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Defense Digest

A Costly Mistake

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025

June 1, 2025

Key Points:

  • A workers’ compensation judge is not required to correct a mistakenly-issued Notice of Compensation Payable, but they may correct a mistakenly-issued Notice of Compensation Payable.
  • The court would not overturn a workers’ compensation judge’s refusal to correct a mistakenly-issued Notice of Compensation Payable.
  • The decision to correct a mistakenly-issued Bureau document is in the workers’ compensation judge’s discretion.

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently issued an opinion finding that, although a workers’ compensation judge may correct a mistakenly-issued Notice of Compensation Payable, it is within the judge’s discretion and is not required.

In City of Philadelphia and PMA Management Corp. v. John Bell (WCAB), 2025 WL 980776 (Pa. Cmwlth. April 2, 2025), the claims handler incorrectly issued a “partial denial,” or a Medical-Only Notice of Compensation Payable (Medical-Only NCP), after the determination was made to issue a denial. After working 17 years as a firefighter for the City, the claimant was diagnosed with colon cancer. He requested that the City recognize his cancer as job-related and pay workers’ compensation benefits. After issuing the Medical-Only NCP, the employer filed a review petition, alleging it mistakenly issued the Medical-Only NCP when it intended to issue a Notice of Compensation Denial.

The employer/carrier presented an affidavit from the City’s Risk Management and Employee Disability Manager in which she noted that, after an investigation, it was recommended that PMA deny the claimant’s claim. The employer/carrier also presented an affidavit from the claims handler which noted that she had begun working for PMA on June 6, 2022, and processing workers’ compensation claims on June 27, 2022. She received the claimant’s claim on September 12, 2022. She contacted the aforementioned risk manager and was advised to issue a denial because there was no evidence of a causal relationship between the claimant’s condition and his employment as a firefighter. She understood the Claims Center’s software allowed her compensability choices of: fully accept, temporarily accept, undetermined, partially deny, and fully deny. The claims handler did not understand the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system’s process or the automatic generation of compensability-establishing documents through these choices. She chose to “partially deny” the claim because she believed she was agreeing to pay for only the medical appointments to any posted panel physician. She did not understand that the form generated would accept liability on the claim. She did not intend to issue a Medical-Only NCP, although that is what clicking “partially deny” generated. Emails exchanged between the claims handler and the risk manager established the intent to deny the claim. 

The workers’ compensation judge found both the adjuster and the claims handler credible and accepted that the adjuster made a mistake and did not intend to generate a Medical-Only NCP. However, the judge was not willing to set aside the Medical-Only NCP. The judge noted that EDI has been around for approximately 10 years, the adjuster should have received better training, and she should have sought advice before taking the action. The judge stated that allowing Bureau documents to be set aside when mistakes are made is not a precedent she was going to set. The judge also found this was distinguishable from cases where information has been made available prior to the completion of an investigation where the claim has already been accepted. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. 

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court noted that the judge and the Board incorrectly relied on Beissel and Barna, which addressed changing a Bureau document after information was gained prior to the completion of an investigation. The court noted that this case was distinguishable because it was the insurer’s intention at the onset to deny the claim after it conducted its investigation. The issuance of the Medical-Only NCP was a mistake. The court looked at whether Section 413(a) of the Act requires a judge to set aside a mistakenly issued NCP. 

The court looked at the language in Section 413(a), which it determined was unambiguous and permissive in nature. Section 413(a) states: “a workers’ compensation judge may, at any time, review and modify or set aside a notice of compensation payable…if it be proved that such notice of compensation payable…was in any material respect incorrect.” The court analyzed whether “may” could mean “shall” in some circumstances and determined that because “may” and “shall” are both used throughout the Act, and are not used interchangeably, “may” is permissive rather than mandatory. Thus, the judge had the discretion to decide whether to set aside the mistakenly issued Medical-Only NCP, which the judge elected not to do, even after she had found it was incorrectly issued. The court would not overturn that decision.

This decision reinforces the possibility of reversing an incorrectly and mistakenly-issued Bureau document by way of a review petition. However, the decision also reinforces the judge’s discretion to make that correction. As the judge noted in this case, most judges are hesitant to change a Medical-Only NCP or an NCP to a denial even if the mistake was clearly established. Therefore, the claims handler or whomever issues the EDI transaction should take the proper precautions and exercise due diligence before issuing any Bureau document. More often than not, the judge will not correct a Bureau form. Proper training and safeguards should be exercised prior to issuing a Bureau document to avoid these issues.

*Michael is a member of our Workers’ Compensation Department and works in our King of Prussia, PA office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.