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Defense Digest

Message From the Executive Committee

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021

June 1, 2021

by Craig S. Hudson

In the previous Defense Digest, you were provided with a link to a well-deserved and moving video tribute to Chris Dougherty, my predecessor as director of the Professional Liability Department and a member of the Executive Committee, who stepped down from both positions at the end of 2020. If you have not yet watched the video, I urge you to do so. I can envision no greater honor and privilege than to succeed my friend, Chris, as the director of the Professional Liability Department.

Settling into this new position has caused me to reflect on my 28 years at Marshall Dennehey. In 1993, I was a senior associate at the Liebert Short law firm. I was invited to join a group of the partners that had decided to join Marshall Dennehey. I was considering my options when Bob Coleman, who “ran” Marshall Dennehey at the time, called and asked me to meet with him. I did, and we spent an hour together. During our conversation, Bob told me of his vision for Marshall Dennehey’s future. When he was done, I knew that Marshall Dennehey was the firm for me. I said, “Yes.” To this day, I consider my decision to join the firm to be one of my best.

When I first started at Marshall Dennehey, I was part of the Casualty Department. Over the ensuing years, I was fortunate to work with and learn from some very fine attorneys, including Harry Short, Eric Weiss, Keith Heinold and Tom Brophy. I handled a mix of cases, ranging from motor vehicle product liability cases to defending Sesame Place (always an advantage to be representing Big Bird).

A couple of years into my time at Marshall Dennehey, Bob Coleman again called and asked that I come to his office. As I walked down the hall to meet him, I had more than a little bit of trepidation. Bob told me that he recalled from our initial meeting that I had told him that one day I would like to get involved in firm management and not just handle cases. Bob said he wanted to give me a chance to see if this was really something I wanted and could do. He asked if I would like to oversee the summer law clerk program. I followed my father’s advice to never turn down opportunities presented to you by your boss (and believe me, Bob was the boss). A couple of years later, I was asked to get involved in associate recruiting. Again, I said yes. I then worked closely with and later succeeded Howard Dwoskin as the firm’s attorney hiring coordinator. I have to admit I take some pride in the fact that some of the attorneys I recruited have become leaders in our firm.

A few years later, I was “recruited” to practice in the Professional Liability Department. Again, I agreed. A short while later, I started working with Phil Toran and Chris Dougherty, who was then the assistant director of the Professional Liability Department, on recruiting and hiring associates. I also was tasked with providing some oversight and direction to the department’s lawyers who practiced out of the Philadelphia office.

After several years in this role, a new opportunity arose. By then, the firm had entered the Florida market, and, by 2005, its four offices were growing. Marshall Dennehey’s base was solid, with Mark Thompson as the manager of the Orlando office, but there was a need to strengthen the firm’s additional offices in Fort Lauderdale, Jacksonville and Tampa. I just so happened to be part of a conversation among Phil Toran, Peter Miller and Tom Brophy, where it was stated that the Fort Lauderdale office might benefit from having a stronger connection to Philadelphia. Having recently returned from a business trip to our Florida offices, I somehow thought it was a good idea to suggest that I might be willing to go to Florida and take on that role. Phil, Pete and Tom were surprised and intrigued to hear that I would even consider doing so. Wisely, they suggested that I should first discuss the idea of moving to Florida with my wife, Connie. Good advice. That night I went home and told her what had transpired and what I was contemplating. Fortunately for me, Connie was supportive of the idea. And so, after 22 years of practicing in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, I took and passed another bar exam (with the same MBE score), and, in July of 2006, relocated to Fort Lauderdale where I became the managing attorney of the Fort Lauderdale office and the supervising attorney of the Florida Professional Liability attorneys.

In addition to my management duties, I also handled cases. When I first arrived in Fort Lauderdale, we had a small office. All of the attorneys had to handle a variety of cases. Over the next 13 years, I handled almost every type of professional liability case. I have represented lawyers, accountants, real estate and insurance agents, architects and engineers, debt collectors, and HOA and condominium boards. Over the last several years, I have also handled a number of employment matters. I have tried cases in state and federal courts in all four of the South Florida counties.

During the next 14 years, Marshall Dennehey emerged as one of the leading civil defense firms in Florida. Today, we have a combined 67 attorneys practicing out of our four Florida offices.

This bring us to 2020. Little did any of us envision what that year had in store for us. For me, startling and life-changing events of 2020 started a bit earlier than for many of you. You see, I turned 60 in January of 2020, and Connie planned a short vacation to celebrate. A day after my birthday, we were walking on the beach, talking about the past and future. Although we both missed certain things about Philadelphia, we liked living in Florida. I was enjoying my position as regional manager of the Florida offices, having succeeded Mark Thompson in that role following his elevation to president and CEO. I was looking forward to the upcoming years working with the attorneys in Florida as we continued to grow our presence in the state. While this may sound a bit too “new age” for me, I had reached a state of contentment. Little did we know that our world would change two days later. That was when Mark Thompson came to Fort Lauderdale for a surprise visit. Mark told me that the Executive Committee would like Connie and me to agree to return to Philadelphia so I could become the assistant director of the Professional Liability Department and eventually succeed Chris when he retired. Again, following my father’s advice, I agreed. Lucky for me, so did Connie.

Since February 2020, I have spent my time becoming re-acquainted with Philadelphia, reconnecting with long-term friends and colleagues, and getting to know the shareholders, associates, paralegals and staff who make up the Professional Liability Department. I have been busy—the department has 120 attorneys in 17 distinct practice groups covering a wide variety of specialties. This past year, I have come to appreciate, more than ever, those attorneys, paralegals and staff members—a group of talented men and women who are dedicated to providing our clients with top-notch legal representation. They care about the work they do and the services they provide.

Going forward, I pledge to continue the vision and drive for excellence first established by Phil Toran, and then honed by Chris Dougherty. Both of them set the standard for providing top-level service to our clients in a cost-effective manner. We strive to be effective advocates for our clients, while treating everyone, including opposing counsel and the judiciary, with respect. As the director of the Professional Liability Department, I bring my years of management and leadership experience and my 20+ years of legal experience gained from defending professionals and other entities in Pennsylvania and Florida.

As a member of the Executive Committee, I have the good fortune to work with my friends and colleagues, Howard Dwoskin and Mark Thompson. We share a commitment to providing clients with excellent legal representation and service, which has been, and will continue to be, the hallmark of our law firm. Doing so with a sense of humor and respect for one another is what makes Marshall Dennehey the place I am so glad I said “Yes” to 28 years ago.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.