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Legal Updates for Health Care Liability

Ohio 8th District Court of Appeals Affirms Trial Court Ruling that Non-Economic Damages Cap on Catastrophic Injuries Is Unconstitutional as Applied

Legal Updates for Health Care Liability – February 25, 2025

February 25, 2025

by Gabriella M. Wittbrod

On January 30, 2025, the Ohio 8th District Court of Appeals held that Ohio’s medical malpractice non-economic damages cap is unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff-appellee who permanently lost his eye as the result of an infection he contracted after cataract surgery. The statute, R.C. 2323.43(A)(3), states that the amount recoverable for non-economic loss in a medical claim shall not exceed $500,000 if the loss includes a permanent and substantial physical deformity or loss of bodily organ system or a permanent physical functional injury.

Paganini v. Cataract Eye Center of Cleveland, 2025-Ohio-275 (8th Dist.), involves a 90-year-old man who received routine cataract surgery from the defendants-appellants. The morning after his surgery, Mr. Paganini was experiencing some pain, blurry vision and floaters. He was seen by one of the defendants, Dr. Louis, who misdiagnosed him with a vitreous hemorrhage. Ultimately, Mr. Paganini was diagnosed with an infection that caused him to permanently lose his eye. 

He filed a lawsuit, claiming Dr. Louis failed to diagnose the infection and should have referred him to a retina specialist sooner. The trial court (Cuyahoga County Common Pleas, CV-22-971901) found in favor of Mr. Paganini and awarded him $1,487,500.00. After the verdict, Mr. Paganini requested the court not apply the R.C. 2323.43 damages cap on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional as applied him.1 The trial court agreed, and the defendants appealed that decision. 

The trial court found that 2323.43(A) was unconstitutional as applied because it violates Ohio’s due process clause. Applying the rational-basis test, the 8th District Court considered whether the statute “bears a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the public” and whether it is unreasonable or arbitrary. They cited Morris v. Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d 684 (1991), where the Ohio Supreme Court held that a $200,000 cap on general damages in medical malpractice cases was unconstitutional because it did not bear a real and substantial relation to the general health and welfare of the public and because it was unreasonable and arbitrary. 

The 8th District Court also cited the General Assembly that enacted 2323.43, stating the statute was designed to “stabiliz[e] the cost of health care delivery by limiting the amount of compensatory damages representing noneconomic loss awards in medical malpractice actions.”2 Yet, the court was not convinced that the damages cap in 2323.43(A) has a significant impact on lowering the cost of health care in Ohio. The court stated: “The legislature has failed to demonstrate how capping noneconomic damages for a very small group of highly injured people, which includes Paganini, will have any impact on malpractice insurance rates beyond those provided by the cap on less severe injuries.” Therefore, the court held that for Mr. Paganini, 2323.43 does not bear a real and substantial relationship to malpractice insurance rates. 

In determining whether the statute is arbitrary and unreasonable, the 8th District applied the following analogy from Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468 (2007):

"If a man’s leg were cut off by a doctor in surgery and he sought non-economic for the catastrophic injury, the damages would be limited to $500,000 under R.C. 2323.43(A)(3). Yet, if the same man were to be run over and lose his leg by the same doctor on the way home from the hospital after a successful surgery, that man could recover all non-economic damages for his catastrophic injury because R.C. 2315.18 has no additional limit. This is not reasonable or logical. The exact same injury inflicted by the same person should yield the exact same damages, but under the current statutory scheme it does not."

The 8th District reasoned that R.C. 2323.43(A)(C) burdens those who are severely injured by medical malpractice by attempting to “provide some unrealized benefit to the general public.” Thus, the court held that the statute is arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to Mr. Paganini.

This ruling is currently controlling precedent for those defending actions in Cuyahoga County. It is anticipated that the defendants-appellants will appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court.

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[1] A party may challenge the constitutionality of a statute in two ways: facially or as applied. A facial challenge applies to every conceivable circumstance in which the statute would be valid. An as-applied challenge only applies to the specific set of circumstances in the current matter. An as-applied challenge does not render the statute unconstitutional as a whole. In Paganini, plaintiff-appellee asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied.

[2] The General Assembly also found: “The overall cost of health care to the consumer has been driven up by the fact that malpractice litigation causes health care providers to over prescribe, over treat, and over test their patients.” The 8th District reasoned that the “reduced risk of large noneconomic damage awards is aimed at keeping medical malpractice insurers in Ohio and thus also keeping good doctors in Ohio. Obviously, the goal of lowering medical malpractice insurance rates is related to the general welfare of the public.” 


 

Legal Updates for Health Care Liability – February 25, 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.