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Defense Digest

Party Time! Revisiting a Company’s Concerns During Social Activity Events

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021

September 1, 2021

Key Points:

  • A company may be liable for injuries sustained during a recreational or social activity event if the injured worker can prove he or she was compelled to attend, and that the event provided some benefit to the company other than morale or employee health.
  • Be aware of your guest list for company events. Including clients and/or vendors may move an event into the area of “benefitting the company.”
  • Invite employees, but do not make attendance mandatory if you want to avoid potential liability.

With the world moving toward a return to normalcy, including company holiday parties, it is useful for employers to remain mindful of how a judge might consider a work injury when dealing with recreational or social activity work incidents. In a recent unpublished decision, a New Jersey appellate court addressed whether an injury that occurred when an employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident following a company holiday party was compensable. In Regalado v. F&B Garage Door, 2021 WL 2325311 (N.J. Super. App. Div. June 8, 2021), the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that the holiday party was a recreational/social activity that produced no benefit to the respondent/employer, beyond its effect on employee morale, and denied the petitioner’s/employee’s request for worker’s compensation benefits.

Under the New Jersey workers’ compensation statute, an employer must compensate an employee for accidental injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment.” N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. The statute excludes, however, any injuries that are sustained during “recreational or social activities.” An injured worker can overcome that barrier by proving that the activity is a “regular incident of employment” and “produces a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” If the petitioner fails to prove both of these, benefits are denied.

In Regalado, the petitioner worked for the employer as an office manager. The company held its annual holiday party at a restaurant on December 23, 2016. Only the company’s employees and their guests were invited; there were no clients, business associates or vendors. Because neither the petitioner nor her guest drove, the company’s owner agreed to provide transportation to and from the event. The petitioner was not paid to attend and was not compensated for her travel time.

After the party, the petitioner and her guest were being driven home by the company’s owner when they were involved in a motor vehicle accident—the car struck a parked car and flipped over. The petitioner was treated in the emergency room and discharged the next day; she was not admitted to the hospital. As a result of her injuries, the petitioner required surgical procedures to her neck and jaw, and had difficulty carrying anything more than ten pounds.

The petitioner later filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, which was denied. She argued that attendance at the holiday party was required in order to receive her end-of-year bonus. She also testified that attendance at the party was mandatory and that an absence would have negatively affected her employment or standing with the company. The company owner and another fact witness testified that the bonuses were paid in the days prior to the holiday party and that attendance was not mandatory for employees.

The appellate judges held that if an employer has required or compelled participation in a recreational or social activity, the Workers’ Compensation Judge should consider the activity as it would any other compensable work-related assignment. Further, when an employer directly commands an employee to engage in an activity, it is understood that the employee has been compelled. However, when a petitioner alleges she was compelled to attend, the injured employee must establish that she engaged in the activity based on an objectively reasonable belief that participation was required. Factors the court applies in determining this are: whether the employer directly solicits the employee’s participation in the activity; whether the activity occurs on the employer’s premises, during work hours and in the presence of supervisors, executives, clients or the like; and whether the employee’s refusal to attend or participate exposes the employee to the risk of reduced wages or loss of employment. An employee’s subjective impression of compulsion alone is not sufficient.

Here, the court held that the invitation did not carry any implied expectations or threats of reprisal if the petitioner did not attend. The court also commented that, because the party was held off site, after work hours, and away from client and vendors, the petitioner could not have reasonably felt compelled to attend. The court pointed to those factors as support that the petitioner’s attendance at the holiday party did not provide any benefit to the employer, and that she was not expected to further any professional relationship or provide some other benefit to her employer.

Keep this in mind in the upcoming months and as we enter the holiday season. The important takeaways are that, if the employee is compelled to attend a function and that function provides some benefit to the employer, other than company morale, any injury that occurs during that function could cause the company to be liable for workers’ compensation benefits. However, if employees are invited but are not obligated to attend, with no repercussions, and the company is not benefiting from the employee’s attendance at the event, then any incident that occurs will likely not result in the company being liable for workers’ compensation benefits.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.