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Defense Digest

The New Jersey Supreme Court Weakens the Duty of Care Standard Applied to Coaches and Instructors

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022

December 1, 2022

Key Points:

  • High school coach’s alleged acts and omissions governed by simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness usually applied in recreational sports settings.
  • New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that alleged tortious conduct by coach pertained only to her decision-making as a coach, not to coach’s active involvement in the sport.

In 2015, plaintiff Morgan Dennehy was a high-school senior and a member of her school’s field hockey team. Before a practice was scheduled to start, Morgan’s coach, defendant Dezarae Fillmyer, instructed the team to begin warming up in an area where the high school’s boy soccer team was also practicing. As plaintiff was lining up to take a practice shot, an errant soccer ball struck the base of her skull, causing injuries which gave rise to a lawsuit.

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently held in Dennehy v. East Windsor Regional Board of Edu., 2022 WL 14668556 (N.J. 2022), that the high school coach’s alleged acts and omissions were governed by a simple negligence standard rather than the heightened standard of recklessness that is usually applied in other recreational sports settings. Usually in the context of recreational sports, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant acted with recklessness (a higher standard of care) to be held liable for a plaintiff’s injuries. See generally Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600(N.J. 1994); and Schick v. Ferolito, 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001). The Supreme Court in Dennehy limited its application of Crawn and Schick because Dennehy alleged tortious conduct by the coach pertained only to her decision-making as a coach, not to the coach’s active involvement in the sport.

The plaintiff asserted that she sustained injuries through the defendant’s alleged failure to supervise, prevent potential and foreseeable dangerous conditions, and post suitable warnings. The defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to show that the defendants’ acts or omissions rose at least to the degree of recklessness (instead of simple negligence), as described in Crawn and Schick. Furthermore, the defendants argued Crawn’s recklessness standard should be extended to apply to the acts and omissions of instructors and coaches, like herself, regardless of the circumstances.

In rejecting the defendants’ arguments, the Supreme Court reasoned that case law instructing courts to apply a heightened standard of care only applied in cases where the coach or instructor actively participated in the sporting activity when the injury occurred. For example, the higher standard of care was applied when a karate instructor injured a student by kicking them during a sparring match. Unlike that situation, Coach Fillmyer was not wielding a field hockey stick or otherwise actively engaged in the preliminary practice with her players when the plaintiff’s injury occurred. In other words, Coach Fillmyer was not “participating” in the sport within the meaning of Crawn and Schick. As the Supreme Court put it, “The essence of plaintiff’s theory of liability—that Fillmyer chose the wrong place and an unpropitious time to commence practice—is no different than the decisions that might be made by a biology teacher taking a class out to study marine life at the beach. In these and other similar settings, parents have the right to expect that teachers and coaches will exercise reasonable care when in charge of their children and courts will not immunize a teacher’s negligence by imposing a higher standard of care.”

There are multiple key takeaways from this case that insurers should be aware of. First, Crawn and Schick remain good law. In other words, a heightened standard of care still applies to instructors and coaches who may injure a player or student while participating in the sport. Second, coaches and instructors who oversee an activity need to be more cautious in their decision making. They need to make sure that their priority is the safety of students.

Furthermore, the court did not address the potential defenses the defendants might have under the Torts Claim Act and whether a written waiver would protect coaches and instructors from liability. In fact, if a waiver had been in place, the case could have been decided differently. As such, it would be a good idea for coaches and instructors to make their students fill out waivers before beginning practice. Only time will tell how future courts interpret this decision and apply it to other settings. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.