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Defense Digest

Who Are We Defending? Conflicts and the Rules of Professional Conduct in New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Cases

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

Key Points:

  • The carrier’s duty to defend extends to the named employer company, not its principals.
  • It does not create a conflict of interest to hire counsel to defend a workers’ compensation claim brought against an employer by one of its principals.
  • Corporations retain individual rights as separate entities from their officers and shareholders that include defenses against claims.

In Robert Alam v. Ameribuilt Contractors, 2022 WL 15540098 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Oct. 28, 2022), the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed whether a conflict existed for a law firm handling a workers’ compensation claim brought against an employer company by one of that company’s principals. The petitioner was injured while allegedly in the course and scope of his employment. Additionally, the injured worker was also the acting president and 50% owner of the respondent employer. The carrier retained counsel to defend the respondent, but the Workers’ Compensation Judge entered an order disqualifying the assigned counsel on the basis of a perceived conflict between the workers’ compensation carrier and the insured and its principal.

Robert Alam was involved in a motor vehicle accident on March 27, 2018. He alleged the accident occurred while he was performing work for the respondent, which is a pre-requisite for a successful workers’ compensation claim. Notably, Mr. Alam was the acting president and 50% owner of Ameribuilt. Travelers provided Ameribuilt with workers’ compensation coverage with Ameribuilt NJ Inc. as the sole named insured. Travelers thereafter hired defense counsel to defend Ameribuilt’s interests against the claim.

The respondent filed an answer acknowledging coverage and employment, however, it indicated that compensability remained under investigation as there was a dispute whether the injury occurred during the course and scope of employment. Due to the compensability issue, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations to resolve the matter under N.J.S.A. 34:15-20, which allows for resolution of matters in dispute in lieu of a trial. After the parties reached the agreement, they sent the proposed agreement to the judge of compensation for approval. The judge, however, declined to enter the order and instead entered an order for defense counsel to be removed because of an inherent conflict between the insured, Ameribuilt, and the carrier, Travelers. The judge’s order went on to indicate that because Ameribuilt was 50% owned by Mr. Alam, the denial of compensability was in conflict with its own insured due to Mr. Alam’s ownership interest. The judge further ordered Travelers to assign counsel for itself as well as Ameribuilt. Ameribuilt then appealed the judge’s order. Following the appeal, the judge of compensation clarified the order to add that defense counsel assigned by the carrier does not represent the interest of the carrier but, rather, the interests of the insured.

On appeal, the respondent argued, in part, that the judge’s order must be reversed because corporations are separate legal entities from their shareholders. The Appellate Division found that the judge of compensation disqualified defense counsel on the basis of a violation of R.P.C. 1.7, which states, “A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest.” However, the Appellate Division agreed with the argument that corporations are regarded as separate entities distinct from its individual officers, directors and agents.

Based on its finding that corporations represent their own distinct entities, the Appellate Division concluded the judge of compensation erred in finding a conflict between Travelers and Mr. Alam, despite his role as president and 50% owner. While the appellate court agreed with the judge of compensation that insurance counsel is required to represent the insured’s interest, it did not agree that defense counsel or the carrier’s positions were adverse to the insured. Rather, the Appellate Division held that defense counsel’s course and scope defense argument was beneficial to Ameribuilt, though not so to Mr. Alam.

This case reinforces the relationship between carriers, insureds and defense counsel. The Appellate Division here reiterated the role of the corporation as its own entity and the rights it retains as such. As outlined earlier, the policy between Travelers and Ameribuilt in this case provided for coverage to Ameribuilt NJ, Inc., solely. The policy did not extend to Ameribuilt’s officers or shareholders. Despite the somewhat unique set of facts of this case—the injured worker happened to be the president and 50% owner of the insured—it did not create a conflict when the carrier and defense counsel offered a defense position that was adverse to that person individually. Accordingly, respondents should continue to strive for their strongest defenses and best outcomes regardless of who is bringing the claim, and defense of the insured should remain at the forefront for carriers and defense counsel.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.