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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025

September 1, 2025

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining reversal of a non-final order that granted leave to amend to an estate to assert a claim for punitive damages and gross negligence against a dive captain, dive master, and the corporate-entity, dive companies. A woman drowned while scuba diving on a chartered tour, after which the toxicology report revealed high levels of illicit drugs and alcohol. During the litigation, her estate moved for leave to amend to add a claim for gross negligence and punitive damages, claiming the defendants were grossly negligent for failing to use the buddy system and for allowing the decedent to dive when they knew or should have known she was intoxicated. The estate also claimed gross negligence for the dive master allowing the decedent out of his eyesight for four to ten minutes during the dive despite having identified the decedent as requiring “special assistance.” In support of the motion, the estate relied on the police statements, deposition testimony, and an expert report. The defendants argued the evidence was insufficient to support the amendment and that none of the witnesses knew that the decedent was intoxicated before the dive. At the hearing, the trial judge noted the standard was “very liberal” and refused to consider the defendants evidentiary arguments because it “put the cart before the horse.” In granting the motion, the trial court did not make an affirmative finding that the estate had made a reasonable showing by evidence which would provide a reasonable evidentiary basis to recover punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with our arguments and reversed on several grounds. The court found that: the trial court applied the wrong legal standard; the estate failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages against the dive captain and dive master; and the estate’s proposed, amended complaint did not properly allege a claim against the corporate entity defendants. Thus, the order for leave to amend was reversed. 

David Blake and Walter Kawalec (both of Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully overturned a $1.8 million judgment on appeal in a case that involved the Laidlow exclusion in a workers’ compensation/employers liability policy. The decedent succumbed to heat exhaustion while at work, and the plaintiff alleged the death was due to working conditions the employer knew were substantially certain to lead to injury. The plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, alleging both negligence and intentional torts. Our client, the insurer, offered to defend the employer, but only to the extent of obtaining dismissal of the workers’ compensation claim, which had been filed in the wrong forum. The insured rejected the offer, and suit for the injury and coverage claims commenced. At summary judgment, the trial court refused to apply the policy s clear and prominent Laidlow exclusion, which would have barred all coverage for claims in the Superior Court whether alleged as negligent or intentional. The trial court entered judgment in the amount of the arbitration award and awarded defense costs for the Laidlow suit, costs of the declaratory judgment action and interest. The matter went up on appeal. After briefing, but before argument, the New Jersey Supreme Court released the Rodriguez decision, which validated our client s position on application of the Laidlow exclusion and went even further to hold that the employer’s liability carrier has no obligation to provide a defense for the common law negligence claims filed in the Superior Court. The Rodriguez decision was unpublished and at the appellate level, while our case was at the trial level. The trial court refused to apply the principles enunciated by the Appellate Division in the Rodriguez decision and refused to apply the reasoning of a second unpublished appellate court decision directly on point. The trial court simply ignored the cases, reasoning they were unpublished. However, prior to oral argument in our matter, the Rodriguez decision was published, and the plaintiffs abandoned the case, settling for nuisance value. 

Kimberly House and Oswald Clark (both of Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiffs’ appeal from a verdict obtained by Aaron Moore and Alesia Sulock (both of Philadelphia, PA) for our client in a legal malpractice claim. During the case, the trial court partially granted our motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed several tort claims and a claim for unfair trade practices. The matter then proceeded to trial on the remaining breach of contract claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of our client, and the plaintiffs appealed, challenging the rulings on the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine that purportedly precluded the plaintiffs from introducing certain evidence. The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous decision, holding that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiffs' argument regarding the trial court's decision on the motion in limine was waived because they failed to properly develop the argument in their appellate brief. 

Kim Boyer-Cohen (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to reverse the trial court's order that reinstated our client as a party for purposes of trial and the verdict sheet. The plaintiff, an employee of the co-defendant, brought suit after she slipped and fell during her employment. The Honorable Sean Kennedy had granted our client's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims and cross claims against them. Over one year later, the Honorable Linda Carpenter granted the co-defendant's motion in limine, allowing the co-defendant to present evidence against our client at trial, place our client on the verdict sheet, and essentially vacate the order granting summary judgment. The Commonwealth Court held that Judge Carpenter's order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule and reversed the order reinstating our client as a party at trial and on the verdict sheet. 

In another matter, Kim Boyer-Cohen persuaded the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to affirm the summary judgment granted in favor of our client, a township solicitor, and the other township defendants. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for a substantive due process violation based on the defendants' alleged appropriation of a portion of the plaintiffs' property as a public road. The Third Circuit declined the plaintiffs' “invitation to constitutionalize garden-variety land-use disputes” and affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that the defendants’ conduct was a not virtual taking which shocked the conscience. 

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court to affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in favor of our client, the employer, which upheld the workers’ compensation judge’s denial of a claim petition. By memorandum opinion, the court found that the judge’s credibility findings were neither contradictory nor arbitrary and capricious, and the decision was well reasoned. The court agreed with the employer that the defense expert’s opinions constituted substantial evidence, also noting that the Social Security Administration’s findings of disability were irrelevant to the issue of work-relatedness. The court concluded that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving a work-related injury, and since the causal connection between her “lingering symptoms and her work duties” was not obvious, she was required to present unequivocal medical evidence establishing that connection, which she failed to do. 

John ‘Jack’ Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias (both of Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully defended an appeal of a legal malpractice action in the New Jersey Appellate Division. The action was tried in Burlington County, New Jersey, and arose out of the plaintiff’s claims regarding our client’s settlement of underlying equitable distribution and alimony claims in connection with the plaintiff’s ownership of an ultrasound company. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.