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Defense Digest

Expert Competency Requirements for Physician Liability Experts in Ohio

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022

April 1, 2022

by Jason P. Ferrante

Key Points:

  • In Johnson v. Abdullah, Ohio Supreme Court opines regarding “active clinical practice” competency requirement for physician liability experts.
  • Court upheld long-standing rule that requires physician liability experts to spend 50% or more their professional time in the “active clinical practice” of medicine.
  • Court noted that “active clinical practice” requirement must be met at the time of trial.

The connection between attorney and medical expert is as important as an attorney’s relationship with any health care-related client. Both associations require ongoing communication to not only establish a sound defense, but also to maintain strategy over what may become prolonged discovery and delayed litigation. This is especially true as we all move through another year of the COVID pandemic and deal with its effects on trial schedules. 

Engaging medical experts at the beginning of litigation and continuing the communication is now even more important following the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021 WL 4301159 (Ohio Sept. 22, 2021). The Johnson court upheld a long-standing rule that requires physician liability experts to spend 50% or more their professional time in the “active clinical practice” of medicine. This decision provides clarification and cautionary acknowledgement of Ohio Evid.R. 601(B)(5), which states that these experts must “devote at least one half of his or her professional time to the active clinical practice in his or her field of licensure, or to its instruction in an accredited field.”

Ohio’s courts have recognized that “active clinical practice” is work “related or adjunctive to patient care as to be necessarily included in that definition for the purpose of determining fault or liability in a medical claim.” Rule 601(B)(5) is understood to preclude testimony from “professional witnesses” and those lacking experience in the field they are opining on. In McCrory v. State, 423 N.E.2d 56 (Ohio 1981), the Ohio Supreme Court defined “active clinical practice” to mean the work of physicians “directly involved” in patient care.

An exception to the expert competency rule was most notably created by the Ohio Supreme Court in Celmer v. Rodgers, 871 N.E.2d 557 (Ohio 2007). The Celmer court looked at whether an expert could testify if he or she did not meet the “active clinical practice” standard at the time of a continued trial but was actively practicing according to the rule at the earlier time of the originally scheduled trial. The Celmer decision effectively allowed some experts to assert almost retrospective qualifications even it their “active clinical practice” was not up to standard at the time of trial. It is an important decision to consider in the age of ongoing trial continuances that we live in today. An otherwise qualified expert in 2018 or 2019 may not maintain the required percentage over the extended periods of time associated with some current litigation schedules.

The Johnson court’s September 2021 decision, however, dismisses any expert relief created in Celmer. The Johnson court refused to engage in what it considered to be a dilution of Evid.R. 601. The holding strengthened the general rule and emphasized that the active clinical practice requirement must be met at the time of trial. This means that a retained medical liability expert who has transitioned into an administrative role or who has reduced their clinical practice may not survive a motion to exclude his or her trial testimony.

The Johnson case specifically dealt with alleged negligence in an emergency medicine setting in 2011. The defendant’s liability expert worked in a hospital management position and served as a medical school professor. He testified at trial about his applicable accomplishments and experience that directly related to the allegations and clinical issues in the case. Arguments were raised that the expert did not meet the Evid.R. 601 competency standard because he was not actively engaged in the clinical practice of medicine. The trial court still allowed him to testify, and the jury ultimately returned a defense verdict. An appeal subsequently found that the expert’s professional time was essentially in an administrative capacity that should have prevented him from testifying.

On further appeal, the Johnson court examined what defines the “active clinical practice of medicine to satisfy the standard” set forth in Evid.R. 601. The defendant physician relied on the Celmer exception to argue that the expert was more than qualified at the time of the care at issue. The court, however, would not stray from the confines of the evidentiary rule. The court’s holding not only upheld the decision to exclude the expert, but very clearly stated that the requisite active clinical practice percentage must be satisfied at the time the expert testifies at trial. Transitioning into administration and limited teaching roles during the course of litigation could very likely preclude a physician liability expert from testifying at trial.

The requirements of the Johnson opinion should be the focus of any expert communication. Confirming qualifications should be an ongoing process. Counsel ought to focus on medical liability experts who intend to actively engage in clinical work for an extended period of time. Clients should also be mindful of the Ohio requirement when considering expert approval recommendations.

*Jason is a shareholder working in in our Cleveland, Ohio, office. He can be reached at 216.912.3808 or JPFerrante@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 1, April 2022 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.