claimant lacked discretion in the manner he performed his job, because all questions had to be referred to J&S.  As for Dish Network’s appeal, the court held that the WCJ erred in holding that Brickstreet was not estopped from denying coverage as to Dish Network. According to the court, the insurance agent was an authorized representative of Brickstreet and, at the direction of J&S, issued the Certificate of Insurance that he knew was not accurate at the time, and was aware would be presented as proof of coverage for J&S. Dish Network relied upon that information and continued to use J&S, ultimately leading to Dish Network being named as the Statutory Employer liable for payment of benefits because of J&S’ uninsured status. The court held that the Board erred in affirming the WCJ ’s conclusion that Dish Network did not establish that Brickstreet was equitably estopped from denying coverage, reversed the decision below, and remanded the case to the WCJ. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Trial Judge’s Orders Granting Summary Judgement for Defendants on COVID-19 Case

In Dunne v. Advanced Subacute Rehab Servs. at Sewell, LLC, et al., the plaintiffs appealed from two Law Division orders. By way of background, Louis Doto, Sr. (Doto) worked for BP & SC Services, Inc. (BP). BP leased Doto to Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell, LLC (Advanced Subacute) and it had control of his work, paid wages, and had the power to hire or fire him. A BP employee was assigned to the facility to train and supervise him and BP was responsible for securing workers’ compensation coverage. Doto worked as an aide in the laundry department. Linen from COVID-19 residents were delivered in clearly marked bags and he had no direct contact with residents. A co-worker, Sheila Smith, was also an aide and she never contracted COVID-19 at the facility. Advanced Subacute did not require Doto to wear an N-95 mask, but instead a surgical mask, though N-95 masks were available to all employees. He was also required to attend period mandatory meetings with other high-risk employees, the last of which he attended was in November 2020. All employees were required to test for COVID-19 and there were no reported cases from June to October 2020. On December 23, 2020, Doto tested positive for COVID-19 and passed away on January 18, 2021. The last member of housekeeping that Doto may have encountered tested positive 22 days earlier. After his death, OSHA found two “serious” violations concerning the N-95 masks worn by housekeepers. In response, Advanced Subacute fit tested all non-clinical staff. Doto’s estate filed a workers’ compensation claim and named both BP and Advanced Subacute as his employer. The estate received an award. In July 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Law Division, alleging wrongful death and survivor causes of action. In October 2024, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing: 1) immunity pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act: 2) the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act; 3) Doto’s inability to establish infection at the facility; 4) net expert opinions by the plaintiffs’ expert; and 5) inadmissibility of the OSHA report. The plaintiffs opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing: 1) no immunity as Advanced Subacute engaged in gross negligent or willful misconduct; 2) no preclusion by the Workers’ Compensation Act as Doto was not Advanced Subacute’s employee; and 3) no net expert opinions. In February 2025, the judge issued a written decision granting the defendants’ motion. Specifically, he found Advanced Subacute’s COVID-19 immunity precluded the plaintiffs’ claim as no reasonable jury could find any gross negligence or utter disregard for Doto’s safety. He also addressed the other defenses for completeness. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and the judge issued another written decision denying the plaintiffs’ motion in April 2025. The plaintiffs then appealed both decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the orders for reasons stated by the judge in his written decisions. The Appellate Division only added: 1) Advanced Subacute acted consistently with the legislative grant of immunity; 2) there was no doubt Doto was an employee of both BP and Advanced Subacute and the latter may have inadvertently failed to follow some precautions; and 3) confirmed the plaintiffs’ experts did not identify a basis for their opinions. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no reason to disturb the judge’s well-reasoned decisions and affirmed the judge’s orders.

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Adopts Traditionally More Expansive Concept of Occupational Causation

The Florida Supreme Court issued a significant decision rebuking the First District Court of Appeal (1st DCA) in the high-profile case of Bouayad v. Normandy Insurance Co., a case addressing the compensability of workplace injuries resulting from assaults by third-party tortfeasors. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits, relying in part on the Florida Supreme Court's earlier decision in Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria from 1980. In Strother, the Court upheld an award of benefits to a cashier who was assaulted and robbed by individuals who followed her home from work under the mistaken belief that she was carrying restaurant cash deposits. In Bouayad, the 1st DCA concluded that the claimant's injuries were not compensable because they did not arise out of his employment. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the 1st DCA applied too narrow an interpretation of the "arising out of employment" requirement. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a broader and more traditional view of occupational causation than that recently adopted by the 1st DCA. The claimant in Bouayad was the general manager of a car rental business operating from a hotel near an airport. Around midnight, while walking along a covered outdoor walkway from the hotel's atrium, where the rental kiosk was located, to an office near the pool, he was shot multiple times by an unidentified assailant. As part of his regular duties, the claimant carried rental agreements and cash receipts from the kiosk to the office at the end of each shift. After the shooting, the claimant managed to return to the hotel atrium, where he stated that he believed "Robert" had shot him, referring to an individual who had threatened the claimant's son the previous day. The assailant, however, was never identified. Consequently, the Supreme Court analyzed the case as involving an unknown third party while the claimant was acting within the course and scope of his employment. The central issue therefore was whether the injury "arose out of" the claimant’s employment. At the final hearing, the claimant presented evidence regarding the risks and hazards associated with his employment, including the nature of his duties, his late-night work schedule, and the location of the business in a high-turnover hotel near a major airport. His expert opined that these factors exposed him to an increased risk of becoming the victim of a crime while at work. In contrast, the employer/carrier's expert characterized the shooting as a targeted attack rather than a robbery and asserted that the risk of violent crime was actually higher near the claimant's residence than at the hotel. Based on that analysis, the expert concluded that the claimant was not exposed to an increased workplace risk. The 1st DCA focused narrowly on the specific activity the claimant was performing at the moment of injury. According to the court, the claimant's “work performed” at the time of the shooting was simply "walking" between two employer-operated locations, and that act of walking did not itself cause the injury. The Florida Supreme Court found this analysis far too myopic and inconsistent with decades of workers' compensation precedent. Reaffirming longstanding principles of workplace causation, the Court explained that the proper inquiry is not whether the precise physical task being performed at the moment of injury directly caused the harm. Rather, the relevant question is whether the employment, viewed as a whole, exposed the worker to risks and hazards that contributed to the injury. The decision is significant because it reinforces a broader conception of work-relatedness in the “arising out of” compensability analysis. Instead of limiting the causation analysis to the employee's discrete physical activity at the time of injury, courts must consider the totality of the employment circumstances, including the employee's duties, work environment, hours, and occupational risks. Under that framework, an injury may arise out of employment when the employment places the employee in a position of increased hazard, even if the specific task being performed at the moment of injury is not itself the direct cause of the harm.