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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…King of Prussia Office: A Historic Legacy and a Dynamic Future of Legal Excellence

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025

December 1, 2025

by Michael L. Detweiler

Situated in the shadow of Valley Forge and the rich history of the Revolutionary War, the King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office is steeped in history. The office itself has a long history of servicing the counties adjacent to Philadelphia, in addition to Philadelphia. Though once located in the Montgomery County seat of Norristown, this office now sits not far from the King of Prussia Mall and an always active Top Golf facility. The office is also steeped in firm history as it has been affiliated with many of the firm’s founders and leaders through the years, including Jack Warner, Tom Brophy, Christopher Dougherty, Joe Santarone, and Wendy Bracaglia, to name a few.

Today, with approximately 40 attorneys and 60 staff employees, the King of Prussia office is one of the firm’s largest branch offices and one of the largest law offices in Montgomery County. The office has long serviced Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia Counties. We consolidated with our Doylestown and Allentown offices several years ago, and we now also service Berks, Bucks, Carbon, Lehigh, Monroe, Northampton, and Schuylkill Counties. The addition of attorneys from other offices and the acquisition of key talent from other firms through the years has created a dynamic team comprised of attorneys with numerous backgrounds, skill sets, and perspectives.

The health care team has been a powerful engine for the office for years and continues to flourish. The group has long-standing client relationships with health care systems and providers throughout eastern Pennsylvania and continues to develop new relationships. Led by attorneys Robin Snyder and Donna Modestine, the group continues to grow, even with the recent retirements of several key health care attorneys in the past several years. In 2024, Gary Samms, one of the most sought-after trial attorneys in Pennsylvania, joined an already stalwart group of attorneys: Joan Ford, Joe Hoynoski, and Gabor Ovari. Recent special counsel and associate additions in the past several years include Kevin Majernik, Jonathan Landua, Evan Pentz, David McColloch, and Julianna Malloy, all of whom have joined us from other firms and have added to an already strong and highly-regarded unit. 

Despite retirements of several experienced and senior attorneys in the past several years (we will sorely miss Mark Riley and Ed McGinn when they retire at year’s end) from the Casualty Department, we have pivoted and recently welcomed several talented and energetic associates—Khaliyah Pugh, Richard Lechette, and Ashley Stasak—to our core casualty group, consisting of Michele Frisbie, Michele Krengel, Tim Hartigan, Ed Tuite, and Rob Morton, in addition to those attorneys who strengthened our group after joining us from the Allentown office: Jason Banonis, Steve Keim, and Wendy O’Connor. The casualty attorneys handle a wide array of high-exposure casualty matters, ranging from construction personal injury to serious auto and premises liability matters and everything in between. 

Frank Wickersham, Judd Woytek, Tony Natale, Michael Duffy, and Anna Jaoudi comprise the office’s workers’ compensation unit, which routinely achieves favorable results on behalf of their clients and is very well-regarded by the workers’ compensation bar. Tony and Anna also work in our Medicare Compliance Practice Group, providing the entire firm with an invaluable resource in reaching solutions for often complicated questions created by settlements and Medicare issues.

Finally, the firm is fortunate to have a group of attorneys who handle a wide array of professional liability matters. They include Audrey Copeland, who handles appeals; Gregory Kelley, who focuses on professional liability and construction defects; Maureen Fitzgerald and Christin Kochel, who handle a wide variety of professional liability cases; and Paul Laughlin, who handles professional liability and health care cases. These added practice areas, and the skill with which these attorneys practice, ensure that the office, the firm, and our clients have access to invaluable resources and representation in numerous practice areas. 

The office is defined, in large part, by the skill and talent of its attorneys, but it has had its share of characters and levity through the years, too. There has never been a shortage of social events (Top Golf, happy hours, associate dinners), games (trivia night), music (a staple on the “Class Action” tour circuit) and the occasional awkward photo of an office attorney from yesteryear. The office has always embodied one of the defining features that makes Marshall Dennehey special and unique: “A culture where humor is the great equalizer, and no one is above the friendly jest.” The office is also blessed with hard-working and talented paralegals and support staff, who are an integral part of our success and are led by our dedicated and tireless office manager, Suzie Spitko.

One of the office’s primary strengths remains its versatility, both in the various practice groups that provide skilled lawyering and in its capacity to provide representation in numerous venues in eastern Pennsylvania. We have always thrived, in great part, due to our flexibility and adaptability and in bringing on new talent to continue our tradition of excellence. In many ways, the King of Prussia office serves as a microcosm of the firm at large: rich in history but poised for great things moving forward. 

Mike is the managing attorney of our King of Prussia, PA office. He can be reached at 610-354-8271 or MLDetweiler@mdwcg.com. 


Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.