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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Construction Zone Death Suit Against employer and Engineering Firms Based on Workers’ Compensation Bar and Failure to Serve Affidavits of Merit.

Estate of Mike Alexander, Deceased, et al. v. Northeast Sweepers, et al., No. A-1486-23 (June 19, 2025)

August 1, 2025

by Kiara K. Hartwell

On July 11, 2014, Michael Alexander was struck and killed by a sweeper truck while working in an active construction zone on the New Jersey Turnpike. Northeast Sweepers owned the truck, which was driven by Christopher Hackett. Crisdel Group, Inc. was the decedent’s employer and was hired as the general contractor. HAKS Engineers, Architects and Land Surveyors, P.C. was retained by New Jersey Transit Authority to provide “professional services” for the resurfacing project, including supervision to ensure compliance. John Schweppenheiser, a HAKS employee and licensed professional engineer, was the project manager. HAKS then subcontracted the construction inspection services to Johnson, Mirmiran & Thompson, Inc. (JMT). Lawrence Fink, a JMT employee and licensed professional engineer, was the supervisor. 

Christopher Hackett drove his sweeper around a milling machine and struck Alexander, who was taken to a hospital and passed away approximately a month later. While it was Crisdel’s practice to assign a dump truck to each sweeper truck, there was none near Hackett’s sweeper at the time of the accident. After the accident, OSHA cited Crisdel for violations; failure to provide a place of employment free from recognized hazards and to establish a pre-planned traffic pattern. It was noted to be a serious violation, but not willful or repeated. 

In October 2014, the plaintiffs filed a complaint, which they amended in January 2016 to add claims against HAKS and JMT. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged intentional wrongs, noting that HAKS and JMT were responsible for supervision of the site and that they had negligently supervised the project. Because Alexander and his estate received workers’ compensation benefits, Crisdel’s answer asserted the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. HAKS’ answer demanded compliance with the affidavit of merit statute, and JMT’s answer made no reference, but did assert a general defense of failure to state a claim. 

In June 2017, HAKS and JMT moved to dismiss the claims for failure to serve affidavits of merit. After oral arguments, the trial court issued orders dismissing the claims, noting the negligence was in their professional capacities as engineers, therefore, affidavits of merit were needed. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted two affidavits from professional engineers, who certified that the work HAKS and JMT performed only involved supervision, not professional engineering services. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in September 2017. 

After the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal, the orders dismissing the claims against HAKS and JMT were reversed for a more complete record on whether the claims required the affidavit of merit requirement. On remand, additional expert discovery was performed, and all parties produced more expert reports. In April 2018, Crisdel moved for summary judgment, and after oral arguments, the trial court granted summary judgment as the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that Crisdel committed an intentional wrong as this was the type of accident that occurred in constructions areas. 

In May 2019, HAKS and JMT moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs’ claims involved professional engineering service malpractice claims. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, noting the expert reports and deposition testimony revealed the duties of HAKS and JMT were within the practice of engineering. As such, the plaintiffs needed to submit an affidavit of merit and failure to do so required dismissal of their claims. 

The other defendants were all dismissed at various times. In December 2023, the plaintiffs resolved their claims against Northeast Sweepers and Hackett. The plaintiffs then appealed the June 22, 2018, order granting summary judgment to Crisdel and the July 26, 2019, orders granting summary judgment to JAKS and JMT.

The Appellate Division reviewed, under the de novo standard, and delved into the Workers’ Compensation Act as well as case law regarding intentional wrongs. While the plaintiffs identified six areas (work lighting, audible backup alarms, properly functioning mirrors, dedicated dump trucks, use of spotters and written traffic control plan) that were allegedly known and ignored by Crisdel, the Appellate Division found none of them were evidence of an intentional wrong within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The Appellate Division also noted the OSHA violations were only “serious” and not “willful.” As such, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Cristel.

As for the summary judgment granted for HAKS and JMT, the Appellate Division reviewed the case law for a claim against a licensed professional covered by the affidavit of merit statute. The Appellate Division noted it was undisputed that both defendants were engineering and architectural companies and that HAKS was retained by New Jersey Transit Authority for professional engineering services. HAKS then retained JMT, and under the terms of the subcontract, all work performed by JMT was required to be done under the “direct supervision” of “licensed professional” engineers. Given the undisputed evidence showed HAKS and JMT were providing professional engineering services and the plaintiffs failed to timely serve affidavits of merit, the Appellate Division affirmed the grant of summary judgment to HAKS and JMT. 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 8, August 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.