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Defense Digest

District Court of Appeals Tell Plaintiffs They ‘Can’t Have Their Cake and Eat It Too’

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

By Jacksonville, Florida Casualty Department


Key Points:

  • In Mickler v. Triplett, 397 So.3d 188 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov. 15, 2024), the Court of Appeal thwarted a new strategy from the plaintiffs’ bar to remove the causation question from the hands of the jury. 
  • Ruling helps shield defendants from having to sacrifice their expert witnesses in order to preserve the causation question for a jury.

The question of causation is often the crux of personal injury litigation, particularly in cases involving pre-existing conditions. In Rebecca Diley v. Bonnie Lee Mickler, a 2023 trial in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Duval County, Florida, the defense confronted this challenge head-on. The plaintiff, Rebecca Triplett, alleged injuries from a 2019 rear-end motor vehicle accident, yet her medical history revealed strikingly similar injuries from prior accidents in 2009 and 2017. The defense argued that her injuries predated the 2019 accident and, furthermore, that she suffered no new harm. However, an unexpected trial ruling significantly altered the trajectory of the case—removing the issue of causation from jury consideration and leading to a substantial plaintiff’s verdict. This decision ultimately set the stage for an appellate battle, culminating in a Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal ruling that reaffirmed the jury’s role in determining causation and reshaped defense strategy in bodily injury cases statewide.

In 2020, Rebecca Triplett sued the defendant, claiming injuries arising from a rear-end motor vehicle accident occurring on September 6, 2019. Notably, the injuries being claimed as arising from this accident were similar to injuries Triplett suffered in two prior motor vehicle accidents—one in 2009 and the other in 2017. One of the defenses focused on these prior injuries. The defendant contended, at least in part, that Triplett’s alleged injuries pre-existed the September 6, 2019, motor vehicle accident. Additionally, going one step further, the defendant argued Triplett did not suffer any injuries as a result of the 2019 accident. 

Through years of litigation and discovery, the defendant refined the key issues for trial. Specifically, one of the primary issues that remained to be litigated was whether the defendant’s negligence, if any, was a legal cause of loss, injury, or damage to Triplett.

The trial lasted a full week, including substantial testimony from the plaintiff, retained experts, and treating physicians. On Thursday, April 20, 2023, Triplett’s counsel moved for directed verdict as to causation. The plaintiff argued, since the defendant’s own expert witnesses testified that Triplett suffered and was treated for a strain or sprain of her neck as a result of the motor vehicle accident, the defendant’s negligence was the legal cause of at least some damage to the plaintiff. 

On the final day of trial, although initially denied, the court ultimately granted the partial directed verdict. This decision had an immense prejudicial effect on the defense. 

Typically, and prior to the court granting Triplett’s motion in this case, the first question on the verdict form is some version of, “Was the negligence of the defendant, a legal cause of loss, injury or damage to plaintiff?” This initial question posed to a jury precedes any additional questions regarding the amount of monetary damages the plaintiff may be entitled to as a result of such negligence. 

By granting the plaintiff’s motion, the court removed the issue of causation from the jury instructions and that initial question from the verdict form. As a result, the jury was simply asked to essentially answer “how much” money Triplett was entitled to. The jury subsequently returned a large verdict, arguably, in part, due to the court’s decision to remove the issue of causation from the jury. 

The defense moved for a new trial as a result, which the court denied, and the issue was taken up to Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal. 

In Mickler v. Triplett, 397 So.3d 188 (Fla. 5th DCA Nov. 15, 2024), a big win for defense counsel, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict, and the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. This ruling, and the growing trend of other Florida district courts following suit, thwarted this new plaintiffs’ strategy to remove the causation question from the hands of the jury. 

In Lancheros v. Burke, 375 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023), a case with similar facts, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on causation, stating: “[a] jury is not free to reject uncontradicted expert findings by multiple doctors. And because [Appellants’ expert] said, yes, the chiropractic care was reasonable and necessary and related to the accident, then that establishes legal cause.” Id., 375 So.3d at 928. The defense in Lancheros contested causation, refuted the plaintiff’s causation evidence, and offered their own evidence showing the plaintiff’s injuries could have occurred for reasons not related to the incident at issue in the case. In Lancheros, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the directed verdict, siding with the defense. 

Prior to the appellate decisions, not only did these trial court rulings jeopardize the defense’s legal strategy, but the retained experts were becoming increasingly concerned with potential credibility issues. In many motor vehicle accident cases, expert witnesses testify a plaintiff only suffered a sprain or strain, which would require approximately six to eight weeks of conservative treatment. This testimony, while denying the existence of a permanent injury, allowed defense experts to strike a middle ground in explaining a plaintiff’s initial pain complaints experienced after an accident. 

However, these trial court rulings forced the defendants to sacrifice their expert witnesses in order to preserve the causation question for a jury, even if it resulted in an uphill (if not near impossible) battle; to argue causation without expert witness testimony. 

Thankfully, these recent Florida Appellate Court decisions on this topic shield defendants who were being boxed into an impossible corner. Defendants will no longer have to decide whether to forgo a causation defense at trial when their experts testify that a plaintiff suffered a sprain or strain. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirmed Workers’ Compensation Order Striking Defenses and Ordering Treatment

Kneezel v. Lambertville House, No. A-2729-24 (June 1, 2026) In Kneezel v. Lambertville House, Lambertville House appealed from a workers’ compensation order to strike its defenses and directing it to authorize knee replacement surgery. By way of background, the petitioner worked as a property manager for Lambertville and injured his back and knee in December 2019. A workers’ compensation claim was filed and the petitioner treated at Rothman Institute. He underwent four injections to his low back and was recommended for surgery. The day before, Lambertville canceled and set up a second opinion exam with Dr. Lawrence Barr. The petitioner filed a motion for medical and temporary benefits (MMT), which was ultimately granted by the workers’ compensation judge. As such, he received authorized treatment for his back. The petitioner was then referred for his left knee pain and treatment was provided by Lambertville. He was recommended for a knee replacement, but the petitioner declined at that time. Approximately two years later, he sought additional treatment, which was denied. After obtaining a report from Dr. Dhimant Balar, the petitioner filed another MMT. In response, Lambertville submitted Dr. Zachwieja’s report and surveillance reports. Dr. Balar opined the left knee injury was related to the work accident, whereas Dr. Zachwieja believed it was due to his advanced degeneration as there was no evidence of acute trauma. A hearing on the MMT began in November 2024, with the petitioner testifying his knee pain never went away and he had a lot of trouble walking, especially for more than five to ten minutes. The surveillance investigators were scheduled to testify after, but had to be rescheduled a couple of times. During a conference in early February 2025, prior to when the investigators were to testify, it was discovered that Lambertville did not provide discovery to the petitioner, including the investigators’ information and surveillance footage. The petitioner moved to strike Lambertville’s defenses and sought an order to authorize the left knee treatment. Petitioner’s counsel pointed to Lambertville’s unreasonable delay in providing the necessary information and Lambertville did not file an opposition. In March 2025, the investigators’ testimonies were set for mid-March. On March 14, 2025, petitioner’s counsel advised she was still waiting for discovery and the judge directed Lambertville’s counsel to provide any missing information by March 17, 2025. Lambertville provided video clips after the petitioner had testified so the judge indicated that if everything was not provided to petitioner’s counsel by the end of March 19, 2025, the judge would sign the order granting the MMT. The next day, the judge entered the order striking Lambertville’s defenses and ordering left knee treatment. Lambertville moved for reconsideration of stay of the order pending appeal. Following oral arguments, the judge denied Lambertville’s motion, citing N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.11 (a)(4)(i) that Lambertville was required to provide surveillance after the petitioner’s testimony and that it had failed to do so even after he testified in November 2024. The judge also noted the investigators’ testimonies were rescheduled multiple times and Lambertville had more than enough time to provide the requested information and failed to do so. The judge also noted Lambertville failed to file a response to the petitioner’s motion to strike. In addition, the judge pointed to the petitioner’s testimony, finding him to be credible and observing him to have to stand and move multiple times during testimony. Lambertville appealed, arguing its due process rights were violated as there was no opportunity to be heard and the order was procedurally and factually defective. However, the Appellate Division disagreed, noting Lambertville had sufficient notice and many opportunities to be heard. It was noted Lambertville’s failure to comply with the judge’s requests led to the order. As for the motion to strike, the Appellate Division indicated Lambertville failed to oppose the motion, which provided the judge with the ability to decide without a hearing for an uncontested motion. Ultimately, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the judge’s rulings and order.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Mitigating Long-Tail Liability: Delaware Court Reaffirms Five-Year Workers’ Compensation Deadline

Williamson v. Donald F. Deaven, Inc., No. N25A-07-004 FWW, 2026 LX 252526 (Del. Super. Ct. June 2, 2026) Claimant was involved in a compensable industrial work accident on May 12, 1995, for a low back injury.  Following this, he received compensation for temporary total disability benefits from July 1996 to September 1996 and for sustaining a permanent impairment in 1997 and 1998.  For the next 23 years, the claimant continued treatment and paid his own medical bills without submitting them to the employer’s insurer.  In November 2021, the claimant filed a petition seeking payment for medical expenses, including prospective surgery and a resulting period of total disability.  The employer moved to dismiss the petition, arguing it was barred by Delaware’s five-year statute of limitations (19 Del. C. § 2361(b)). Pursuant to 18 Del. C. § 3914, insurers must provide prompt written notice of the applicable statute of limitations to invoke the five-year deadline.  Due to the age of the case, neither party had a comprehensive file of the claim and the Board had archived its file of the matter.  The carrier’s computer system retained only bare information indicating that payments occurred and agreements and receipts were filed with the Board in 1997. While the claimant argued that the employer could not prove it provided the mandatory statutory notice, the Hearing Officer recovered the archived file, which contained two “Receipts for Compensation Paid” signed by the claimant.  The receipts explicitly contained the required five-year limitation language, which the claimant testified to signing at the hearing.  The claimant also attempted to introduce evidence of payments he claimed the employer made, which would have extended the statute of limitations.  As a preliminary matter, the hearing officer excluded the testimony about the payments because the claimant did not produce them to the employer.  The Board found in favor of the employer and dismissed the claimant’s petition as time-barred. The claimant appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that he never received adequate notice of the statute of limitations and that the hearing officer’s evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the archived, signed receipts constituted substantial evidence that the insurer fulfilled its statutory notice requirements.  Therefore,  the claimant’s petition was time-barred under the statute of limitations provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2361(b).  Furthermore, the Court reinforced strict procedural compliance: it rejected the claimant’s attempts to introduce evidence of payment on appeal, ruling the argument was waived for failure to preserve it while the matter was still before the Board. This recent ruling by the Court underscores the importance and necessity of robust data preservation and precise compliance with notice requirements.  For risk managers, employers, and insurers, the decision highlights how tight administrative execution protects against catastrophic long-tail liability.

Thought Leadership

Employer/Carriers Must Explicitly Invoke Right to Deny Claim Under “Pay and Investigate” Statutory Provision; Employes Must Always Prove Medical Necessity of Treatment

Koren v. City of Kissimmee/PGCS, ___So.3d___(Fla 1st DCA 6/10/26) The majority opinion in Koren holds that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) properly denied psychiatric treatment because the claimant did not challenge on appeal the JCC’s finding that the requested treatment was not medically necessary. However, Judge K. Thomas authored a detailed concurrence agreeing with the result on the ground that the claimant failed to meet his burden of proving medical necessity. In doing so, Judge K. Thomas also emphasized an important principle: employer/carriers must expressly invoke the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision under Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Act if they intend to preserve their right to deny compensability. Merely authorizing evaluations, without explicitly invoking the 120-day rule, may be insufficient to preserve the right to deny compensability of specific injuries. In Koren, the claimant sustained injuries to his upper lip, tooth, right knee, and right foot when a board gave way on a deck he was repairing for the employer/carrier. The accident was accepted as compensable, and multiple specialists were authorized to treat his physical injuries, including an ear, nose, and throat physician, dentist, orthopedist, and plastic surgeon. The claimant later sought psychiatric treatment and attended an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychiatrist. The IME diagnosed adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, opining that the condition was caused by “the actual appearance of the scar” resulting from the industrial accident. The IME recommended continued medication, including an antidepressant, as well as follow-up care with a psychiatrist and psychologist. Critically, however, the IME did not offer an opinion regarding the medical necessity of this treatment. The claimant then filed a petition for benefits attaching the IME report and requesting authorization of psychiatric care. The employer/carrier responded by authorizing a psychiatrist, whom the claimant did, in fact, see. However, the employer/carrier neither denied the claim nor issued written notice invoking the 120-day pay-and-investigate provision. The authorized psychiatrist subsequently opined that the claimant’s psychiatric condition was unrelated to the industrial accident and instead attributable to prior employment as a law enforcement officer and volunteer firefighter. The psychiatrist further concluded that the work accident was not the major contributing cause of the condition. Although the employer/carrier stipulated to the authorization of the psychiatrist, it ultimately denied the claimant’s entitlement to psychiatric treatment. The JCC denied the requested benefit. The majority opinion affirmed on the narrow ground that medical necessity had not been established. Judge K. Thomas’s concurrence, however, expands on the legal framework. Under Florida law, an employer/carrier presented with a claim must “pay, pay and investigate, or deny.” To avail itself of the 120-day pay-and-investigate protection, the employer/carrier must affirmatively and explicitly invoke that option, typically through a written 120-day letter. The statutory investigative period does not arise automatically upon the provision of care. Furthermore, an attempt to characterize authorization as a “one-time evaluation” does not avoid waiver, as even a single evaluation may constitute the provision of a compensable benefit. By authorizing psychiatric care without invoking the 120-day provision, the employer/carrier in Koren effectively accepted compensability of the claimant’s PTSD condition. Nonetheless, it retained the ability to contest entitlement to ongoing treatment. While the employer/carrier failed to demonstrate a break in the causal chain, the claimant still bore the burden of proving that the requested treatment was medically necessary. Because the JCC found that the claimant failed to meet this burden, and the claimant did not challenge that finding either below or on appeal, the denial of psychiatric benefits was ultimately affirmed.