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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 2026

January 1, 2026

RESULTS*

Tony Natale (King of Prussia, PA) successfully prosecuted a termination petition. The claimant, a police officer for the borough, sustained a work injury to the neck, back and lower extremities in the form of aggravations of pre-existing conditions. The claimant testified that he only treated sporadically for the pre-existing condition before the work injury and that his treatment intensified greatly after the work injury. To the contrary, the treatment records showed the claimant regularly treated for his medical conditions three times a week prior to the work injury, all the way up to two days before the work injury. The claimant’s expert was unaware of the prior treatment, and on cross examination Tony was able to force the expert to agree that the claimant’s base-line condition was equivalent to the current symptomatology. As such, the court granted the full recovery as the claimant reached base line and fully recovered from the work aggravation.

Rachel Ramsay-Lowe and Bill Murphy (both of Roseland, NJ) received dismissal without prejudice. The petitioner alleged a motor vehicle accident on May 5, 2024, resulting in injuries to her neck, back, left side of her body and her left arm. A motion was filed to dismiss for lack of employment, arguing that the petitioner was never in the employment of our insured. The motion was unopposed, and on November 25, 2025, the judge ordered dismissal of the claim for lack of employment. 

Anna Robertelli and Bill Murphy (both of Roseland, NJ) received dismissal without prejudice. The petitioner alleged occupational exposure from October 2013 to October 2023, resulting in orthopedic and neurologic injuries to his right arm, hand and wrist, including but not limited to carpal tunnel syndrome. Following the petitioner’s failure to timely respond to our discovery requests, a motion to dismiss was filed for lack of prosecution. On December 8, 2025, the judge entered an order for dismissal for lack of prosecution.

Michael Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) and Alana Staniszewski (Pittsburgh, PA) were successful in having a Claim Petition denied where the claimant avered he sustained work-related chemical burns. The claimant testified that while working for the employer, he sat on an overturned trash can to take a brief break before clocking out. After getting up, he noticed his pants and underwear were wet. He punched out and walked to his apartment about a block away. He undressed, took a shower, and noticed his buttocks burning. He put a cream on it, but it became worse. The next morning he sought medical treatment. He was hospitalized from August 3, 2024, until September 3, 2024, as he had second degree chemical burns on his buttocks and the back of his thighs. He received an incision, debridement, and soft tissue necrosis procedure to his perineum, buttock and left thigh. The claimant eventually was released to return to work without restrictions and found fully recovered by his doctor. No medical testimony was submitted. The claimant submitted medical records and relied upon a one-page report opining that his burns were related to sitting on a wet trash can. No details were provided regarding any specific exposure to chemicals. We presented fact witness testimony detailing the claimant’s job duties and exposure to chemicals which revealed the claimant was not exposed to any hazardous chemicals, only normal cleaning supplies. Video footage submitted revealed the claimant sitting on the trash can, getting up, moving to another trash can, and then leaving without issue; he never looked at his pants or felt his pants to see if they were wet. The workers’ compensation judge found the claimant’s testimony not credible because he would expect the claimant to try to touch his pants, look at it, or dry it off. He did not find the claimant credible regarding showering and then sleeping with the burning sensation before seeking treatment 16 or more hours later. The judge also found the employer’s fact witness credible. He did not find the claimant’s one-page medical report credible as this claimant’s expert opinion was cursory and provided no explanation other than merely relying on the claimant’s history. Thus, the claim petition was denied and dismissed.

Michael Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) successfully settled a case with no admission of liability and a settlement of $24,500 with no payment of medical bills. The claimant, a mason, alleged he sustained a stroke while at work. The claimant reported to work in the morning, although he told his supervisors he was not feeling well. He was provided an apprentice and told to take it easy. He went to the bathroom multiple times and then asked to leave early. He left after about two to three hours of working. He then went to the hospital, was discharged, and then went back. When he returned, he was told he had a stroke. He was hospitalized for a period of time and then discharged with out-of-work restrictions. His expert testified that the claimant’s job duties as a mason caused his stroke. Specifically, this expert alleged the claimant’s job was physically demanding, he was regularly exposed to concrete dust and had stressors from supervising an apprentice, all of which caused his stroke. Our expert testified that the claimant’s stroke was a result of his unregulated hypertension and failure to consistently take his blood pressure medication. The employer’s fact witness testimony revealed the claimant did not supervise any apprentice and wore respirators whenever he was exposed to concrete dust. After completing all evidence, claimant’s counsel presented a demand of $310,000 plus payment of medical bills and reimbursement of litigation costs. 

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 


NEWS

Michael R. Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) we recently elected a shareholder of the firm effective January 1, 2026. Mike focuses his practice on defending employers and insurance carriers in matters related to workers’ compensation. He represents employers across numerous industries including trucking, construction, landscaping, manufacturing, hospitality and long-term care. He is a member of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Coalition, Brehon Law Society, Philadelphia Bar Association and Judge Alexander F. Barbieri Workers’ Compensation Inn of Court. He earned his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University and his juris doctor from Widener University Delaware Law School. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.