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Defense Digest

District Court of Appeals Tell Plaintiffs They ‘Can’t Have Their Cake and Eat It Too’

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

By Jacksonville, Florida Casualty Department


Key Points:

  • In Mickler v. Triplett, 397 So.3d 188 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov. 15, 2024), the Court of Appeal thwarted a new strategy from the plaintiffs’ bar to remove the causation question from the hands of the jury. 
  • Ruling helps shield defendants from having to sacrifice their expert witnesses in order to preserve the causation question for a jury.

The question of causation is often the crux of personal injury litigation, particularly in cases involving pre-existing conditions. In Rebecca Diley v. Bonnie Lee Mickler, a 2023 trial in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Duval County, Florida, the defense confronted this challenge head-on. The plaintiff, Rebecca Triplett, alleged injuries from a 2019 rear-end motor vehicle accident, yet her medical history revealed strikingly similar injuries from prior accidents in 2009 and 2017. The defense argued that her injuries predated the 2019 accident and, furthermore, that she suffered no new harm. However, an unexpected trial ruling significantly altered the trajectory of the case—removing the issue of causation from jury consideration and leading to a substantial plaintiff’s verdict. This decision ultimately set the stage for an appellate battle, culminating in a Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal ruling that reaffirmed the jury’s role in determining causation and reshaped defense strategy in bodily injury cases statewide.

In 2020, Rebecca Triplett sued the defendant, claiming injuries arising from a rear-end motor vehicle accident occurring on September 6, 2019. Notably, the injuries being claimed as arising from this accident were similar to injuries Triplett suffered in two prior motor vehicle accidents—one in 2009 and the other in 2017. One of the defenses focused on these prior injuries. The defendant contended, at least in part, that Triplett’s alleged injuries pre-existed the September 6, 2019, motor vehicle accident. Additionally, going one step further, the defendant argued Triplett did not suffer any injuries as a result of the 2019 accident. 

Through years of litigation and discovery, the defendant refined the key issues for trial. Specifically, one of the primary issues that remained to be litigated was whether the defendant’s negligence, if any, was a legal cause of loss, injury, or damage to Triplett.

The trial lasted a full week, including substantial testimony from the plaintiff, retained experts, and treating physicians. On Thursday, April 20, 2023, Triplett’s counsel moved for directed verdict as to causation. The plaintiff argued, since the defendant’s own expert witnesses testified that Triplett suffered and was treated for a strain or sprain of her neck as a result of the motor vehicle accident, the defendant’s negligence was the legal cause of at least some damage to the plaintiff. 

On the final day of trial, although initially denied, the court ultimately granted the partial directed verdict. This decision had an immense prejudicial effect on the defense. 

Typically, and prior to the court granting Triplett’s motion in this case, the first question on the verdict form is some version of, “Was the negligence of the defendant, a legal cause of loss, injury or damage to plaintiff?” This initial question posed to a jury precedes any additional questions regarding the amount of monetary damages the plaintiff may be entitled to as a result of such negligence. 

By granting the plaintiff’s motion, the court removed the issue of causation from the jury instructions and that initial question from the verdict form. As a result, the jury was simply asked to essentially answer “how much” money Triplett was entitled to. The jury subsequently returned a large verdict, arguably, in part, due to the court’s decision to remove the issue of causation from the jury. 

The defense moved for a new trial as a result, which the court denied, and the issue was taken up to Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal. 

In Mickler v. Triplett, 397 So.3d 188 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov. 15, 2024), a big win for defense counsel, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict, and the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. This ruling, and the growing trend of other Florida district courts following suit, thwarted this new plaintiffs’ strategy to remove the causation question from the hands of the jury. 

In Lancheros v. Burke, 375 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), a case with similar facts, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on causation, stating: “[a] jury is not free to reject uncontradicted expert findings by multiple doctors. And because [Appellants’ expert] said, yes, the chiropractic care was reasonable and necessary and related to the accident, then that establishes legal cause.” Id., 375 So.3d at 928. The defense in Lancheros contested causation, refuted the plaintiff’s causation evidence, and offered their own evidence showing the plaintiff’s injuries could have occurred for reasons not related to the incident at issue in the case. In Lancheros, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the directed verdict, siding with the defense. 

Prior to the appellate decisions, not only did these trial court rulings jeopardize the defense’s legal strategy, but the retained experts were becoming increasingly concerned with potential credibility issues. In many motor vehicle accident cases, expert witnesses testify a plaintiff only suffered a sprain or strain, which would require approximately six to eight weeks of conservative treatment. This testimony, while denying the existence of a permanent injury, allowed defense experts to strike a middle ground in explaining a plaintiff’s initial pain complaints experienced after an accident. 

However, these trial court rulings forced the defendants to sacrifice their expert witnesses in order to preserve the causation question for a jury, even if it resulted in an uphill (if not near impossible) battle; to argue causation without expert witness testimony. 

Thankfully, these recent Florida Appellate Court decisions on this topic shield defendants who were being boxed into an impossible corner. Defendants will no longer have to decide whether to forgo a causation defense at trial when their experts testify that a plaintiff suffered a sprain or strain. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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