.

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Marshall Dennehey Is Happy to Celebrate Our Recent Appellate Victories*

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021

September 1, 2021

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in obtaining a dismissal by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of an appeal of an order denying emergency relief in our client’s action to foreclose a claim of lien and for damages and breach of contract against a former condominium unit owner. The appellant attempted to revive an untimely appeal of a prior order by obtaining a new order to the same effect, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and granted the association its motion for entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees. Sawyers v. Lakeside Manor North Association, No. 4D21-225 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 7, 2021).

Kimberly, Shaggy Nowroozpour and Michael Packer (Fort Lauderdale, FL) obtained an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a final judgment entered for an insurance carrier. The case involved an alleged assignment of benefits for a water loss, where the county court found the plaintiff lacked standing to sue. Empire v. United Property & Casualty Company, No. 4D21-65 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 14, 2021).

Kimberly and Craig Hudson (Fort Lauderdale, FL) succeeded in the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In this case, the court affirmed a final dismissal order of third-party claims for tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship, civil conspiracy to commit tortious interference with a contract, aiding and abetting tortious interference with a contract, and vicarious liability against a law firm and its lawyers who filed the underlying lawsuit against the appellant. Jallali v. Zhou, 4D20-5 (Fla. 4th DCA Apr. 22, 2021).

Kimberly and Stephen Poljak (Fort Lauderdale, FL) obtained the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s affirmance of a final judgment in favor of an insurance carrier in an insurance coverage dispute. The trial court found that there was no coverage under a CGL policy for the vicarious liability of an insured when its employee had committed an intentional act in the course and scope of his/her employment; the Fourth District agreed. Slocomb v. Old Dominion Insurance Company, 4D20-1515 (Fla. 4th DCA May 6, 2021).

Kimberly, James Hanratty and Robert Williams (Jacksonville, FL) convinced the First District Court of Appeal to affirm a final summary judgment for a restaurant/bar owner in a slip and fall case. The appellant argued that a restaurant/bar owner should have warned a patron about the barstool being a dangerous condition and of the slippery dance floor, but presented no evidence that the owner was in a superior condition than the appellant. Aljuni v. Blackfinn Jax, LLC, No. 1D20-946 (Fla. 1st DCA Apr. 20, 2021).

Kimberly and Ryan Burns (Fort Lauderdale, FL) persuaded the Fifth District Court of Appeal to affirm a final dismissal order of a wrongful death product liability action. The Estate had filed the lawsuit two years after the statute of limitations expired. The Estate claimed the limitations period was tolled due to the alleged adverse interest of the child’s mother, who had been abused by the deceased prior to the accident on an agricultural production site. The trial court dismissed the case, with prejudice, after giving the Estate five attempts to amend. The Fifth District affirmed the dismissal and dispensed with oral argument that same day. Rude v. Morbark, Inc., Case No. 5D20-976 (Fla. 5th DCA Apr. 20, 2021).

Audrey Copeland (King of Prussia, PA) persuaded the Commonwealth Court to dismiss the claimant’s untimely appeal where the claimant did not allege any basis for relief nunc pro tunc. King v. Olympic Tool and Machine Corp. (WCAB), No. 48 CD 2021 (Pa. Cmwlth., May 18, 2021).

Audrey and Estelle McGrath (Pittsburgh, PA) won an appeal where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied a newspaper delivery person’s petition for allowance of appeal on March 30, 2021. The claimant had filed a claim petition in 2018, alleging that he suffered serious injuries to his right leg after slipping and falling on ice when he was delivering newspapers. The newspaper asserted the claimant was an independent contractor. The case was bifurcated to determine whether the claimant was an employee. After fully litigating the issue, the Workers’ Compensation Judge found in favor of the newspaper and found that the case was not so different than the seminal case of Johnson v. WCAB (DuBois Courier Express), 631 A.2d 693 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). The Johnson court had held that a newspaper carrier was an independent contractor because the newspaper did not exercise substantial control over his activities. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. After hearing argument and reviewing the parties’ briefs, the Board affirmed the judge’s decision and order. The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, urging the court to consider the evolving nature of the newspaper delivery business in rendering its decision. The court refused to do so and highlighted the lack of control by the newspaper because there was no prohibition on delivering competing newspapers or enlisting a substitute without prior notice or permission. The Commonwealth Court’s decision, which was issued as a non-precedential opinion, is the latest in an unbroken line of similar cases holding that newspaper carriers are independent contractors. The claimant’s suit ended when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal.

Walter Kawalec (Mount Laurel, NJ), of our appellate group, and Leonard Leicht and Michelle Michael (Roseland, NJ) were successful before the the New Jersey Appellate Division. The plaintiff filed suit against her employer, a governmental agency, alleging she was subject to discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination based upon her disability and that she was subject to retaliation for filing a previous discrimination suit. She further asserted aiding-and-abetting claims against fellow employees. The case was dismissed via summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division accepted our argument that the failure to move the plaintiff to a position she desired did not constitute an adverse employment action or failure to accommodate as she suffered no adverse effect on her salary or benefits, and did not materially alter her working conditions. Further, the court addressed the concerns plaintiff’s physician had expressed when she sought the accommodation, even though she was not transferred to a position in which she preferred to work, and agreed these claims were properly rejected by the trial Judge.

Walt, Howard Mankoff and Michelle Michael (Roseland, NJ) were successful before the New Jersey Appellate Division. The plaintiff is a former employee of a non-profit agency that provides services to disabled individuals. She filed suit against her former employer and its manager, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. As discovery progressed, thousands of pages of discovery were exchanged, which demonstrated that legitimate, long-standing performance deficiencies were the actual basis for her termination. The defendants filed for summary judgment prior to the end of the discovery period, and the Law Division granted the motion, finding no reason not to grant the immediate dismissal, especially as the plaintiff failed to even respond to the statement of material facts. On appeal to the Appellate Division, the court affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the plaintiff’s arguments that the motion judge engaged in a subjective analysis of the facts and thereby made factual findings on disputed issues, and that the motion judge erred by granting the motion before discovery was complete. The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, with any degree of particularity, that further discovery would supply the missing elements to her cause of action. The court further found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of gender discrimination or workers’ compensation retaliation given the unrebutted facts provided by the defendants.

Walt and Lynne Nahmani (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully obtained a reversal of a trial court’s denial of our motion to file a third-party action. We represented a nursing home who is alleged to have caused significant injury to a former patient, and we sought to bring a third-party action against other medical providers who could potentially be liable for the alleged injury. The trial judge rejected the motion on the grounds that it should have been brought earlier and that the third-party action would cause a delay in the litigation. On an interlocutory appeal granted by the Appellate Division, the appellate court reversed. It held that because the COVID-19 pandemic caused a closure of the courts and created a massive backlog of cases, the delay was inevitable, so it could not support a denial of the request to add the third parties to the action. As such, the Appellate Division found an abuse of discretion and remanded with instructions to permit the third-party action.

Walt and Walter Klekotka (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully obtained and affirmance in the Appellate Division of a grant of summary judgment. The case involved a plaintiff who, on a dark and rainy night, slipped and allegedly injured himself while walking quickly on a grassy alleyway between two buildings toward the entrance to his apartment. Our clients were a construction company and its owner who were doing work in one of the buildings. In his answers to interrogatories and depositions, the plaintiff failed to identify anything that caused the slip other than wet grass. On the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought to introduce an affidavit that placed blame for the fall on an unidentified “tar-like substance” and construction debris. The Law Division judge disregarded the affidavit based on the “sham affidavit” doctrine and found no basis to find liability against any defendant because the plaintiff failed to identify the cause of his alleged fall. The Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division judge’s decision, finding no error in the analysis or in rejecting the plaintiff’s affidavit.

Karen Grethlein and Shane Haselbarth (Philadelphia, PA) obtained a dismissal of a consumer fraud class action. Our clients, a national firm and its principal, specialize in identifying and reclaiming lost property for consumers who are unaware that such lost property exists. The plaintiff brought claims under the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) and for fraudulent inducement, arguing that the business model was deceptive because consumers could recover their own property without paying for the ease and convenience of having the defendant business work on their behalf. Not surprisingly, the district court found that the plaintiff’s serial complaints failed to allege anything “more than Defendants’ expertise,” and that there was no factual basis to support the notion that consumers are unduly influenced or misled. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, expressly noting that the defendants made no misrepresentation at any time, and the UTPCPL and fraud claims were dismissed without merit. DeSimone v. U.S. Claims Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 2556949 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2020), aff’d 2021 WL 1662779 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2021).

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.