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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

The Appellate Court affirms denial of petitioner’s motion for treatment, finding she failed her burden to prove the treatment would relieve her symptoms and improve her ability to function.

Martone v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., No. A-2739-19 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2021)

February 1, 2022

by Kiara K. Hartwell

The petitioner appealed a workers’ compensation order denying her motion for medical treatment. The Appellate Division affirmed, noting the workers’ compensation judge’s findings were supported by the record.

On November 15, 2013, the petitioner fell and injured her right knee. Between March 2014 and February 2015, the petitioner underwent three procedures to her right knee, including a total right knee replacement, a bilateral knee manipulation under anesthesia and a right knee arthroscopy. She was unable to continue working after some time due to ongoing pain and medication. She also treated with Dr. J. Yanow, a pain management specialist, from August 2015 to January 2016 after unsuccessful anesthetic blocks to several nerves.

The petitioner saw Dr. Z. Post for a second opinion exam. Dr. Post took x-rays and found her knee replacement was well-placed. Because the petitioner continue to complain of pain, she underwent a right revision of the total knee replacement, scar revision and manipulation under anesthesia by Dr. A. Mark, the authorized surgeon. This did not alleviate her pain, so she underwent a revision of the tibial component of the total knee replacement and synovectomy in December 2016.

She also saw other orthopedic surgeons for independent exams, each noting she was a poor candidate for further surgeries due to multiple failed surgeries. The petitioner saw another pain management specialist in February 2017, who found her to be manipulative and “volitive” toward obtaining high amounts of pain medication. On April 21, 2017, Dr. Mark discharged the petitioner, noting he could not offer any further curative treatment.

In August 2017, the petitioner returned to Dr. Post, who had not reviewed Dr. Mark’s notes or operative reports from 2016. Dr. Post found the petitioner would be a candidate for revision of the right knee, and Dr. Alan Nasar, who evaluated the petitioner in May 2018, agreed. The petitioner then filed a motion for medical benefits in October 2018, using Dr. Nasar’s report. Due to the extensive history and treatment, the workers’ compensation judge ordered a one-time need-for-treatment exam. As such, Dr. M. Sidor evaluated the petitioner in March 2019 and found no need for additional treatment. 

The petitioner returned to Dr. Post in April 2019, who again found her to be a candidate for total right knee reconstructive surgery. The claimant used his report to file an additional motion. The employer opposed, noting the petitioner was at maximum medical improvement per Dr. Mark and Dr. Sidor. All three doctors testified at trial.

Dr. Post stated that, while he was willing to operate, he could not guarantee the surgery would cure the petitioner and admitted it could worsen. Dr. Mark testified there was a low chance of success for further surgeries as the petitioner had no evidence of problems with her artificial knee, had arthrofibrosis and pain management was not effective. Dr. Sidor opined that further surgery would likely result in bone loss, that there could be possible infection and that she could be worse afterwards.

In the subsequent opinion, although the Workers’ Compensation Judge found all three doctors were credible, he disagreed with Dr. Post’s opinion that the location of the implant was the cause of the pain. Instead, the judge agreed with Dr. Sidor’s opinion that her pain was due to fibrosis and noted risk concerns with another surgery. The judge also accepted Dr. Mark’s opinion that further surgery would create additional arthrofibrosis, contribute to more pain and inability to move. He entered an order denying the motion for medical treatment, as he did not feel there was “any reasonable likelihood surgery would help.”

The petitioner appealed, arguing the judge improperly denied her treatment that Dr. Post recommended, despite finding him credible. However, the Appellate Division disagreed, finding the petitioner failed her burden to prove the treatment would “probably relieve petitioner’s symptoms and thereby improve [her] ability to function.” Hanrahan v. Twp. of Sparta, 284 N.J. Super. 327, 336 (App. Div. 1995). In addition, the petitioner had undergone six right knee procedures, which did not help, and Dr. Post, along with various other doctors, found her pain was out of proportion. The petitioner also contended the judge erred by giving greater weight to Dr. Sidor than Dr. Post. The Appellate Division found the judge reviewed the records and expert testimonies in finding the petitioner had arthrofibrosis, diagnosed by all three doctors. This made for potential poor success in future surgery and recovery.
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

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Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.