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Legal Updates for Amusements, Sports and Recreation Liability

Florida Legislature Passes the Roller Skating Rink Safety Act

Presented by the Amusements, Sports & Recreation Litigation Practice Group

May 8, 2023

On May 2, 2023, Florida became the 12th state to pass legislation intended to keep roller rink operators in business by promoting safety, risk management and shared responsibility of liability. 

The Roller Skating Rink Safety Act will be codified as 768.395 F.S. It began as Senate Bill 1458 and was adopted by the House, which had its own bill. Senator Clay Yarborough and Representative Susan Plasencia sponsored the original bills after hearing from several constituents and owner/operators of skating rinks across the state. Through the advocacy of the Roller Skating Association (comprised of owners/operators and their supporters) and the International Amusement and Leisure Defense Association (IALDA), the members of the legislature were made aware of the striking need for legislation.

Those needs were demonstrated by the closures and reductions of operating roller skating rinks throughout the state, combined with the avalanche of lawsuits and the crushing economics of litigation—and the inability to retain insurance—all despite industry-wide efforts to maintain and train for a culture of safety.

What was also demonstrated by the constituents and their counsel through phone calls, emails, letters as well as public comment and testimony was the unique value of this industry and why it should be protected. The skate rinks are mostly family-owned and operated. They provide economic opportunities and, to many young people, their “first-job” experience in a family-friendly atmosphere. They are one of the last remaining affordable large family fun activities that involves healthy movement. They are also an affordable venue for schools and other organizations, for fun as well as education through STEM-programmed field trips.

Now, with this legislation in place, Florida, like its 11 predecessor states, clearly delineates the safety responsibilities and duties of the owners and operators as well as the inherent risks assumed by any patron when deciding to lace up a pair of skates and put their body in motion.

More specifically, this legislation balances and clarifies the responsibilities of operators and patrons by defining “Inherent Risk” as those dangers or conditions that are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of the activity of roller skating. 

The Act sets forth the conditions under which an operator is not liable to a roller skater or spectator for any damages or personal injury resulting from the inherent risks of roller skating and makes clear that these protections do not apply if there are specified failures of the operator. Duties of the operator include posting responsibilities of roller skaters and spectators in at least three areas on the premises, having at least one supervisor or manager on duty for every 200 skaters, and maintaining the skating surface in a reasonably safe condition which includes cleaning and inspecting the skating surface before each skating session.

Likewise, duties of the skater include maintaining reasonable control of speed and direction, and heeding all the posted signs and warnings, maintaining awareness, knowing the range of their own ability, and refraining from acting in a manner that may contribute to their own or others injury.

With this legislation in place, lawsuits may decrease, but will still be viable if they have good cause such as if there is evidence of a failure of the operator to take the actions described in subsection (5). However, failure of a roller skater to comply with paragraph (6) (b) also now legislatively constitutes negligence. 

Therefore, roller rink operators can now claim defenses as to the skater’s negligence, and their own duties are legislatively determined. By making the duties of each clear, the life span, cost, and toll of lawsuits are lessened, allowing a viable defense to be raised at an insurable cost. 

This legislation, like the industry itself and its long-term advocates, is focused on safety. There are some inherent risks that no amount of reasonable care can prevent. The risk of losing balance while skating cannot be eliminated without taking away the fun and the freedom of movement inherent to the sport. However, this legislation also sets out the duties of the rink operators. With clear language articulating what can reasonably be done to promote less risk and more safety, and what no amount of action can prevent, the shared responsibility of safety is fairly divided providing better outcomes for all involved. 



 

 

Legal Update for Amusements Sports & Recreation Litigation, May 8, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. 
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Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.