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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023

September 1, 2023

by John J. Delany, III

When the stakes are high, clients rely on Marshall Dennehey’s experienced team of litigators, counselors, and trial attorneys to defend their interests in state and federal courts across the country and internationally. Kristen L. Worley and I are honored to share that experience with you as the co-chairs of the Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group. The breadth of our practice extends past the geographical footprint of our offices because of our network of resources and relationships. Accordingly, the reach of our protective umbrella is international, consisting of a network of counsel, experts, and litigation crisis management organizations based on our memberships, alliance, and role as National Coordinating Counsel for numerous product manufacturers, and chairs in key committees of the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel (Trial Masters, Evolve), the International Association of Defense Counsel, the Defense Research Institute, American Trial Lawyers, industrial/commercial/product organization and associations, and specialty product practice groups.

Experience
We have a proven track record of successfully defending clients in cases involving catastrophic events, such as large-scale accidents, environmental disasters, construction collapse, high-rise fires, product liability claims, mass shootings, and other high-exposure claims. Our attorneys have extensive knowledge representing clients in a wide range of industries, including but not limited to manufacturing, construction, hospitality, trucking and transportation, energy, and insurance.

Our Attorneys
As chair of the Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group, I have over 30 years' experience defending catastrophic, high-profile, high-exposure cases against some of the country’s most formidable plaintiff firms and have taken to conclusion more than 60 jury trials, as well as hundreds of bench trials, arbitrations, and mediations. It has been my privilege to represent many Fortune 500 companies directly and as insureds in complex litigation matters at the federal and state levels, and before administrative agencies and alternate dispute resolution forums. 

Kristin Worley is co-chair of our practice group. She has two decades of litigation and trial experience, representing clients in Pennsylvania and New Jersey in matters involving catastrophic litigation, product liability, personal injury, and commercial auto litigation.

Tom Wagner, in our Philadelphia office, is a litigation and trial lawyer with more than 40 years' experience. He concentrates his practice on the defense of casualty, product liability, and transportation industry cases. He has tried numerous cases to verdict in both state and federal courts. His clients have included well-known national retailers and product manufacturers, the largest operator of school buses in the world, and one of the largest transit authorities in the U.S.

Our group consists of nearly 40 attorneys firmwide, all of whom are dedicated to defending clients facing complex and high-exposure litigation arising from catastrophic events. With decades of experience handling these complex claims, we are well equipped to handle the most challenging and sensitive cases, working with clients to tailor our approach based on their needs. 

Comprehensive Defense Strategy
We understand the unique challenges that catastrophic and high-exposure claims present, and we work closely with our clients to develop a comprehensive defense strategy tailored to their specific needs. Our approach includes a thorough investigation of the facts and circumstances surrounding the claim, in-depth legal analyses, and strategic planning to effectively protect our clients’ interests. We employ a proactive and results-driven approach to litigation, with the goal of achieving favorable outcomes through settlement, alternative dispute resolution, or trial. We implement our resolution strategies after a prompt and comprehensive liability assessment is completed.

Collaborative and Client-Centric Approach
At Marshall Dennehey, we value close collaboration with our clients. We believe that a strong attorney-client relationship is essential to achieving success in high-stakes litigation. Our attorneys work directly with clients to understand their goals, concerns, and risk tolerance, and we keep our clients informed and involved at every stage of the litigation process. We strive to provide prompt and responsive communication and are committed to delivering exceptional service and achieving the best possible outcomes for our clients.

Cutting-Edge Resources and Technology
Our firm is at the forefront of using cutting-edge resources and technology to support our practice group’s efforts in defending catastrophic and high-exposure claims. We leverage advanced legal research tools, industry-leading experts and consultants, data analytics, and other state-of-the-art technologies to conduct thorough investigations, analyze complex data, and develop compelling legal arguments. This enables us to effectively manage large volumes of information and handle complex cases with efficiency and accuracy. At the end of the day, our trial attorneys are persuasive storytellers. As the dust settles from a catastrophic event, we are there to shape and tell your persuasive story.

Our Emergency Response Team is available 24/7 to respond to any catastrophic or high-exposure emergency (https://marshalldennehey.com) and is prepared to develop, coordinate, and execute an effective plan to protect our clients.
 

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 3, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.