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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

In four back-to-back appeals, the Appellate Division finds the triennial redetermination of average current monthly earnings was not applicable in New Jersey as a reverse offset state.

Wilhelm v. Ryder Logistics & Transp. & Second Injury Fund, No. A-3770-18; Bozarth, Sr. v Burlington Cnty. & SIF, No. A-3792-18; Schiazza v. Western Oilfield Supply & SIF, No. A-3797-18; Pierce, Jr. v. CBF Trucking & SIF, No. A-3798-18, (App. Div. 6/21/21)

September 1, 2021

by Kiara K. Hartwell

In four back-to-back appeals, the Appellate Division again affirmed the workers’ compensation court’s decisions, noting the petitioners were not entitled to a redetermination of benefits. In these cases, the petitioners all collected permanent and total disability benefits and Social Security Disability benefits. Wilhelm’s Social Security Disability application was pending, whereas Pierce’s and Schiazza’s applications were on appeal at the time of the total disability orders. They were required to notify the respondents and the Second Injury Fund (Fund) if Social Security Disability was approved so that reimbursements could be made for workers’ compensation benefits paid in excess of the Social Security Disability offset rate. Once they were approved for Social Security Disability, the Fund moved for reimbursement. The petitioners opposed, seeking a recalculation of the benefit rates to include a triennial redetermination of the average current monthly earnings (ACE). Bozarth also re-opened his case for same reason.

The cases were consolidated and tried in 2016-2017. The Fund produced Larry Crider as its witness, who was the administrator of Special Compensation Funds for the New Jersey Department of Labor since 1990. In 1980, he became involved in processing calculations for the Fund with the Social Security offset. He worked with compensation judges Alan Napier and Michael Cunningham. He testified that they agreed an offset was required if the “total of the weekly workers’ compensation benefits and the weekly equivalent of social security benefit exceed[s] [eighty] percent of the ACE.” There were no cost-of-living increases mentioned in the statute. Crider indicated that legislative history did not reveal an intent for a triennial review for the offset calculations.

He recalled that in 2004 or 2005 an attorney inquired whether petitioners were entitled to a triennial redetermination of ACE. Crider did his own research and requested Glenn Sklar, the Associate Commissioner of Disability Programs at the Social Security Administration, to provide clarification. Sklar confirmed that Social Security was precluded from taking a reduction in Social Security Disability in a reverse offset state and that their manual noted a reverse offset existed for Fund benefits in New Jersey. Crider concluded that N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 did not support a triennial redetermination and that 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) excluded a reverse offset state from performing same.

The petitioners presented Alan Polonsky, an attorney with 30 years of experience handling Social Security benefit claims, as a witness. He was a staff attorney with the Social Security Administration Office of Hearing and Appeals until 1987 when he entered private practice. He related the triennial redetermination to a cost-of-living adjustment, but conceded he had never seen the triennial redetermination applied to a petitioner under the age of 62 receiving total disability benefits. He also confirmed the redetermination would not be applicable as New Jersey is a reverse offset state.

The Judge of Compensation issued an oral decision, finding N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 did not compel a triennial redetermination of ACE nor was it mentioned. Also, the judge found the petitioners neglected 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d). The petitioners’ motions for a triennial redetermination was denied, and the respondents’ and the Fund’s motions for offset and reimbursement were granted.

The petitioners appealed, arguing they were entitled to the redetermination of ACE under N.J.S.A. 34:15-95.5 until they reach age 62 and that the statute did not comply with 42 U.S.C. § 424a(f). The Fund contended the petitioners were precluded from asserting this issue as it was not presented before the total disability awards, and the respondents asserted there was no support for a triennial determination.

The Appellate Division briefly addressed the procedural bar raised by the Fund, noting the petitioners did not raise the triennial redetermination issue prior to the entry of the awards nor that their disability increased or decreased. It was noted the petitioners failed to meet the statutory criteria to re-open their cases. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division did address the substantive issue, as it was an issue of first impression. The Appellate Division noted that New Jersey is a reverse offset state, in which the workers’ compensation award is reduced rather than Social Security Disability. Both Crider and Polonsky testified that a person below the age of 62 is subject to the reverse offset if receiving total disability benefits.

As 42 U.S.C. § 424a(f) provided for a redetermination of the Social Security offset every three years, the petitioners argued the New Jersey Legislature intended to adopt the federal triennial redetermination. However, the Appellate Division noted the plain language does not include same and there was no mention in the legislative history. It was also indicated that 42 U.S.C. § 424a(d) created an exception for reverse offset states. As such, the Appellate Division found the triennial redetermination of ACE was not applicable in New Jersey as a reverse offset state.
 
 

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. 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Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.