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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025

December 1, 2025

Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania to reverse the trial court’s denial of motions for post-trial relief and to direct entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s client. The plaintiff alleged he was injured while standing unsupported on a moving bus. He claimed that he lost his balance when the bus accelerated away from a bus stop and that he grabbed an overhead bar to keep from falling and injured his arm. The video showed only that the plaintiff lost his balance when the bus started moving. At trial, the defense moved for nonsuit and directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was insufficient, particularly in light of the video evidence, to overcome the jerk-and-jolt doctrine applicable to a passenger injured on a moving bus. Submission of a jerk-and-jolt case to a jury requires a sudden stop or jerk so unusual and extraordinary as to be beyond a passenger’s reasonable anticipation. The trial court denied our motions for nonsuit and directed verdict, as well as post-trial motions, having determined that the video evidence presented a jury question under the jerk-and-jolt doctrine. After independently reviewing the video evidence, the Commonwealth Court reversed and granted jnov to the defendant, pointing out that various of the trial court’s observations “were not supported by the video or testimony” adduced at trial. 

Carol and Aaron Moore (Wilmington, DE) obtained the Delaware Supreme Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of a complex legal malpractice claim. The plaintiffs, seven affiliated companies and their owners in the business of developing property, had been sued by their bank for defaulting on multiple lines of credit. The bank filed multiple lawsuits against the property developers, claiming approximately $7 million in damages, plus attorneys’ fees, which were recoverable pursuant to the terms of the promissory notes. The property developers retained our client to defend the lawsuits, asserting that the amounts claimed to be owed to the bank were significantly overstated. Our client vigorously defended the bank’s underlying lawsuits. Ultimately, the property developers settled the bank’s lawsuits for the entire amount owed, plus interest, and the bank’s legal fees. The developers argued that its attorneys should have advised them to settle the bank’s claims after the lawsuits were commenced and that, if they had done so, they would not have had to pay the bank’s legal fees ($825,000), our client’s legal fees ($485,000), our expert witness fees ($335,000), or the additional interest on the loan. The property developers also claimed that not settling with the bank earlier caused them lost business opportunities valued at nearly $1 million. The plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were dismissed because their expert witness, a Maryland attorney with no business litigation experience, was not qualified to serve as an expert and because their damage claims were speculative.

Kimberly Berman and Matthew Wildner (both of Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a final order dismissing claims against Marshall Dennehey’s client, a professional engineer and his engineering firm, in a construction defect case in Florida. The appeal presented an issue of whether a non-supervisory engineer and his firm, who were retained by a third party to examine and inspect a contractor’s work, which third party then told the contractor to stop work, could be held liable for professional negligence. The trial court dismissed the professional negligence claims with prejudice, and without oral argument. The appellate court affirmed. 

Kimberly House (Philadelphia, PA) convinced the Pennsylvania Superior Court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ appeal of a judgment on a defense verdict for our client that was obtained by Allison Krupp (Harrisburg, PA). Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs, who were sued for legal malpractice. They notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. The plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract and bad faith. In the trial handled by Allision, the jury returned a defense verdict, and the plaintiffs filed post-trial motions, which were denied. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite to relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial. 

Kimberly and Scott Gemberling (both of Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiff’s appeal of a trial court decision sustaining a preliminary objection on the ground of improper venue. In the underlying case, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found that venue was improper in Philadelphia County and ordered that the case be transferred to Centre County, and the plaintiff appealed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a precedential decision, affirmed the trial court’s decision and found that there was no abuse of discretion. In support of its decision, the Superior Court found that the plaintiff’s arguments were unsupported by Pennsylvania law. The Superior Court, in finding waiver of an issue, quoted directly from the brief prepared by Kim. 

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) obtained the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court en banc’s affirmance of the grant of summary judgment on remand in favor of our client, which had been obtained by Patricia Monahan (Pittsburgh, PA). The court denied the plaintiff’s (a retiring police officer) claim for unjust enrichment and breach of contract regarding his pension benefits. It was the law of the case from the prior appeal that, although the plaintiff’s employment contract stated that he would be entitled to Act 600 pension benefits, he had an existing Act 15 pension pursuant to an ordinance under the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Law and the defendant Borough had never enacted an ordinance to establish an Act 600 pension. The Borough was not unjustly enriched by not providing the plaintiff with such a plan and, too, the Borough did not “fail” to contribute the plaintiff’s pension contributions to a pension plan. The court also upheld denial of the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. 

Audrey also persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s transfer of venue from Philadelphia County to York County obtained by her and Edward McGinn (King of Prussia, PA) for our client. The court had found that our client had no Philadelphia presence, customers, or sales and was in the business of processing and packaging canned and frozen vegetables. The Superior Court found that importing raw vegetable material through the Port of Philadelphia and the use of third-party vendors to carry out the importation and transportation was analogous to the purchase of supplies and did not meet the standard of “regularly conducting business.” Venue was also not proper merely because the defendant’s products were offered for sale in Philadelphia stores. 

Audrey and Suzanne Utke (Philadelphia, PA) obtained the dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of judgment in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s client as the plaintiff and his attorney failed to file post-trial motions after the defense verdict. Therefore, they had waived all issues for appeal. 

John Hare and Shane Haselbarth (both of Philadelphia, PA) conduced a successful oral argument before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that resulted in the Court’s unanimous ruling to uphold statutory employer immunity on Pennsylvania construction sites. The six Justices who voted rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that such immunity should be overturned as antiquated and should be deemed waivable. Read more about this case in The Legal Intelligencer. 

*Results do not guarantee a similar result. 


Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.