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Defense Digest

Watch That First Step! New Jersey Again Addresses The Eternal Battle of Intentional injuries vs. The Exclusive Remedy Doctrine

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by Robert J. Fitzgerald

Key Points:

  • The exclusive remedy doctrine bars a petitioner from filing a personal injury suit arising out of a workplace injury.
  • The exclusive remedy doctrine can be overcome if a petitioner can prove an “intentional injury.”
  • A petitioner has a high burden of proof under a multi-part analysis to succeed on an intentional injury claim.

The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court once again reaffirmed the strength of the exclusive remedy doctrine of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Statute against alleged intentional injury claims in Jonathan Little v VDM Metals USA, LLC, et al., 2025 WL 3276688 (NJ Super. App. Div. Nov. 25, 2025). In this case, the petitioner worked as a material handler for VDM, a steel manufacturer, when he sustained a compensable fall while exiting a trailer. The petitioner was clearing packing materials on a flat-rack trailer: an open trailer with only two sides – front and back. The petitioner sustained head injuries in the fall and was unable to describe the accident.

The petitioner’s supervisor, Frendly Blas, provided some details leading up to the accident, although he did not witness the fall. Blas testified that, prior to the accident, the petitioner received safety training on fall prevention. Blas estimated the flat-rack trailer bed sat five or six feet off the ground. Further, a "RollaStep Mobile Platform," intended to protect workers from falls whenever they accessed a surface at least four feet off the ground, was near the truck, but not used at the time of the fall. Blas was responsible for ensuring the use of the RollaStep, but did not remember why it was not used during the incident.

An OSHA report confirmed the RollaStep was positioned nearby the trailer. OSHA determined the primary cause of the accident was complacency, as it appeared the RollaStep was generally not used when there were only a few steel plates being unloaded. The petitioner’s expert report in the personal injury case indicated that training records did not show the petitioner received specific training on flat-rack trailers.

The petitioner filed a personal injury action for negligence, gross negligence, and intentional wrongs against the employer, VDM. More specifically, the petitioner asserted VDM failed to provide adequate training, safety measures, and protective equipment, along with not providing enough staff to safely operate the facility. After discovery concluded, VDM won a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that

VDM’s conduct was an intentional act sufficient to surmount the Act's high bar, and dismissed the petitioner’s complaint.  The court employed the two-part standard test in Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 790 A.2d 884, 894-896 (N.J. 2002): the court determined the petitioner had not established his injuries were substantially certain to occur or fell outside the "facts of life" attendant to industrial employment.

On appeal, the petitioner argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, as he established sufficient facts to show the defendant's intentional conduct. The petitioner contended that the record contained facts sufficient to show that adequate training was not provided related to unloading the flat-rack trailer or protecting his safety by using the RollaStep safety measure. Thus, claiming the fall from an elevated surface could not be a fact of industrial life for someone that finished and packed material.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, noting that the intentional wrong exception in Laidlow is interpreted very narrowly so that as many work-related injury claims as possible can be processed exclusively within the workers' compensation system. Thereunder, to successfully prove an intentional injury claim the petitioner must prove:

  1. that the employer knew that its actions are substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee; and
  2. the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be

(a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond

anything the legislature intended the Act to immunize.

Laidlow, 790 A.2d at 894.

Further, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing both the "conduct" and "context" prongs. To satisfy the conduct requirement, a petitioner must show a defendant acted with "substantial certainty” that injury or death would result. Again, mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk is insufficient.

In this case, the court noted VDM failed to utilize the RollaStep during small unloading jobs, and that OSHA concluded that the defendant failed to provide the RollaStep due to "complacency."  However, the court also noted there was no evidence to suggest any employees previously fell from a trailer while unloading it. Further, the petitioner was not unloading the truck, but exiting the trailer after the work was completed. Thus, even presuming his inexperience with “unloading," the petitioner was not handling or removing the metal sheets when the fall occurred.

Additionally, the petitioner was trained to avoid falls, albeit not specifically to avoid falls from flat-rack trailers. Without evidence that VDM was aware of a known or heightened danger, any lack of training, even considered together with VDM’s failure to use a RollaStep, did not demonstrate that the defendant was substantially certain that harm would arise from its actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant deliberately and deceptively removed the safety device from the location.

Even if VDM knew that the failure to use the RollaStep created some degree of danger, mere knowledge by an employer that a workplace is dangerous does not equate to an “intentional wrong."  The court noted that it had rejected the idea that a longstanding negligent or reckless practice should be deemed an intentional wrong under the Act simply because the risk posed by an ongoing wrongful practice will eventually occur.

While this case does not necessarily add anything new to the “intentional injury” test, it is a great reminder as to the court’s analysis of such claims. Again, a petitioner has a very high burden of proving both the “conduct” and “context” prongs under Supreme Court’s Laidlow decision.

The purpose of the exclusive remedy doctrine is to keep work claims in the workers’ compensation forum, while only the most egregious cases dealing with poor employer conduct can pierce the bar. Regardless of this decision, employers and carriers should always take great strides in insuring workplace safety. If you have any questions about your workplace safety program and procedures, please reach out to your TPA carrier and counsel for advice before the next potential work injury. 

Robert Fitzgerald works in our Mount Laurel, NJ office. He can be reached at (856) 414-6009 or RJFitzgerald@mdwcg.com.

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