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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Marshall Dennehey Is Happy to Celebrate Our Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021

March 1, 2021

Kimberly Boyer-Cohen (Philadelphia, PA) obtained a victory before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Edwin Schwartz (Harrisburg, PA) initially obtained a grant of summary judgment in the trial court in favor of the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and that the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment doctrine did not apply. On appeal, the plaintiff requested adoption of the continuous representation rule to permit statutes of limitations for causes of action sounding in legal malpractice to be tolled until the attorney’s ongoing representation is complete. Kim convinced the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to reject adoption of the continuous representation rule, making clear that attorneys will not be subjected to a more stringent statute of limitations than other professionals. Clark v. Stover, 242 A.3d 1253 (Pa. 2020).

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the First District Court of Appeal of a defense verdict obtained for an owner of a commercial retail center and parking lot, in a negligent security action. A chef was taking garbage outside a restaurant when he was shot and killed. The Estate sued the owner of the building and the parking lot, as well as the defendants involved in the development, design and maintenance of the retail center. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of all defendants. The Estate appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in excluding subsequent evidence of remedial measures—installation of lighting, signs and cameras in the parking lot after the shooting. The First District rejected the Estate’s argument and affirmed the final judgments in favor of the defendants. Rowe v. Rowin, 306 So.3d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 25, 2020).

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) convinced the Pennsylvania Superior Court to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment on behalf of the firm’s clients, the defendant rental agents, in a case where the plaintiff (then a minor) tripped and fell down a stairway in a rented residence where she lived with her family. The court found as to the separate defendant landlords (and generally) that, while the plaintiff claimed she fell because the first three stairs lacked a railing, she was aware of this condition and had been taught by her mother how to safely negotiate the steps. The court further found that the plaintiff did not support her allegations against the defendant rental agents with any relevant authority or develop any meaningful argument against them, as the appellate rules require. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to establish that these defendants owed her a duty. Sprouse v. Keller, et al., 2020 WL 7706808 (Pa. Super. Dec. 29, 2020).

Walter Klekotka and Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) were successful in defending a grant of summary judgment in the New Jersey Appellate Division. ​Our clients were the owner and manager of an apartment complex for seniors. The plaintiff was a resident who was returning from walking her dog and was entering the elevator. After the dog had already entered the elevator, the doors began to close. The plaintiff alleged injuries that occurred when the right door struck her arm and when she pushed the left door with her arm and the left side of her body enough to slow the doors closing and leap into the elevator. She sued our clients and the company hired to maintain the elevator but was unable to establish any proof of negligence. Her case was dismissed as the trial judge declined to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in part, because she could not establish the third element of the doctrine that the injury did not result from the plaintiff’s own voluntary act or neglect. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the Appellate Division should eliminate this third element. The Appellate Division, in a published decision, concluded that the third element is well-established law in New Jersey and only the Supreme Court could eliminate it, but it has shown no inclination to do so.

George Helfrich (Roseland, NJ) and Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully persuaded the New Jersey Appellate Division to reverse a coverage determination. The original determination had found that the plaintiff was entitled to $500,000 in coverage under her then-boyfriend’s insurance policy, rather than being limited to the $100,000 in her own policy. The New Jersey Law Division rejected our arguments that the policy did not deem the plaintiff a “covered person” because she was the named insured in her own policy, and rejected the argument that the step-down provision applied. On appeal, the Appellate Division did not agree with us that the Law Division erred in its determination that the plaintiff was a “covered person,” but it did agreed that the step-down provision applied to limit the plaintiff’s recovery to that of her own policy. Cross petitions for review were filed with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which declined to alter the Appellate Division’s decision, resulting in significant savings on the claim for our client.

*Results do not guarantee a similar result.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.