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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot In Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 2024

January 1, 2024

NEWS

Kiara Hartwell’s (Mount Laurel, NJ) article “A Workers’ Compensation Judge’s Approval of a Section 20 Settlement Can Be Contingent on a Petitioner’s Live Testimony” appeared in the December 2023 issue of Defense Digest. You can read her article here. 
 

RESULTS*

Kristopher Starr (Wilmington, DE) received a favorable decision from the Industrial Accident Board. The claimant had been injured in a compensable, accepted work accident where he sustained an injury to his lumbar spine (ligamentous). However, he had pre-existing degenerative pathology in the spine. We filed a Petition for Review to end temporary total disability benefits, alleging the claimant could work within restrictions. The claimant filed a petition for additional compensation, demanding approval of a lumbar discogram and ongoing total temporary disability benefits. The Board held that conservative treatment was appropriate, including TFESI injections, and that the lumbar discogram was not reasonable. Two MRI studies evidenced resolving soft tissue injury to the lumbar spine ligaments, and the claimant did not present as a surgical candidate. The employer’s doctor was found persuasive as to the issue of lumbar discography. The claimant’s doctor conceded, under cross-examination, there were no neurologic deficits evidencing radiculopathy on successive exams. Considering the evidence and the Health Care Practice Guidelines, the Board determined discography was not reasonable. A DACD Petition was granted in part and denied in part. As to indemnity, Kris presented vocational evidence and a Labor Market Survey showing no wage loss for positions within the claimant’s work restrictions. Kris indicated that Hoey v. Chrysler did not apply as the claimant was advised he could no longer be accommodated and was obligated to look for work. The claimant’s physician agreed, under cross-examination, that the claimant could work the Labor Market Survey jobs (all sedentary positions) and that the claimant was not totally disabled. Ongoing indemnity benefits were denied and our petition for review was granted. No appeal is anticipated by the claimant.

Frank Wickersham (King of Prussia, PA) successfully defended a Claim Petition on behalf of a national trucking company where the answer was late without a reasonable excuse. Frank persuaded the workers’ compensation judge that the Claim Petition was not well-pled as to the main allegation, which was that the claimant suffered a disabling aggravation of a pre-existing cervical condition from a fall at work. Frank further convinced the judge that the claimant did not meet his burden of showing that he aggravated a pre-existing cervical condition from his fall. The claimant’s expert admitted on cross-examination that when he first saw the claimant about one month after the work incident, he already had a head droop from a cervical fusion that was done five months before the date of injury. According to this expert, surgery “unrelated” to the work injury would be needed to correct it. This was inconsistent with the expert’s direct examination testimony, which was that the work incident had caused the head droop.

Kacey Wiedt (Harrisburg, PA) achieved the following successful results:
•    Successfully prosecuted a Modification Petition where the workers’ compensation judge found that the claimant’s benefits are to be reduced based upon an earning power assessment. The judge found our medical and vocational experts more credible than the claimant’s experts that the claimant had an earning power of $610.00 per week.
•    Successfully defended a Claim Petition where the workers’ compensation judge found that the claimant did not sustain a work-related wrist injury due to repetitively lifting cardboard boxes at work. The judge found our employer’s witnesses more credible and persuasive than the claimant, who testified that he was performing this task for a short period of time and that his medical issues are related to his diabetes, not an overuse injury in accordance with our medical expert opinion.
•    Successfully prosecuted a Termination Petition where the workers’ compensation judge found that the claimant was fully recovered from his back injury, which was previously accepted as a “lumbar sprain, L4-5 disc herniation with aggravation of degenerative spondylosis and spinal stenosis at L4 causing radiculopathy.” The judge found our medical expert more credible than the claimant’s medical expert.

Judd Woytek (King of Prussia, PA) achieved the following successful results:
•    Successfully defended a survivor’s claim for Federal Black Lung benefits. The miner had worked 11 years in the coal mine industry, and the parties stipulated that he had simple coal workers’ pneumoconiosis at the time of his death. Judd presented credible medical evidence to show that the miner’s pneumoconiosis did not cause or contribute his death, and benefits were denied. 
•    Successfully defended a claim for a right shoulder sprain/strain, impingement and SLAP tear. Based upon the fact witness and medical expert testimony that Judd presented, the workers’ compensation judge limited the injury to a right shoulder sprain/strain, limited disability benefits to a closed period of four months and terminated benefits as of the date of our IME. 
•    Along with Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA), successfully defended the claimant’s appeal from a workers’ compensation judge’s decision (that had been affirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board), which found that the claimant’s temporary total disability benefits should be reinstated as of the date he filed his Reinstatement Petition based upon Protz following a pre-Protz IRE. 

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome
 


 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.