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Defense Digest

Watch That First Step! New Jersey Again Addresses The Eternal Battle of Intentional injuries vs. The Exclusive Remedy Doctrine

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Robert J. Fitzgerald

Key Points:

  • The exclusive remedy doctrine bars a petitioner from filing a personal injury suit arising out of a workplace injury.
  • The exclusive remedy doctrine can be overcome if a petitioner can prove an “intentional injury.”
  • A petitioner has a high burden of proof under a multi-part analysis to succeed on an intentional injury claim.

The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court once again reaffirmed the strength of the exclusive remedy doctrine of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Statute against alleged intentional injury claims in Jonathan Little v VDM Metals USA, LLC, et al., 2025 WL 3276688 (NJ Super. App. Div. Nov. 25, 2025). In this case, the petitioner worked as a material handler for VDM, a steel manufacturer, when he sustained a compensable fall while exiting a trailer. The petitioner was clearing packing materials on a flat-rack trailer: an open trailer with only two sides – front and back. The petitioner sustained head injuries in the fall and was unable to describe the accident.

The petitioner’s supervisor, Frendly Blas, provided some details leading up to the accident, although he did not witness the fall. Blas testified that, prior to the accident, the petitioner received safety training on fall prevention. Blas estimated the flat-rack trailer bed sat five or six feet off the ground. Further, a "RollaStep Mobile Platform," intended to protect workers from falls whenever they accessed a surface at least four feet off the ground, was near the truck, but not used at the time of the fall. Blas was responsible for ensuring the use of the RollaStep, but did not remember why it was not used during the incident.

An OSHA report confirmed the RollaStep was positioned nearby the trailer. OSHA determined the primary cause of the accident was complacency, as it appeared the RollaStep was generally not used when there were only a few steel plates being unloaded. The petitioner’s expert report in the personal injury case indicated that training records did not show the petitioner received specific training on flat-rack trailers.

The petitioner filed a personal injury action for negligence, gross negligence, and intentional wrongs against the employer, VDM. More specifically, the petitioner asserted VDM failed to provide adequate training, safety measures, and protective equipment, along with not providing enough staff to safely operate the facility. After discovery concluded, VDM won a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that

VDM’s conduct was an intentional act sufficient to surmount the Act's high bar, and dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.  The court employed the two-part standard test in Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 894-896 (N.J. 2002): the court determined the petitioner had not established his injuries were substantially certain to occur or fell outside the "facts of life" attendant to industrial employment.

On appeal, the petitioner argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, as he established sufficient facts to show the defendant's intentional conduct. The petitioner contended that the record contained facts sufficient to show that adequate training was not provided related to unloading the flat-rack trailer or protecting his safety by using the RollaStep safety measure. Thus, claiming the fall from an elevated surface could not be a fact of industrial life for someone that finished and packed material.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, noting that the intentional wrong exception in Laidlow is interpreted very narrowly so that as many work-related injury claims as possible can be processed exclusively within the workers' compensation system. Thereunder, to successfully prove an intentional injury claim the petitioner must prove:

  1. that the employer knew that its actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee; and
  2. the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be

(a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond

anything the legislature intended the Act to immunize.

Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 894.

Further, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing both the "conduct" and "context" prongs. To satisfy the conduct requirement, a petitioner must show a defendant acted with "substantial certainty” that injury or death would result. Again, mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk is insufficient.

In this case, the court noted VDM failed to utilize the RollaStep during small unloading jobs, and that OSHA concluded that the defendant failed to provide the RollaStep due to "complacency."  However, the court also noted there was no evidence to suggest any employees previously fell from a trailer while unloading it. Further, the petitioner was not unloading the truck, but exiting the trailer after the work was completed. Thus, even presuming his inexperience with “unloading," the petitioner was not handling or removing the metal sheets when the fall occurred.

Additionally, the petitioner was trained to avoid falls, albeit not specifically to avoid falls from flat-rack trailers. Without evidence that VDM was aware of a known or heightened danger, any lack of training, even considered together with VDM’s failure to use a RollaStep, did not demonstrate that the defendant was substantially certain that harm would arise from its actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant deliberately and deceptively removed the safety device from the location.

Even if VDM knew that the failure to use the RollaStep created some degree of danger, mere knowledge by an employer that a workplace is dangerous does not equate to an “intentional wrong."  The court noted that it had rejected the idea that a longstanding negligent or reckless practice should be deemed an intentional wrong under the Act simply because the risk posed by an ongoing wrongful practice will eventually occur.

While this case does not necessarily add anything new to the “intentional injury” test, it is a great reminder as to the court’s analysis of such claims. Again, a petitioner has a very high burden of proving both the “conduct” and “context” prongs under Supreme Court’s Laidlow decision.

The purpose of the exclusive remedy doctrine is to keep work claims in the workers’ compensation forum, while only the most egregious cases dealing with poor employer conduct can pierce the bar. Regardless of this decision, employers and carriers should always take great strides in insuring workplace safety. If you have any questions about your workplace safety program and procedures, please reach out to your TPA carrier and counsel for advice before the next potential work injury. 

Robert Fitzgerald works in our Mount Laurel, NJ office. He can be reached at (856) 414-6009 or RJFitzgerald@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.