.

Defense Digest

Notice of An Injury Can Be Extended Beyond 120 Days

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021

March 1, 2021

Key Points:

  • Section 311 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act specifies the time that injured workers have for providing notice of a work injury to employers.
  • Unless the employer has knowledge of the occurrence of the injury, the injured worker has to provide notice of a work injury within 21 days to be eligible to receive compensation from the date of injury and onward.
  • If an injured worker does not provide notice within 21 days, no compensation is due until the day notice is provided.
  • An injured worker will be barred from receiving benefits if notice of the injury is not provided within 120 days from the date of injury.

In a case of first impression, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania “extended” the statutory time period for giving notice of an injury. An injured worker, in certain circumstances, now has up to 123 days to report a work injury!

In Holy Redeemer Hosp. Systems v. WCAB (Figueroa), 2020 WL 7778193 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 31, 2020), the claimant was employed as an emergency room nurse when, on Saturday, July 25, 2015, she felt significant pain in her left leg. The claimant was scheduled to work on Sunday, July 26, 2015, but she called off and sought medical treatment from her physician, who removed her from work. The claimant did not report her work injury to the employer until Monday, November 23, 2015. The case was denied and disputed by the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier, which prompted the claimant to file a claim petition. The Workers’ Compensation Judge found that the claimant sustained a work injury, but that she didn’t provide timely notice under Section 311 of the Act. Specifically, the judge found that the claimant notified the employer of the work injury 121 days after the injury, or one day late.

The claimant appealed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Judge to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which reversed the judge’s finding of timeliness of the claimant’s notice to the employer. The Board noted that the 120th day fell on a Sunday and that Section 311 of the Act was silent as to whether notice needs to be given on a Sunday if the claimant’s notice obligations are set to expire. Accordingly, the Board looked beyond the Act to Section 1908 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908, which states:

When any period of time is referred to in any statute, such period in all cases, . . . shall be so computed to exclude the first and include the last day of such period. Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on a Saturday or Sunday, or any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation.

The Board found that the claimant timely reported her work injury because she had until Monday, November 23, 2015, to report it. Although that date was 121 days after the work injury, the report was still timely because the 120th day fell on a Sunday, which is omitted from the computation per Section 1908.       

Ultimately, the case reached the Commonwealth Court when the employer appealed the decision of the Board. The sole issue raised was whether the Board erred in finding that the claimant provided timely notice of the work injury.

The employer tried to establish that nothing prevented the claimant from reporting her work injury on Sunday, November 22, 2015, and that the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 did not have an application to Section 311 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. In sum, the employer argued that she didn’t work for an employer who was open for business five days a week. Instead, she worked in the emergency room, which was open 24 hours a day, 365 days per year. Furthermore, she was injured on a Saturday and even called off of work the next day.

The Commonwealth Court acknowledged that neither the Act nor the regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation provide guidance on how to calculate the 120-day notice requirement. The Commonwealth Court analyzed the above arguments and determined that the claimant timely reported her injury. In doing so, the Commonwealth Court found that Section 1908 applies to a statute that “contains a time period within its terms,” unless the statute specifically excludes the application of Section 1908. The Commonwealth Court explained that, when calculating the 120-day time period, the date of injury is excluded from the calculation, and so is the last day, provided it lands on a weekend or a holiday recognized by the Commonwealth or the United States.

These days, the claimant has up to 123 days to report an injury if the 120th day falls on a Saturday and a legally recognized holiday is on a Monday. Make sure you review your calendars closely the next time you think you have a notice defense and can issue a notice of workers’ compensation denial based upon the same. Also, after the claim is reported, make sure you gather as much information as possible during your investigation since this decision doesn’t change the fact that late reporting, even if timely under the Act, is often the first of many red flags related to the claim.

*Ryan is a shareholder in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania office. He can be reached at 412.803.1173 or rahauck@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Adopts Traditionally More Expansive Concept of Occupational Causation

The Florida Supreme Court issued a significant decision rebuking the First District Court of Appeal (1st DCA) in the high-profile case of Bouayad v. Normandy Insurance Co., a case addressing the compensability of workplace injuries resulting from assaults by third-party tortfeasors. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) found the claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits, relying in part on the Florida Supreme Court's earlier decision in Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria from 1980. In Strother, the Court upheld an award of benefits to a cashier who was assaulted and robbed by individuals who followed her home from work under the mistaken belief that she was carrying restaurant cash deposits. In Bouayad, the 1st DCA concluded that the claimant's injuries were not compensable because they did not arise out of his employment. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the 1st DCA applied too narrow an interpretation of the "arising out of employment" requirement. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a broader and more traditional view of occupational causation than that recently adopted by the 1st DCA. The claimant in Bouayad was the general manager of a car rental business operating from a hotel near an airport. Around midnight, while walking along a covered outdoor walkway from the hotel's atrium, where the rental kiosk was located, to an office near the pool, he was shot multiple times by an unidentified assailant. As part of his regular duties, the claimant carried rental agreements and cash receipts from the kiosk to the office at the end of each shift. After the shooting, the claimant managed to return to the hotel atrium, where he stated that he believed "Robert" had shot him, referring to an individual who had threatened the claimant's son the previous day. The assailant, however, was never identified. Consequently, the Supreme Court analyzed the case as involving an unknown third party while the claimant was acting within the course and scope of his employment. The central issue therefore was whether the injury "arose out of" the claimant’s employment. At the final hearing, the claimant presented evidence regarding the risks and hazards associated with his employment, including the nature of his duties, his late-night work schedule, and the location of the business in a high-turnover hotel near a major airport. His expert opined that these factors exposed him to an increased risk of becoming the victim of a crime while at work. In contrast, the employer/carrier's expert characterized the shooting as a targeted attack rather than a robbery and asserted that the risk of violent crime was actually higher near the claimant's residence than at the hotel. Based on that analysis, the expert concluded that the claimant was not exposed to an increased workplace risk. The 1st DCA focused narrowly on the specific activity the claimant was performing at the moment of injury. According to the court, the claimant's “work performed” at the time of the shooting was simply "walking" between two employer-operated locations, and that act of walking did not itself cause the injury. The Florida Supreme Court found this analysis far too myopic and inconsistent with decades of workers' compensation precedent. Reaffirming longstanding principles of workplace causation, the Court explained that the proper inquiry is not whether the precise physical task being performed at the moment of injury directly caused the harm. Rather, the relevant question is whether the employment, viewed as a whole, exposed the worker to risks and hazards that contributed to the injury. The decision is significant because it reinforces a broader conception of work-relatedness in the “arising out of” compensability analysis. Instead of limiting the causation analysis to the employee's discrete physical activity at the time of injury, courts must consider the totality of the employment circumstances, including the employee's duties, work environment, hours, and occupational risks. Under that framework, an injury may arise out of employment when the employment places the employee in a position of increased hazard, even if the specific task being performed at the moment of injury is not itself the direct cause of the harm.

News

106 Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Recognized in the 2027 Editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America

Marshall Dennehey is proud to highlight the firm’s 106 attorneys who have been recognized in the 2027 editions of The Best Lawyers in America® and the Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch® in America. Less than 6% of all practicing lawyers in the U.S. were selected by their peers for this recognition. Additionally, four of the firm’s attorneys received the Best Lawyers® 2027 “Lawyer of the Year” awards in their respective practice areas and demographic regions. Since it was first published in 1983, Best Lawyers® has become universally regarded as the definitive guide to legal excellence. Best Lawyers lists are compiled based on an exhaustive peer-review evaluation. For more information, please visit https://www.bestlawyers.com/. OUR 2027 LAWYERS OF THE YEAR Harrisburg, PA Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers Compensation Law - Employers Roseland, NJ Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants   OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS IN AMERICA Philadelphia, PA Nicholas D. Bowers, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Josh J. T. Byrne, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Jefferey J. Chomko, Insurance Law James H. Cole, Insurance Law John J. Delany III, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Laurianne Falcone, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John P. Gonzales, Employment Law - Management John Hare, Appellate Practice Daniel D. Krebbs, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Michele Punturi, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Bradley D. Remick, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Andrea Cicero Rock, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robin M. Romano, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Daniel J. Ryan, Jr., Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Gary M. Samms, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Christopher N. Santoro, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation -Defendants Josh D. Scheets, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Robert P. Schenk, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Robert E. Smith, Insurance Law Robin Snyder, Litigation - Health Care Michael L. Turner, Commercial Litigation; Criminal Defense: White-Collar; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Claire Breaux Ventola, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Melissa Devich Cochran, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants  John F. Deasy, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Daniel W. Deitrick, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Douglas C. LaSota, Litigation - Construction; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Joseph V. Lesinski, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants   Christian D. Marquis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia A. Monahan, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Patrick T. Reilly, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Brett C. Shear, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Teresa O. Sirianni, Education Law; Employment Law – Management; Litigation - Labor and Employment Stuart Sostmann, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Danielle M. Vugrinovich, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants Scranton, PA Sarah E. Argo, Litigation - Insurance Michael J. Connolly, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants Matthew Keris, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants John T. McGrath, Jr., Insurance Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants William J. McPartland, Insurance Law John R. Nealon, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Victoria Scanlon, Health Care Law; Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Michael A. Sebastian, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Thomas A. Specht, Insurance Law; Litigation - Insurance Suzanne Tighe, Litigation Insurance Harrisburg , PA Casey Alan Coyle, Administrative/Regulatory Law; Appellate Practice; Commercial Litigation Brittany E. Bakshi, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Shannon P. Fellin, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Allison Krupp, Insurance Law John R. Ninosky, Litigation – Insurance; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Christopher Reeser, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Kacey Wiedt, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers King of Prussia, PA  Michael L. Detweiler, Construction Law Joseph L. Hoynoski III, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Gregory J. Kelley, Construction Law, Litigation - Construction Anthony Natale III, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Francis X. Wickersham, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers A. Judd Woytek, Workers' Compensation Law – Employers Erie, PA Patrick M. Carey, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Joel M. Snavely, Health Care Law; Insurance Law New Haven, CT Michael Wrona, Commercial Litigation, Litigation - Bankruptcy  Mount Laurel, NJ David D. Blake, Litigation - Insurance Barbara Davis, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lynne Nahmani, Litigation - Health Care John H. Osorio, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants John L. Slimm, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants Roseland, NJ Robert T. Evers, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Justin F. Johnson, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Julia Klubenspies, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Leonard C. Leicht, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Patricia M. McDonagh, Appellate Practice Sunny Sparano, Litigation - Construction Randall S. Watts, Health Care Law New York, NY Tonya M. Lindsey, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants Tampa, FL Michael Archibald, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Lindsay G. McCormick, Litigation – Construction Orlando, FL Thomas F. Brown, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Dante C. Rohr, Commercial Litigation Fort Lauderdale, FL Kimberly Kanoff Berman, Appellate Practice Patrick M. Delong, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Jacksonville, FL  Heather Byrer Carbone, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Linda Wagner Farrell, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Elizabeth B. Ferguson, Litigation - Construction James P. Hanratty, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Wilmington, DE Sarah B. Cole, Litigation - Insurance Benjamin K. Durstein, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Maria R. Granaudo, Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants  Keri L. Morris-Johnston, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Cincinnati, OH Timothy B. Schenkel, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David E. Williamson, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Cleveland, OH Vincent E. Cononico, Litigation – Insurance, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Jillian L. Dinehart, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants David J. Fagnilli, Insurance Law Jason P. Ferrante, Health Care Law, Litigation - Health Care Andrew H. Isakoff, Transportation Law Leslie M. Jenny, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendant OUR 2026 BEST LAWYERS: ONES TO WATCH Jacksonville, FL Sean J. Reeves, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants Orlando, FL Carolin A. Pacheco, Insurance Law Mount Laurel Stacey Gorin, Insurance Law Melville, NY Kimberly Gitlin, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants Matthew A. Gray, Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Philadelphia, PA Holli K. Archer, Health Care Law; Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law Emily Pritchyk, Commercial Litigation; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants Pittsburgh, PA Taylor E. Kosko, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants Alana Staniszewski, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers Michael D. Winsko, Product Liability Litigation – Defendants; Transportation Law King of Prussia, PA Richard Lechette, Commercial Litigation; Insurance Law, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Deemed Worker an Employee Despite Independent Contractor Agreement; Insurer Estopped from Denying Coverage

In this case, the claimant filed a Claim Petition for injuries sustained on October 28, 2019, naming J&S as his Employer, and alleging that the injuries occurred when he fell from a ladder while installing a satellite dish for Dish Network. Dish Network contracted with J&S to install satellite dishes. Subsequently J&S filed a Petition to Join Brickstreet Insurance Company and the claimant filed a Claim Petition against the Uninsured Employer Guaranty Fund. The Fund then joined Dish Network as another employer.  Before the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), the claimant testified that he was hired in 2015 by J&S and at the time signed an Independent Contractor Agreement (IC Agreement). J&S defended the case on the basis that the claimant was not an employee, but was an independent contractor, even after the IC Agreement expired. Additional evidence showed that, at the time of the October 28, 2019, work injury, J&S’ workers’ compensation insurance with Brickstreet had lapsed, even though a Brickstreet agent had been working to renew J&S’ policy and had a Certificate for coverage from September 25, 2019 to September 25, 2020 issued, with Dish Network listed as the Certificate Holder. A renewal policy was not in effect at the time the Certificate was issued and the agent learned on October 25, 2019 that Brickstreet was not going to renew their policy with J&S, due to an unpaid premium.    Ultimately, the WCJ found that the claimant was an employee of J&S at the time of the work injury and that J&S did not have a workers’ compensation policy in place at the time, due to their failure to pay the renewal premium to Brickstreet. The WCJ also found Dish Network was a Statutory Employer under Section 302(a) of the Act. The Claim Petition and the Guaranty Fund Claim Petition were both granted, as was the Guaranty Fund’s Petition to Join Dish Network. The WCJ also denied J&S’ Petition to Join Brickstreet, finding that neither J&S or Dish Network showed that Brickstreet was estopped from denying coverage. J&S and Dish Network appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) and the Board affirmed. J&S and Dish Network appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The Commonwealth Court rejected J&S' argument that the claimant was an independent contractor. In doing so, the court noted that the claimant credibly testified that he worked for J&S full time, could not work for another company, and that J&S, scheduled his jobs, tracked him, and scheduled additional installations, if he finished early. Additionally, the court noted the claimant lacked discretion in the manner he performed his job, because all questions had to be referred to J&S.  As for Dish Network’s appeal, the court held that the WCJ erred in holding that Brickstreet was not estopped from denying coverage as to Dish Network. According to the court, the insurance agent was an authorized representative of Brickstreet and, at the direction of J&S, issued the Certificate of Insurance that he knew was not accurate at the time, and was aware would be presented as proof of coverage for J&S. Dish Network relied upon that information and continued to use J&S, ultimately leading to Dish Network being named as the Statutory Employer liable for payment of benefits because of J&S’ uninsured status. The court held that the Board erred in affirming the WCJ ’s conclusion that Dish Network did not establish that Brickstreet was equitably estopped from denying coverage, reversed the decision below, and remanded the case to the WCJ. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Trial Judge’s Orders Granting Summary Judgement for Defendants on COVID-19 Case

In Dunne v. Advanced Subacute Rehab Servs. at Sewell, LLC, et al., the plaintiffs appealed from two Law Division orders. By way of background, Louis Doto, Sr. (Doto) worked for BP & SC Services, Inc. (BP). BP leased Doto to Advanced Subacute Rehabilitation Center at Sewell, LLC (Advanced Subacute) and it had control of his work, paid wages, and had the power to hire or fire him. A BP employee was assigned to the facility to train and supervise him and BP was responsible for securing workers’ compensation coverage. Doto worked as an aide in the laundry department. Linen from COVID-19 residents were delivered in clearly marked bags and he had no direct contact with residents. A co-worker, Sheila Smith, was also an aide and she never contracted COVID-19 at the facility. Advanced Subacute did not require Doto to wear an N-95 mask, but instead a surgical mask, though N-95 masks were available to all employees. He was also required to attend period mandatory meetings with other high-risk employees, the last of which he attended was in November 2020. All employees were required to test for COVID-19 and there were no reported cases from June to October 2020. On December 23, 2020, Doto tested positive for COVID-19 and passed away on January 18, 2021. The last member of housekeeping that Doto may have encountered tested positive 22 days earlier. After his death, OSHA found two “serious” violations concerning the N-95 masks worn by housekeepers. In response, Advanced Subacute fit tested all non-clinical staff. Doto’s estate filed a workers’ compensation claim and named both BP and Advanced Subacute as his employer. The estate received an award. In July 2022, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Law Division, alleging wrongful death and survivor causes of action. In October 2024, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing: 1) immunity pursuant to the Emergency Health Powers Act: 2) the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act; 3) Doto’s inability to establish infection at the facility; 4) net expert opinions by the plaintiffs’ expert; and 5) inadmissibility of the OSHA report. The plaintiffs opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing: 1) no immunity as Advanced Subacute engaged in gross negligent or willful misconduct; 2) no preclusion by the Workers’ Compensation Act as Doto was not Advanced Subacute’s employee; and 3) no net expert opinions. In February 2025, the judge issued a written decision granting the defendants’ motion. Specifically, he found Advanced Subacute’s COVID-19 immunity precluded the plaintiffs’ claim as no reasonable jury could find any gross negligence or utter disregard for Doto’s safety. He also addressed the other defenses for completeness. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and the judge issued another written decision denying the plaintiffs’ motion in April 2025. The plaintiffs then appealed both decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the orders for reasons stated by the judge in his written decisions. The Appellate Division only added: 1) Advanced Subacute acted consistently with the legislative grant of immunity; 2) there was no doubt Doto was an employee of both BP and Advanced Subacute and the latter may have inadvertently failed to follow some precautions; and 3) confirmed the plaintiffs’ experts did not identify a basis for their opinions. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no reason to disturb the judge’s well-reasoned decisions and affirmed the judge’s orders.