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Defense Digest

On the Pulse… Marshall Dennehey’s Fort Lauderdale Office: Diverse People and Diverse Practices

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021

January 29, 2021

by Michael A. Packer

In February 2002, Marshall Dennehey established an office in Fort Lauderdale with two attorneys. Nineteen years and three locations later, the office today is sixth largest in the firm and home to 32 attorneys. Situated just outside of downtown Fort Lauderdale, a stone’s throw from the beach with a spectacular view of the Atlantic Ocean, our office defends lawsuits throughout Southeast Florida, including in Miami-Dade, Broward, Monroe and Palm Beach Counties, as well as Collier and Lee Counties on the Gulf coast.

Much of the office’s growth can be attributed to Craig S. Hudson, who served in my position for several years. Craig recently moved to Philadelphia to lead the firm’s Professional Liability Department and join Marshall Dennehey’s Executive Committee. Craig, along with office manager, Sandy Doersam, fostered an environment of professionalism, collaboration and mutual respect for all, which is the hallmark of Marshall Dennehey’s culture. One great example of the opportunities offered here includes Jessie Harris, who joined us as a file clerk in 2011 and has since risen to legal assistant and, most recently, assistant office manager.

The attorneys in our Fort Lauderdale office are highly experienced in both casualty and professional liability matters. The casualty litigation group, managed by Alan (A.C.) Nash, represents a number of Fortune 100 companies in general liability, negligent security, product liability, hospitality and liquor liability, and a host of other matters. The professional liability group represents all manner of professionals when claims are made against them, including police forces throughout Southeast Florida in civil rights and municipal matters. Our roster of professional liability attorneys includes Andrew Marchese, one of the first Board Certified Condominium and Planned Development Law Attorneys in the state of Florida, and Kimberly Berman, one of just 205 Board Certified Appellate Attorneys in the state.

The office also has a robust insurance coverage, first party property and bad faith practice group that not only defends first party property lawsuits throughout the state, but assists insurance companies with their claims investigations, including routinely conducting examinations under oath. Shareholder, Danielle Robinson has developed a very successful Lemon Law practice representing vehicle manufacturers in Consumer Board Arbitrations with an amazing success rate. Lastly, one of the fastest-growing groups in the office is our PIP/SIU department, which litigates thousands of PIP/SIU cases on behalf of one of the nation’s largest insurance companies.

Over the last several years, our Fort Lauderdale attorneys have prevailed in jury trials. For example, we represented one of Southeast Florida’s largest property developers; obtained defense verdicts for insurance companies on first party property lawsuits; won a bench trial after seven years of litigating and defending a Board of Directors; successfully advised the general liability carrier and settled numerous claims arising out of the tragic massacre at the Pulse Nightclub; obtained summary judgment in federal civil rights actions against a large local police department; and prevailed in numerous third party coverage actions.

Probably the greatest attribute of the Fort Lauderdale office is our diversity. A large portion of our attorneys and staff hail from the Caribbean, Russia, the Middle East and Latin America, and almost half of our attorneys are women. The diverse backgrounds and experiences that our employees bring ensure that we have an inclusive workplace culture and enhances our law practice and representation of clients. In addition, the diversity around the office leads to remarkable debates and advocacy, especially in the Fall when the topic on everyone’s mind turns to football, and which is the best college football team in the state? UF, Miami or FSU?

One of our favorite office traditions is the downtown Fort Lauderdale Corporate Run, in which thousands of local businesses participate in a 5K (walking and running) to raise money for local charities. Ryan Burns, a shareholder in the casualty group, is the reigning office champion, having achieved the fastest race time for the past few years. On the flip side of that event, another favorite day of the year is our office Thanksgiving feast. Everyone brings a dish to share, and we get to taste delicacies and share in others’ family traditions.

The diverse and talented attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Fort Lauderdale office stand ready to assist you with all of your civil litigation needs. Please do not hesitate to email or call me should you have any questions at all about our legal services and how we may assist you.

*Michael is the managing attorney of the Fort Lauderdale, Florida office and co-chair of the firm’s Insurance Services Practice Group. He can be reached at (954) 847-4921 or mapacker@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 1, January 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.