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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What's Hot in Workers' Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 10, October 2022

October 1, 2022

NEWS

Angela Y. DeMary (Mount Laurel, NJ) recently presented a client seminar on “New Jersey Workers’ Compensation in a Nutshell: Overview of Handling New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Claims”. Presented on August 25, she discussed various topics from claims investigation strategies to navigating the New Jersey workers’ compensation system.

Shannon Fellin (Harrisburg, PA) and Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) presented two client seminars on the “Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Bureau Forms and Limiting Claim Exposure.” They discussed the mechanism and use of the Bureau forms and strategies for claims handling.

Tony Natale and Robin Romano (Philadelphia, PA) were co-presenters at this year’s Philly I-Day conference. Their session, Hot Topics in Worker’s Comp and Litigation Trends, focused on trends and case law that are making waves in Pennsylvania workers’ compensation litigation, including unreasonable contest, discharge from employment issues within a workers’ compensation case, head injuries with post-concussion syndrome, and specific loss and extension to full body. Robin and Tony analyzed the impact of these cases on future similar litigation, and provided tips for mitigating exposures and liabilities from a risk management perspective. The presentation was attended by local insurance, claims and legal professionals.

Tony Natale (Philadelphia, PA) recently sat down with AM Best’s Insurance Law Podcast to discuss workers’ compensation fraud. Listen to the podcast here: https://lnkd.in/eTMvMkVe.

 

RESULTS*

Angela DeMary (Mount Laurel, NJ) and William Murphy (Roseland, NJ) successfully obtained a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and coverage for an occupational accident policy carrier. The petitioner filed a claim petition within the New Jersey Division of Workers’ Compensation seeking benefits and alleging employment with a trucking company. However, the petitioner had previously obtained an occupational accident policy in the role of an independent contractor. When filing the workers’ compensation petition, counsel for the petitioner erroneously named the occupational accident policy carrier as carrier for the trucking company. Although it would appear clear that jurisdiction and coverage do not exist in such cases, most times it is a lengthy process to have such matters addressed by the court and ultimately dismissed. However, Angela and Bill were successful in obtaining the dismissal and ceasing further unnecessary financial costs to the client.

Ben Durstein (Wilmington, DE) successfully handled a number of workers’ compensation cases. In Bruce Mosley v. State of Delaware, the Industrial Accident Board granted the employer’s motion for reimbursement of an amount of total disability benefits tendered that were offset by contemporaneous short-term disability payments. The Board denied the claimant’s motion to compel production of paystubs that he claimed were required to determine the appropriate offset amount, if any. The Board reasoned that the information provided was sufficient to calculate the overpayment amount and that the Fair Labor Standards Act did not require the pay records be kept in any particular form.

In Melissa Taylor v. State of Delaware, the Industrial Accident Board denied a claimant’s petition to determine additional compensation for increased medical bill payments for ketamine infusion procedures. The Hearing Officer rejected the claimant’s argument that she was entitled to the “reasonable cost” of the treatment pursuant to Section 2322(b) and held that the employer had correctly applied and paid for the treatment in accordance with the Delaware Fee Schedule pursuant to Section 2322B(7).

Finally, in Tracy Matheus v. State of Delaware, the Industrial Accident Board determined that the claimant’s cervical strain and lumbar strain injuries resolved as of January 24, 2022. The Board reasoned that the claimant was not pain free from preexisting issues prior to the work accident, that there was no indication of radiculopathy immediately after the work accident, and that her ongoing problems were localized to the levels of her spine adjacent to prior fusion surgeries, which indicated she was treating for her preexisting condition rather than the injuries sustained at work.

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended claimant’s appeal of the judge’s decision terminating benefits based upon a full recovery opinion on behalf of a multi-national automotive manufacturing corporation. The claimant argued to the Appeal Board that the judge’s decision was not supported by substantial, competent evidence. The claimant argued that the employer did not establish a change in physical examination from the time of the last disability adjudication. Michele argued, and the Appeal Board agreed, that the defense expert’s opinion (a board certified orthopedic examination, three examinations of the claimant, the most recent comprehensive exam and his review of medical records and diagnostic films) supported a change in physical examination such that the claimant had no objective findings in relation to the work injury, non-work-related conditions and no need for any ongoing medical treatment. Further, the Appeal Board found the judge did not accept as credible the claimant’s testimony or the medical evidence submitted by the claimant. The Appeal Board ultimately concluded that the judge did not err in finding that the defense met the change in condition standard per Lewis v. WCAB (Giles and Ransome, Inc.), 919 A.2d, 922 (Pa. 2007) and Delaware County v. WCAB (Browne), 964 A.2d 29, 33-34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended a claim petition on behalf of a well-known local hospital. The judge’s decision was based upon a full recovery opinion by a Board Certified orthopedic surgeon, who was found credible, competent and persuasive given his credentials; clear, concise and credible understanding of the claimant’s extensive history; review of post- and pre-injury records; along with his review of the diagnostic study films supporting no post-traumatic abnormalities. Based upon this strong medical expert testimony, the judge limited the claimant’s claim to a period of three months only, despite the claim for ongoing total disability, and did not expand the claimant’s nature of injury to include a herniated disc in the lumbar spine. In addition to expert deposition testimony, surveillance was also submitted and accepted, which demonstrated the claimant’s activities contrary to any ongoing disability and, more importantly and just as significant, were extensive medical records demonstrating that the claimant downplayed her prior injuries and her complaints, completely inconsistent with the actual medical records. Further, the judge recognized Michele’s cross-examination of the claimant’s medical expert, particularly with respect to his credentials, analysis of the MRI, lack of identifying a herniated disc diagnosis in all of his medical records, yet testifying to same in an effort to support the claimant’s alleged allegations of this description of injury.

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) successfully prosecuted a termination petition on behalf of a multi-national retailer. Michele established that the claimant fully recovered from the work-related right shoulder strain/sprain, although the claimant testified to ongoing complaints of pain and an injury beyond a sprain/strain. Michele’s medical evidence from a Board Certified orthopedic surgeon supporting a comprehensive physical examination, revealing no objective findings, along with his review of diagnostic studies that did not support any additional injury beyond a sprain/strain. Instead, this defense expert found a longstanding condition no longer related to the work injury and no evidence of an exacerbation/aggravation of the pre-existing condition. The claimant failed to submit any contrary medical evidence. As a result, the carrier/employer will be entitled to Supersedeas Fund reimbursement for all medical and indemnity paid from the date the termination petition was filed, which will be a sufficient monitory recovery on behalf of the employer.

Judd Woytek (King of Prussia, PA) obtained a favorable decision denying the claimant’s claim petition which alleged a low back injury, including sprain/strains and intervertebral disc displacement status post multiple surgeries. The claimant had a lumbar laminectomy in 2016 and a lumbar fusion in 2018. He alleged a work injury in April 2019 when emptying a small trash can into a dumpster. During the course of the litigation, however, the claimant and his doctor offered testimony that the claimant’s back problems, including the 2016 and 2018 surgeries, were related to his general employment duties with the employer and that the April 2019 incident was the “straw that broke the camel’s back.” Judd presented expert medical testimony from an orthopedic surgeon that the claimant’s back problems were degenerative in nature and were not caused by or aggravated by the claimant’s work activities or the alleged April 2019 incident. The judge denied the claim petition outright and found that the claimant had failed to sustain his burden of proving any work-related injury.

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee A Similar Outcome

 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 26, No. 10, October 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.