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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Appellate Court affirms denial of petitioner’s motion for treatment, finding she failed her burden to prove the treatment would relieve her symptoms and improve her ability to function.

Martone v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., No. A-2739-19 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2021)

February 1, 2022

by Kiara K. Hartwell

The petitioner appealed a workers’ compensation order denying her motion for medical treatment. The Appellate Division affirmed, noting the workers’ compensation judge’s findings were supported by the record.

On November 15, 2013, the petitioner fell and injured her right knee. Between March 2014 and February 2015, the petitioner underwent three procedures to her right knee, including a total right knee replacement, a bilateral knee manipulation under anesthesia and a right knee arthroscopy. She was unable to continue working after some time due to ongoing pain and medication. She also treated with Dr. J. Yanow, a pain management specialist, from August 2015 to January 2016 after unsuccessful anesthetic blocks to several nerves.

The petitioner saw Dr. Z. Post for a second opinion exam. Dr. Post took x-rays and found her knee replacement was well-placed. Because the petitioner continue to complain of pain, she underwent a right revision of the total knee replacement, scar revision and manipulation under anesthesia by Dr. A. Mark, the authorized surgeon. This did not alleviate her pain, so she underwent a revision of the tibial component of the total knee replacement and synovectomy in December 2016.

She also saw other orthopedic surgeons for independent exams, each noting she was a poor candidate for further surgeries due to multiple failed surgeries. The petitioner saw another pain management specialist in February 2017, who found her to be manipulative and “volitive” toward obtaining high amounts of pain medication. On April 21, 2017, Dr. Mark discharged the petitioner, noting he could not offer any further curative treatment.

In August 2017, the petitioner returned to Dr. Post, who had not reviewed Dr. Mark’s notes or operative reports from 2016. Dr. Post found the petitioner would be a candidate for revision of the right knee, and Dr. Alan Nasar, who evaluated the petitioner in May 2018, agreed. The petitioner then filed a motion for medical benefits in October 2018, using Dr. Nasar’s report. Due to the extensive history and treatment, the workers’ compensation judge ordered a one-time need-for-treatment exam. As such, Dr. M. Sidor evaluated the petitioner in March 2019 and found no need for additional treatment. 

The petitioner returned to Dr. Post in April 2019, who again found her to be a candidate for total right knee reconstructive surgery. The claimant used his report to file an additional motion. The employer opposed, noting the petitioner was at maximum medical improvement per Dr. Mark and Dr. Sidor. All three doctors testified at trial.

Dr. Post stated that, while he was willing to operate, he could not guarantee the surgery would cure the petitioner and admitted it could worsen. Dr. Mark testified there was a low chance of success for further surgeries as the petitioner had no evidence of problems with her artificial knee, had arthrofibrosis and pain management was not effective. Dr. Sidor opined that further surgery would likely result in bone loss, that there could be possible infection and that she could be worse afterwards.

In the subsequent opinion, although the Workers’ Compensation Judge found all three doctors were credible, he disagreed with Dr. Post’s opinion that the location of the implant was the cause of the pain. Instead, the judge agreed with Dr. Sidor’s opinion that her pain was due to fibrosis and noted risk concerns with another surgery. The judge also accepted Dr. Mark’s opinion that further surgery would create additional arthrofibrosis, contribute to more pain and inability to move. He entered an order denying the motion for medical treatment, as he did not feel there was “any reasonable likelihood surgery would help.”

The petitioner appealed, arguing the judge improperly denied her treatment that Dr. Post recommended, despite finding him credible. However, the Appellate Division disagreed, finding the petitioner failed her burden to prove the treatment would “probably relieve petitioner’s symptoms and thereby improve [her] ability to function.” Hanrahan v. Twp. of Sparta, 284 N.J. Super. 327, 336 (App. Div. 1995). In addition, the petitioner had undergone six right knee procedures, which did not help, and Dr. Post, along with various other doctors, found her pain was out of proportion. The petitioner also contended the judge erred by giving greater weight to Dr. Sidor than Dr. Post. The Appellate Division found the judge reviewed the records and expert testimonies in finding the petitioner had arthrofibrosis, diagnosed by all three doctors. This made for potential poor success in future surgery and recovery.
 

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First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.