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Defense Digest

Waiting on a Workers' Compensation Lien Reimbursement in New Jersey? You May Have to Wait a Little Longer. Section 40 and the Timeline for Satisfaction

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024

June 1, 2024

Key Points:

  • The New Jersey workers’ compensation statute and applicable case law protects employers’ worker’s compensation lien rights against an injured worker’s third-party recovery. 
  • An employer can perfect its lien by providing notice to the third party that there is a worker’s compensation action; Perfecting the lien obligates the third party to inquire about and satisfy the statutory portion of the employer’s lien prior to paying the third-party proceeds to the injured party. 
  • The statute does not require either the third party or the injured worker to make payment on its lien immediately following payment of third-party proceeds, rather, this obligation waits until the lien amount is set. 

In New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Darshelle Joseph, 2024 WL 1172784 (NJ Super. App. Div. Mar 19, 2024), the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed a court order denying an employer’s application for satisfaction of a workers’ compensation lien. The Division found that an employer cannot recover on its workers’ compensation lien until that amount is set. The Appellate Division’s decision impacts an employer’s timely right to compensation of their lien under Section 40 of the New Jersey workers’ compensation statute.

Darshelle Joseph was involved in a compensable work injury on October 23, 2019. Mr. Joseph later filed a workers’ compensation, claim alleging permanent disability. Mr. Joseph also filed a third-party action against the alleged responsible party in the underlying incident. 

New Jersey Transit’s carrier sent a letter to Mr. Joseph dated November 11, 2019, informing him of its right to recover on money paid as a result his workers’ compensation claim. The carrier also requested that Mr. Joseph notify them whether he retained counsel to represent him in his third-party action.

The carrier ultimately paid a total of $7,112.90 in workers’ compensation benefits as a result of Mr. Joseph’s work injury. Mr. Joseph resolved his third-party claim in December 2021 for $14,000. Mr. Joseph’s attorney in the third-party action disbursed the settlement minus the attorney fee of $4,661.63 and $15.10 for costs. Mr. Joseph’s net was $4,676.73. The workers’ compensation case remains unresolved.

Following the third-party resolution, New Jersey Transit filed a verified complaint and order to show cause seeking reimbursement of its worker’s compensation lien. The parties argued their respective points, and the court subsequently denied New Jersey Transit’s request as premature. New Jersey Transit appealed that decision, and the Appellate Division took the appeal. 

The Appellate Division recited the relevant parts of Section 40 of the New Jersey workers’ compensation statute. It noted that in the event of an injured worker’s third-party recovery, the employer shall be entitled to recover if the amount the injured worker obtains from the third-party action is equivalent to or greater than the workers’ compensation lien and on the amount that exceeds the attorney fee on the third-party action and the costs associated with that action. The Division also noted that the statute provided that, if the employer provides notice of its workers’ compensation lien to the third party prior to third-party payment on a suit, the third party then has the duty to inquire prior to making any payment of the amount of the workers’ compensation lien and the obligation for payment. 

New Jersey Transit argued that it was entitled to reimbursement on its statutory workers’ compensation lien immediately upon the third-party action being resolved. It further argued that this is required regardless of the status of the workers’ compensation action in question. 

The Division noted that Section 40 of the statute, which covers third-party recovery, was enacted to guard against double-recovery. Section 40 provides a statutory lien in favor of an employer that attaches against an injured worker’s third-party recovery. This right to reimbursement depends on an injured worker realizing recovery on a third-party action. The Division also noted that while the statute outlines when and under what conditions an employer can recover on its lien, the statute does not provide a specific timeline on when this recovery takes place. However, it notes that the amount of the employer’s lien cannot be determined until the workers’ compensation benefits paid is finalized. 

The Division went on to discuss that, if the employer perfected its lien and notified the third party regarding the workers’ compensation lien, then the third party, as outlined above, would be obligated to satisfy this portion of the lien prior to making payment on the third-party action. The Division reinforced the section of the statute wherein workers’ compensation liens attach the third-party recovery. However, the Division cited case law supporting that notice of and perfection of the lien is not required in order to attach Section 40 lien rights to a injured worker’s third-party recovery. Perfecting the lien obligates the third party to consider the employer’s lien and make payment on that lien prior to making third-party payment to the injured party. 

However, none of this requires either the third party or the injured worker to satisfy the employer’s Section 40 lien rights immediately following recovery on its third-party action. In fact, the parties are unable to know the extent of the employer’s lien amount until that amount is finalized. Regardless, the Division reinforced that the employer’s right to third-party recovery enjoys great protection. The Division, therefore, remanded the case back the trial court so steps could be taken to reinforce the employer’s lien rights either via a third-party fund being held by the court or deposited into an attorney trust account until such time that the workers’ compensation action is resolved. 

This case reinforces the employer’s right to recovery on its workers’ compensation lien against an injured worker’s third-party recovery if that recovery is equal to or greater than the workers’ compensation lien. This decision also provides guidance to an employer regarding its right to recovery in the event the lien is perfected or not. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.