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Defense Digest

Penalties, Sanctions and Other Bad Employer Words

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2022

October 1, 2022

by Robert J. Fitzgerald

Key Points:

  • Permanency benefit awards must be paid in a timely manner.
  • The penalties awarded should be consistent the lateness of the payment, the amount of permanency benefits awarded and the possible bad faith of the parties.
  • The penalties awarded should be governed by permanency award factors, such as the amount of time it takes the litigation to resolve.

In Luis Ripp v. County of Hudson, 277 A.3d 1071 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2022), the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed factors to be considered in awarding financial penalties for the late payment of permanency benefit awards. The petitioner worked for Hudson County as an assistant chief engineer/boiler operator. He sustained a work injury on February 11, 2013, and filed a claim petition. On January 26, 2021, he received an award of permanent/total disability. When the award was not paid within 60 days, the petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce.

The award was paid on April 12, 2021, 16 days after what the parties considered to be the due date. The respondent offered several excuses for the late payment, including that its third-party administrator failed to submit the payment request in time for the county commissioners meeting, that its third-party administrator was delayed due to the transfer of an adjustor and, of course, that there was delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Judge of Compensation noted in the underlying litigation that the petitioner needed to successfully make enforcement motions to obtain temporary disability benefits. The judge also noted that there were settlement discussions for a permanent/total award in August 2019, but the county did not authorize settlement until January 2021. She stated the petitioner was “without significant funding for quite a long time” and had written to the court on many, many occasions, sharing his dismay over the amount of time it was taking to resolve his claim. She said the petitioner was “anxious about money and the court was very sensitive to all of that.”

In granting the motion, the judge ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner an additional $43,370 within 60 days. The county appealed. In the subsequent written decision, the judge reiterated that the respondent agreed in early 2019 that the petitioner was totally disabled. She noted that the petitioner was receiving Social Security Disability benefits and that, because “Social Security is notoriously slow,” it delayed computation of the petitioner’s average current earnings, necessary so the order could be effectuated.

The judge also recognized that, given the size of the award, the county needed to involve its excess insurance carrier. The excess carrier’s authority to settle was not provided until December 2020.

However, the judge stated this delay “was to the dismay of [Ripp].” She cited “several letters” from the petitioner that she shared with counsel, detailing his emotional and financial distress as a result of not working. The judge cited the petitioner’s “life-altering injury,” lack of “wages for over four years,” and his “disabled child,” which left the judge very sympathetic. The judge also said the court had “bent over backwards to give the [county] the time to ‘get it’s ducks in a row,’” and it was “inconceivable” that payment was overdue. The judge found the county’s delay was “unreasonable” and concluded it was appropriate to impose the maximum additional assessment of 25% to enforce the order.

On appeal, the respondent argued the judge erred in her expansive application of Section 28.2 (Penalties and Sanctions) and, additionally, that she abused her discretion in imposing a manifestly excessive assessment under the circumstances. The court agreed and reversed the order. It first referenced Section 28.1 which provides:

If an . . . employer’s insurance carrier, . . . unreasonably or negligently delays or refuses to pay temporary disability compensation, or unreasonably or negligently delays denial of a claim, it shall be liable to the petitioner for an additional amount of 25% of the amounts then due plus any reasonable legal fees incurred by the petitioner as a result of and in relation . . .

Next, the court referenced the amendments to Section 28.2, which now provide:

If any employer . . . fails to comply with any order of a judge of compensation . . . , a judge of compensation may, in addition to any other remedies provided by law:

a.         Impose costs, simple interest on any moneys due, an additional assessment not to exceed 25% of moneys due for unreasonable payment delay, and reasonable legal fees, to enforce the order, statute or regulation;

b.         Impose additional fines and other penalties on parties or counsel in an amount not exceeding $5,000 for unreasonable delay, with the proceeds of the penalties paid into the Second Injury Fund

Additionally, the Division then adopted Rule 12:235-3.16(h)(1)(i), which allows a judge to impose an additional assessment not to exceed 25% on any moneys due if the judge finds the payment delay to be “unreasonable.” Unlike Section 28.1, which deals with delays in paying temporary disability benefits and defines a 30-day delay as presumptively unreasonable, the Legislature here chose not to specify what is a presumptively unreasonable delay in payment of settlement proceeds under an order entered under the statute.

Based on these provisions, the court reasoned that the plain and unambiguous language of Section 28.2 limits imposition of a penalty to situations justifying the court’s enforcement of its order fixing the moneys due a petitioner pursuant to that order only if there is an “unreasonable payment delay.” In this case, the order was not entered until January 26, 2021. Therefore, it was not an “unreasonable payment delay” prior to March 26, 2021.

Accordingly, it was legal error for the judge to consider, for example, the length of time it took to resolve the petition after the parties agreed the petitioner was totally disabled. No payments were due the petitioner until the order was entered, and no payments were delayed for the first 60 days after that. Further, the judge recognized that there were ample, legitimate reasons why it took until January 2021 to enter the order finally settling the matter, and that those delays were not “unreasonable.”

Having said that, however, the county did not contest that it failed to pay the petitioner the moneys due under the order in a timely fashion. Rather, it offered various excuses for the delay, which the judge considered and, to some degree, accepted as reasonable. Nevertheless, the judge imposed the maximum statutory penalty for a 16-day payment delay.

In reversing the order, the court noted there was no reported case defining the appropriate standard of appellate review of a penalty awarded pursuant to a motion seeking enforcement of an order entered under the statue. In remanding the case, the court instructed that it would be appropriate to consider the length of the delay, the size of the late payment, and the effect a sizeable payment that is delayed beyond its due date would undoubtedly have upon a petitioner and his or her family.

Notably, a judge cannot consider delays in the litigation that predated entry of the order. Further, the court insinuated that an award of the maximum penalty under the statute, even though the delay in payment was only 16 days, and the certain extenuating circumstances that reasonably delayed payment in this case, would be struck down. Additionally, the court also suggested the lack of presence of bad faith, if any, would be factor to consider. Interestingly, the court indicated that the proceedings on remand could be conducted by a different judge.

This is the first case that addresses the factors to be considered in awarding penalties and sanctions for the late payment of a permanency benefit award. It is also very timely, given that many respondents are struggling to hire and retain claims professionals in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and The Great Resignation over the past couple of years. In its decision, the court confirms the long-standing requirement that workers’ compensation awards are required to be paid on a timely basis. When that fails to happen, Section 28.2 allows for various penalties, sanctions, etc., but maximum monetary punishments should not be awarded reflexively. Accordingly, respondents should continue to strive for full compliance in the timely payment of awards, or unnecessary and possibly substantial additional financial losses could result.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.